WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 
COMMANDER  C.  C.  GILL,  U.  S.  NAVY 


WHAT    HAPPENED 
AT    JUTLAND 

THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 


BY 

C.  C.  GILL 

COMMANDER,    U.    S.    NAVY 
AUTHOB  OF  "naval  POWEB  IN  THE  WAB,"   ETC. 


WITH  26  DIAGRAMS 


NEW  XMr  YORK 
GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


J 


COPYRIGHT.  1921, 
BY  GEORGE  H.  DORAN  COMPANY 


'^^l^^l 


PRINTED  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


FOREWORD 

This  work  of  Commander  Gill,  U.  S.  Navy, 
is  a  thoughtful,  painstaking  and  thorough  re- 
search into  all  the  evidence  bearing  upon  the 
now  historic  battle  of  Jutland  and  constitutes 
a  valuable  contribution  to  the  list  of  publica- 
Ttions  upon  the  Art  of  War  on  the  Sea. 

H.  B.  Wilson, 

Admiral  U.  S.  Navy, 

Commander-in-Chief, 

Atlantic  Fleet. 

U.S.S.  Pernisylvania, 
Flagship. 


439^  i 


[^'l 


PREFACE 

A  GREAT  deal  has  already  been  written  about  the 
battle  of  Jutland.  The  most  recent  contribution 
is  a  600-page  official  record  of  the  original  English 
reports  and  despatches.  The  British  have  pre- 
sented their  side  of  the  battle — the  Germans  have 
described  the  action  as  it  appeared  from  the  other 
point  of  view.  Admiral  Jellicoe,  the  British  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and  Admiral  S cheer,  the  German 
Commander-in-Chief,  have  both  written  books  and 
explained  their  respective  maneuvers  fully  and 
frankly.  For  these  two  books  students  of  naval 
affairs  should  be  deeply  grateful.  It  should  be 
recognized,  however,  that  they  are,  necessarily,  one- 
sided treatments.  The  subject,  moreover,  has  be- 
come highly  controversial,  and,  as  a  consequence, 
has  been  confused  by  somewhat  misleading  argu- 
mentative discussions. 

Important  questions  of  present  and  future  naval 
policy  depend,  in  large  measure,  upon  conclusions 
drawn  from  the  experiences  of  Jutland.  The  study 
of  this  engagement  is  an  urgent  matter  and  does 
not  admit  delay.  No  apology,  therefore,  is  made 
for  this  attempt  to  gather  together  in  one  narrative 
authentic  information  available  from  both  British 

[vii] 


PREFACE 

and  German  sources,  and  to  give,  as  accurately  as 
may  be,  an  unbiased  analysis  of  the  battle. 

Acknowledgment  is  made  to  officers  of  the  War 
College  and  officers  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Pennsylvania 
for  valued  criticism  and  comment  received  dur- 
ing preparation  of  the  manuscript.  Acknowledg- 
ment is  also  made  to  Lieutenant  G.  J.  Hazard, 
U.S.N.R.F.,  for  his  skill  and  courtesy  in  the  work 
of  making  the  diagrams. 

C.  C.  Gill. 


[viii] 


CONTENTS 


I  THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 


II  FLEET    MOVEMENTS    BEFORE    THE 
BATTLE     


III  THE  PHASES  OF  THE  BATTLE 

IV  THE   BATTLE:  First   Phase     . 
V  THE  BATTLE:  Second  Phase  . 

VI  THE   BATTLE:  Third  Phase     . 

VII  THE  BATTLE:  Fourth  Phase  . 

VIII   THE  BATTLE:  Fifth  Phase      . 

IX    CONCLUSION  ....       X 


APPENDICES : 

Losses  and  Damage 


Design  of  War  Vessels  as  Affected  by 
Jutland    »       .       *       


PAOB 

17 


32 

68 

60 

80 

117 

137 

150 

165 

171 
175 


[ix] 


LIST  OF  DIAGRAMS 

DIAGRAM 
NO.  PAOB 

1  Chart  of  North   Sea,   Showing   Strategic 

Dispositions 22 

2  Battle     Cruisers     and     Fast     Battleships 

(Showing   Tonnage,   Speed,   Armor,   and 
Armament) 33 

3  German  High  Sea  Fleet  in  Cruising  Forma- 

tion   (Showing  Tonnage,   Speed,  Armor, 

AND  Armament) 35 

4  British  Battle  Fleet  of  24  Dreadnaughts 

(Showing   Tonnage,    Speed,  Armor,   and 
Armament) 39 

5  Relative     Positions     of     All     Forces     at 

2 :00  P.M.,  31  May,  1916 43 

6  Cruising  Formation  of  Forces  Under  Imme- 

diate Command  of  Admiral  Jellicoe  and 
Rear  Admiral  Hood 47 

7  Cruising  Formation  of  Forces  Under  Imme- 

diate Command  of  Vice  Admiral  Beatty 

AND  Rear  Admiral  Evan-Thomas      .       .        51 

8  Cruising     Formation     of     Reconnaissance 

Force  Commanded  by  Vice  Admiral  Hip- 
per    .       .       .       .       » 55 

9  Track    of    the    Battle    Cruisers    During 

Their  Battle  Approach    (2:00  P.M.   to 

3:48  P.M.,  31  May) 61 

[xi] 


LIST  OF  DIAGRAMS 

DTAOBAM 
NO.  PAGB 

10  Teack    of    the    Heavy    Ships    During    the 

First  Phase  (2:00  P.M.  to  4:55  P.M.)       .        63 

11  At  3  :48  P.M.  the  Opposing  Battle  Cruisers 

Open  Fire 67 

12  At  4 :08  P.M.  Admiral  Beatty  Increases  the 

Range  and  Admiral  Evan-Thomas  Closes 
Enough  to  Open  Fire  at  Long  Range  .       71 

13  At  4:45  P.M.  Both  Sides  Deliver  Torpedo 

Attacks 75 

14  At  4 :55  P.M.  Admiral  Beatty  Takes  North- 

west Course,  and  Admiral  Scheee  Joins 

IN  Battlb 81 

15  Track    of    the    Heavy    Ships   During    the 

Second  Phase  (4:55  P.M.  to  6:40  P.M.)        87 

16  At  5 :45  P.M.  Admiral  Hood's  Light  Forces 

Engage  Admiral  Hipper's  Advance 
Scouts.  In  the  Meanwhile  Scheer  Slows 
Down  and  Reforms  His  Fleet      ...       91 

17  At  6 :16  P.M.  Admiral  Jellicoe  Deploys  the 

British  Battle  Fleet  to  Port  and  Slows 
Down,  While  Admiral  Beatty  Closes 
German  Van  at  Utmost  Speed  ...        95 

18  British   Battleships   in   Approach   Forma- 

tion with  Destroyers  in  Position  No.  1 

FOE  Deployment  on  Left  Flank  Division     101 

19  At  6:35  P.M.  Admiral  Jellicoe  Completes 

His  Deployment  and  Admiral  Scheee 
Executes  a  "Swing-Aeound"  Withdeawing 

Maneuvee       .       s       » l^T^ 

[xii] 


LIST  OF  DIAGRAMS 

DIAGRAM 
NO.  PAQH 

20  Track    of   the   Heavy    Ships   During   the 

Third  Phase    (6:40   P.M.   to   7:17   P.M.)      119 

21  At  7:17  P.M.  Admi&al,  Scheer,  After  At- 

tacking THE  British  Center,  Again  Exe- 
cutes His  Withdrawal  Maneuver      .       .     125 

22  Track    of    the    Heavy    Ships   During   the 

Fourth  Phase   (7:17  P.M.  to  9:00  P.M. 

— ^Dark) 139 

23  At    8:30   P.M.   Admiral     Beatty  Is  Again 

Engaged.     Admiral    Jellicoe    Turns    to 

the  Southwest 143 

24  Track    of    the    Heavy    Ships   During   the 

Fifth  Phase   (9:00  P.M.  31  May  to  3:00 
A.M.   1  June) 151 

25  British  Night  Cruising  Formation  Signaled 

Shortly  After  9:00  P.M.,  31  May      .       .      155 

26  Maneuvers  on  June  1st  After  the  Battle     159 


[xiii] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 


WHAT  HAPPENED 
AT  JUTLAND 


THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 

"Strategy"  prepares  battles ;  "tactics"  fights  them. 
Strategy  decides  the  force  to  be  sent  to  any  theater 
of  operations,  assigns  the  task  or  mission,  arranges 
logistics — ^the  supply  of  food,  fuel  and  munitions, 
— coordinates  effort  by  land  and  sea  on  all  fronts, 
and  in  general  deals  with  the  larger  considerations 
in  the  conduct  of  war.  The  decisions  of  strategy 
regarding  the  disposition  and  employment  of  fleets 
and  armies  are  carried  out  by  tactical  maneuvers. 
It  is  thus  seen  that  strategy  and  tactics  are  closely 
related.  Tactics,  in  fact,  is  an  instrument  of  strat- 
egy. There  is  no  clear  line  of  demarcation  between 
the  two,  and  confusion  rather  than  clarity  is  likely 
to  result  if  attempt  is  made  to  consider  the  one  as 
quite  distinct  from  the  other. 

Tactics  may  be  defined  broadly  as  embracing 
that  part  of  strategy  which  has  to  do  with  maneu- 
vers in  the  field.    For  instance,  strategy  decides  to 

[17] 


:..'i;WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

move  a  fleet  from  one  port  to  another,  and  the 
maneuvers  used  to  carry  out  the  decision  are  "tac- 
tical." Maneuvers  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  for 
approach,  for  battle,  for  chase,  or  for  retirement, 
comprise  battle  tactics. 

Although  the  highest  form  of  tactics  is  an  aggres- 
sive offensive  to  destroy  the  fighting  power  of  the 
enemy,  it  sometimes  happens  that  a  temporary  de- 
fensive attitude  by  certain  forces  is  essential  to  the 
success  of  the  general  plan.  A  premature  attack, 
even  if  a  local  tactical  victory  is  achieved,  may  be 
detrimental  rather  than  helpful  in  the  accomplish- 
ment of  the  principal  objective;  or  the  cost  of  a 
victory  may  be  greater  than  it  is  worth ;  or  the  situ- 
ation may  be  such  that  it  is  not  prudent  to  risk  a 
battle.  War  is  a  serious  business  in  which  quixotic 
motives,  however  worthy  they  may  be  from  a  senti- 
mental point  of  view,  have  no  place. 

Strategy  is  the  master  of  tactics  and  determines 
their  character,  which,  according  to  the  war  objec- 
tive and  the  circumstances  of  the  special  situation, 
may  be  aggressive  or  evasive,  offensive  or  defen- 
sive. Tactical  decisions  have  to  be  made  in  the 
light  of  strategic  considerations. 

With  this  brief  digression  to  explain  the  term 
"tactics"  and  the  relation  of  "tactics"  to  "strategy," 
we  shall  now  torn  to  a  study  of  the  battle  of  Jut- 
land. 

Throughout  the  war  the  main  Naval   Battle 
[18] 


THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 

Front  was  in  the  North  Sea.  Here  the  fleet  of 
Great  Britain,  officially  named  the  Grand  Fleet, 
faced  the  German  fleet,  named  the  High  Sea  Fleet. 
In  this  area  of  about  120,000  square  miles  these  two 
most  powerful  fleets  in  the  world  were  continually- 
engaged  in  a  great  strategic  contest.  The  stake 
was  absolute  control  of  the  seas  and  on  this  con- 
trol hinged  ultimately  the  issue  of  the  World  War. 
In  main  features  the  strategy  employed  by  both 
England  and  Germany  followed  normal  lines. 
England's  naval  policy  was  to  establish  control  of 
all  the  great  ocean  areas  by  destroying  enemy  ships 
abroad,  and  to  stop  Germany's  ocean  trade  and  con- 
tain her  home  fleets  by  a  so-called  "distant  block- 
ade." The  menace  of  off  shore  mine  and  torpedo 
operations  covered  by  an  inferior  but  powerful 
German  battle  fleet  made  a  close  blockade  of  Ger- 
man ports  impracticable.  The  Grand  Fleet,  under 
Commander-in-Chief  Admiral  Sir  John  Jellicoe, 
was  ready  to  fight  in  the  open  sea,  but  the  margin 
of  superiority  was  not  deemed  sufficient  to  warrant 
seeking  an  engagement  with  the  High  Sea  Fleet 
under  conditions  of  Germany's  own  choosing,  in  the 
vicinity  of  her  mine  fields  and  submarine  bases. 
Except  for  occasional  excursions  to  the  South, 
England's  battleships  were  held  on  watch  in  the 
less  dangerous  waters  to  the  northward,  in  the  vi- 
cinity of  Scapa  Flow,  Orkney  Islands.  An  out- 
post detachment  of  light  cruisers,  destroyers  and 
submarines  operated  from  Harwich,  the  nearest 

[19] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

suitable  port  on  the  English  coast  to  the  enemy  fleet 
base  behind  Heligoland,  while  the  Dover  patrol 
guarded  the  Straits.  These  outpost  vessels  were 
supported  by  Vice  Admiral  Beatty's  battle  cruiser 
fleet  based  at  Ros3i;h;  and  in  April,  1916,  an  addi- 
tional support  of  eight  predreadnaughts  and  four 
cruisers  was  stationed  in  the  Humber  to  safeguard 
\  the  coast  against  sudden  invasion.  Fast  German 
cruisers  could  make  sudden  raids  upon  the  coast 
or  even  the  channel,  but  they  always  ran  the  risk  of 
being  intercepted  by  a  superior  force  and  could 
hardly  expect  to  do  damage  of  military  signifi- 
cance.    (Diagram  I.) 

The  war  plan  of  Germany  assigned  her  navy  an 
offensive-defensive  role.  It  was  the  objective  of 
the  High  Sea  Fleet  to  keep  the  Allied  Naval  forces 
at  a  distance  from  German  shores ;  to  safeguard  the 
North  and  West  frontiers  joining  the  Army  flanks 
in  Russia  and  Belgium;  to  blockade  Russia's  Baltic 
ports ;  and  at  the  same  time  maintain  open  German 
sea  communications  with  the  northern  neutrals. 

Germany  did  not  wish  to  challenge  the  superior 
British  fleet  to  decisive  action  on  the  high  seas,  but 
preferred  to  operate  her  battleships  within  re- 
stricted areas  as  a  fleet  in  being,  that  is  to  say,  hold- 
ing the  High  Sea  Fleet  as  a  continual  menace, 
within  supporting  distance  of  shielding  mine  fields 
and  submarines  among  which  it  would  not  be 
prudent  for  the  British  fleet  to  advance  to  attack. 
In  addition  it  was  the  plan  of  Germany  to  institute 
[20] 


CHART    OF     NORTH     SEA,     SHOWING     STRATEGIC 
DISPOSITIONS 

1.  Beatty  at  3:48  p.m.         5.  Beatty  at  6:50  p.m. 
"  4:40    "  6.  Jellicoe  "  7:41    " 

3.  Scheer    "  4:55    " 

4.  Jellicoe  "  6:14    " 


THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 

raids  for  moral  effect  and  also  to  endeavor  to  bring 
about  such  a  division  of  the  British  Fleet  as  might 
permit  a  locally  superior  German  force  to  engage 
and  destroy  a  British  detachment.  By  tactics  of 
attrition  Germany  hoped  to  reduce  Britain's  supe- 
riority until  her  fleet  could  be  engaged  on  more 
equal  terms. 

Mines  and  submarines,  always  useful  for  the 
weaker  naval  power,  were  assiduously  used  by  the 
Germans.  When  it  was  seen  that  the  war  was  to 
be  a  long  one,  German  strategists  realized  that  the 
pressure  of  the  sea  blockade  would  fall  heavily  on 
German  economic  life.  A  counter  naval  offensive 
was  necessary  and  the  only  weapon  Germany  could 
use  was  her  submarines.  The  U-boat  campaign 
against  commerce  was  inaugurated  and  came  peril- 
ously near  to  success.  But  it  should  be  borne  in 
mind  that  it  was  the  protection  of  German  dread- 
naught  guns  that  released  these  U-boats  from 
coast  defense  duties  and  permitted  them  compara- 
tive freedom  of  operation. 

It  has  been  contended  that  Great  Britain,  by 
her  North  Sea  blockade,  enjoyed  all  the  advantages 
which  would  have  been  gained  by  the  destruction 
of  the  High  Sea  Fleet.  This  is  not  correct.  Ger- 
many's fleet  was  an  important  factor  throughout 
the  war.  It  was  the  power  of  this  fleet  that  made 
the  Baltic  practically  a  German  Lake,  maintained 
open  the  trade  routes  between  Germany  and  the 
North  European  neutrals,  closed  Russia's   chief 

[25] 


N 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

ports,  and  protected  the  German  frontiers  from 
the  Gulf  of  Riga  to  Holland.  It  would  be  diffi- 
cult to  overestimate  the  influence,  both  direct  and 
indirect,  which  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  ex- 
erted in  bringing  about  the  collapse  of  Russia. 
And,  finally  it  was  the  cover  of  the  High  Sea  Bat- 
tle Fleet  that  permitted  the  U-boats  freedom  to 
come  and  go  in  the  prosecution  of  their  campaign 
against  commerce.  In  estimating  the  tactical  sit- 
uation in  the  North  Sea  there  should  be  no  mis- 
understanding as  to  the  essential  task  performed 
by  the  German  battleship  fleet,  and  the  great  in- 
fluence a  decisive  British  victory  at  Jutland  would 
have  had  on  the  course  of  the  war. 

Turning  now  to  the  particular  strategy  which 
culminated  in  the  battle  of  Jutland,  it  will  be  re- 
called that  in  May,  1916,  the  general  military  situ- 
ation was  not  particularly  pleasing  for  Germany. 
Russia  was  a  powerful  enemy.  Her  Baltic  Fleet 
was  then  by  no  means  negligible  and  had  been  co- 
operating in  the  Gulf  of  Riga  with  the  right  flank 
of  the  Russian  Army.  On  the  Western  front  the 
German  offensive  at  Verdun  had  not  succeeded. 
While  the  German  General  Staff  did  not,  in  all 
probability,  feel  any  gi'cat  anxiety  as  to  the  condi- 
tions on  the  land  frontiers,  still,  the  promise  of 
victory  made  to  the  German  people  had  not  ma- 
terialized. Although  the  submarine  campaign 
against  commerce  was  in  operation,  it  was  re- 
[26] 


THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 

stricted,  and  as  yet  no  great  amount  of  tonnage  had 
been  sunk.  In  1916  Germany  was  not  ready  to 
risk  an  open  rupture  with  America,  and  the  vigor- 
ous protest  of  the  United  States  against  unlawful 
sinkings  had  resulted  in  a  diplomatic  humiliation 
damaging  to  German  prestige.  Under  these  cir- 
cumstances it  was  logical  strategy  for  Admiral 
Scheer,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  High  Sea 
Fleet,  to  seek  a  successful  naval  demonstration  in 
order  to  strengthen  national  morale. 

In  studying  the  dispositions  which  led  up  to  the 
battle  of  Jutland  and  the  tactical  decisions  made  by 
Scheer  and  Hipper  during  the  engagement,  it  is 
important  to  understand  the  German  point  of  view. 
The  German  people  at  this  time  were  demanding 
greater  activity  on  the  part  of  their  fleet  in  justi- 
fication of  the  vast  sums  spent  for  its  creation  and 
maintenance,  and  to  make  more  distinctly  manifest 
its  war-time  usefulness.  In  view  of  the  general  sit- 
uation, and  further  in  view  of  this  popular  demand 
for  greater  fleet  activity,  in  the  spring  of  1916, 
the  German  strategists  had  decided  to  launch  a 
more  aggressive  naval  campaign  the  object  of 
which  was  to  strike  at  England  by  sea  in  such  a  way 
as  to  deprive  her  of  inclination  to  continue  the  war. 

Commander-in-Chief  Scheer  reasoned  that  this 
could  be  achieved  by  a  successful  blow  at  English 
sea  power  centered  in  the  navy,  or  by  a  blow  at 
British  financial  life  centered  in  commercial  ship- 

[27] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

ping,  or — better  yet — by  a  combination  of  both 
these  courses.* 

Admiral  S cheer,  in  estimating  the  situation, 
argued  that  if  the  High  Sea  Fleet  was  withheld  on 
the  defensive  while  the  U-boats  instituted  a  vigor- 
ous campaign  against  merchant  ships,  then,  if  the 
submarines  were  successful,  Admiral  Jellicoe  might 
lead  out  the  Grand  Fleet  on  an  aggressive  offensive 
which  might  compel  Germany  to  fight  a  fleet  to 
fleet  action  at  Admiral  Jellicoe's  selected  time ;  that 
there  was  disadvantage  in  thus  giving  the  initiative 
to  the  British,  as  Admiral  Jellicoe  might  choose  a 
time  when  part  of  the  German  forces  "were  under 
repairs,  or  otherwise  unfit  for  service,  or  absent  in 
the  Baltic  for  exercises;  and,  therefore,  that  the 
wiser  plan  was  for  Germany  to  assume  the  initia- 
tive, and  conduct  definite,  systematic  operations  to 
induce  the  British  to  send  out  forces  and  afford  the 
High  Sea  Fleet  opportunity  to  attack  them  under 
conditions  favorable  to  Admiral  Scheer,  at  his — 
not  Admiral  Jellicoe's — selected  time.f 

The  minor  raids  already  conducted  against  Eng- 
land had  made  an  impression.  The  successful  bom- 
bardment of  Lowestoft  on  April  25th,  and  the 
escape  of  the  raiders,  had  caused  public  dissatis- 
faction, and  Mr.  Balfour,  the  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  had  announced'that  should  the  German 
ships  again  venture  to  show  themselves  off  the  Brit- 

*  Reference,  Admiral  Scheer's  book  "The  German  High  Seas  Fleet 
in  the  World  War." 
t  Reference,  Admiral  Scheer's  book. 

[28] 


THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 

ish  coast,  measures  had  been  taken  to  insure  their 
being  severely  punished.  (After  this  raid  the  3rd 
Battle  Squadron  of  predreadnaughts  and  the  3rd 
Cruiser  Squadron  were  withdrawn  from  Scapa  and 
stationed  in  the  Humber  to  guard  the  English 
coast. ) 

Reasoning  from  these  premises,  Admiral  S cheer 
planned  operations  to  bring  about  a  naval  battle 
on  terms  advantageous  to  Germany  during  the  pe- 
riod May  23rd  to  June  1st,  1916.  It  should  be 
added  that  Admiral  S  cheer  was  not  seeking  a  de- 
cisive fleet  battle  unless  he  could  succeed  in  drawing 
the  British  fleet  into  a  trap.  What  he  sought  was 
an  opportunity  to  engage  and  destroy  with  superior 
force  an  inferior  detachment  of  the  British  fleet 
before  the  main  body  could  arrive  in  support.  To 
do  this  Admiral  Scheer  was  ready  to  risk  a  "tip 
and  run"  encounter  with  the  British  Main  Fleet, 
and  for  this  contingency  he  had  a  carefully  re- 
hearsed maneuver  of  retirement  by  which  he  in- 
tended to  withdraw  the  High  Sea  Fleet  should  it 
become  involved  against  a  superior  British  concen- 
tration. 

In  brief,  the  German  enterprise  involved  a 
cruiser  bombardment  of  Sunderland  to  draw  out 
British  naval  forces,  and  an  endeavor  to  lead  these 
British  forces  toward  the  supporting  German  Bat- 
tle Fleet  so  that  Admiral  Scheer  might  attack  them 
under  favorable  conditions.  During  this  week, 
May  23rd  to  June  1st,  about  24  U-boats  were  sta- 

[29] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

tioned  off  the  British  ports  of  sortie  and  along  the 
probable  enemy  routes  of  advance,  to  observe  and 
attack.  Also,  a  large  number  of  Zeppelins  were 
assigned  to  assist  the  enterprise  by  reconnaissance 
from  the  air.     (Diagram  1.) 

The  fact  that  the  U-boats  could  not  remain  out 
longer  than  June  1st  imposed  this  limit  to  the 
operation.  The  attack  on  Sunderland  required 
clear  weather.  Of  this  Admiral  Scheer  states:  "An 
extensive  aerial  reconnaissance  was  an  imperative 
necessity  for  an  advance  on  Sunderland  in  the 
northwest,  as  it  would  lead  into  waters  where  we 
could  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  forced  into  giving 
battle." 

If  the  weather  continued  unfavorable  for  scout- 
ing from  the  air,  a  substitute  plan  was  provided  by 
which,  in  place  of  the  Sunderland  bombardment, 
an  advance  against  cruisers  and  shipping,  in  and 
near  the  Skaggerak,  was  to  be  employed  in  order 
to  draw  out  the  British  forces.  Operating  in  this 
direction  made  it  possible  to  do  without  the  air 
reconnaissance  as  the  Jutland  coast  offered  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  cover  against  surprise,  and  also  the 
distance  to  the  British  points  of  support  was  con- 
siderably greater. 

The  order  issued  by  Admiral  Scheer  on  May 
18th  was  as  follows: 

"The    bombardment    of    Sunderland    by    our 
cruisers  is  intended  to  compel  the  enemy  to  send 
[30] 


THE  TACTICS  OF  THE  BATTLE 

out  forces  against  us.  For  the  attack  on  the  ad- 
vancing enemy  the  High  Sea  Fleet  forces  to  be 
south  of  the  Dogger  Bank,  and  the  U-boats  to  be 
stationed  for  attack  off  the  east  coast  of  England. 
The  enemy's  ports  of  sortie  will  be  closed  by  mines.* 
The  Naval  Corps  will  support  the  undertaking  with 
their  U-boats.  If  time  and  circumstances  permit, 
trade-war  will  be  carried  on  during  proceed- 
ings. .  .  ." 

Each  day  proved  unfavorable  for  airship  obser- 
vation and  on  the  31st  Admiral  Scheer  decided  to 
use  the  modified  plan  by  which  the  advance  against 
shipping  in  the  Skaggerak  was  substituted  for  the 
bombardment  of  Sunderland.  That  reconnaissance 
from  the  air  could  not  be  depended  upon  during  the 
entire  period  from  May  23rd  to  June  1st  directs 
attention  to  one  of  the  limitations  of  aircraft  as 
scouts. 

*  One  of  these  mines  later  caused  the  loss  of  the  Cruiser  Ham/pshire 
with  Earl  Kitchener  and  Iiis  staff. 


[31] 


II 


FLEET  MOVEMENTS  BEFORE  THE 
BATTLE 

At  early  dawn  of  May  31st,  Vice  Admiral  Hip- 
per, commanding  the  German  advance  reconnais- 
sance force  of  5  battle  cruisers  attended  by  5 
light  cruisers  and  33  destroyers,  left  the  Jade  Basin 
and  stood  out  to  sea  followed  one  half  hour  later 
by  the  supporting  High  Sea  Battle  Fleet.  (Dia- 
grams 2,  3.)  The  "Third  Squadron,"  7  of  Ger- 
many's most  modern  dreadnaughts,  was  in  the  van 
with  the  Flagship  Koenig  leading;  then  came 
Squadron  One,  9  dreadnaughts  of  the  Heligoland 
and  Nassau  type,  led  by  the  Fleet  Flagship, 
Friedrich  der  Grosse,  flying  the  flag  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Admiral  Scheer;  and  bringing  up 
the  rear  was  the  "Second  Squadron,"  6  predread- 
naughts  of  the  Deutschland  class.  The  entire  fleet 
numbered  22  battleships,  5  battle  cruisers,  11  light 
cruisers  and  about  78  destroyers.  This  second 
most  powerful  fleet  in  the  world  was  a  compar- 
atively new  creation.  Germany  had  almost  no 
naval  traditions.  At  this  time,  however,  Admiral 
Scheer's  force  was  in  a  high  state  of  efficiency  with 
[32] 


BbATTV. 
0  TIGtR  28.500.  6-13.5'.  29K..9'A. 

A  hl?JtK,  .^Aox/       \        26.350 TONS.  28K. 

0  QUE.EN  MARY         1^         ,  . 

A  «r,.v.^e^e  r,^^*.    1 8-J5.5" GUNS.  ARMOR  9! 

0  PRINCEISS  ROYAL  J 

0   NEW  ZEALAND    1         t&.800T0NS.  26K. 

0   JNOHFAT; GABLE  J  6-»2'GUUS.  ARMOR 6! 

HOOD. 

0    INDOMITABLE     [^-12- GUNS.  ARMORS". 
0    INFLEXIBLE        ) 

BVAN  THOMAS 

0  BARHAM  \ 

0  VALIANT  I  2T.500  TONS,  25K. 

0  WARSPITE  f6-»5'GUNS,  ARMOR  13: 

0  MALAYA  ' 


HlPFbR 

•  OERFFLINGER  "i  26.I80T0NS 

I  LUTZOW  J   8-l2"GUNS.  28K,ARM0RI2' 

•  SEYDUTZ  24.610.   I0-I\"  26.7  5  K,  1 1. 75"  A. 

•  MOLTKE  22.640,  lO-ll"  2T25KjrA 

•  VONDERTANN      19.100. .  B-ir    E6Ko5.75X 

Diagram  No.  2 

battle  cruisers  and   fast   battleships   (showing 
tonnage,  speed,  armor  and  armament) 

[33] 


m. 

•  KONIG 

I  GROSSER  KURFORST 
I  MARKGRAF 
I  KRONPRINZ 

•  KAISER  ] 
I  PRINZ  RE-GENT  LUtTPOLO 
I  KAISEKIH  I 


25.390  TONS. 
I0-12"GUNS,    SPEED  Z3. 
ARMOR  14": 

24-.410  TONS. 
»0-l2"GUNS,  SPEEID  Z\. 
ARMOR  13.75' 


%  FRIEDRJCH  DER  CROSSE 
I  OSTFRlESLAtvJD 

•  THURINGEM 
I  HELGOLAND 
i  OLDENBURG 

•  POSEN 

I  RHEJNLAND 

I  NASSAU 

I  WESTFALEN 


24s4lO,  IO-^^'•,  ZJK.,\375'A. 

^^.400T0Ns. 

I2-|E"GUNS,  SPEEID  20.5. 
ARMOR  WIS" 

18.600  TONS. 

»2.-irGUNS.SPEXOZ0. 
ARMOR  VI.75: 


n. 

I  DEUTSCHLAND 
I  POMMERM 
I  SCHLESIEN 

•  SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN 
I  HANNOVER 

•  HESSEN    


13.200  TONS. 
4-U"GUNS.  SPEEID  18. 

ARMOR  aiS*. 


Diagram  No.  3 

german    high    sea   fleet   in   cruising   formation 

(showing    TONNAGE,    SPEED,    ARMOR    AND    ARMAMENT) 

Distance  between  ships  760  yards.  Distance  between 
squadrons  3,800  yards.  For  battle  formation  distances 
were  closed  to:  550  yards  between  ships  and  1,100  yards 
between  squadrons 

[35] 


FLEET  MOVEMENTS  BEFORE  BATTLE 

a  personnel  as  yet  untainted  by  the  sinister  influ- 
ences which  later  broke  down  its  morale  and  finally 
culminated  in  mutiny. 

Mine  sweepers  had  cleared  a  way  through  the 
British  fields  and  screening  destroyers  zig-zagged 
in  and  out  to  keep  down  any  submarines  that  might 
be  lying  in  wait.  When  west  of  Amrum  Bank, 
the  course  was  laid  north,  and  Admiral  Hipper 
with  his  advance  force  proceeded  to  carry  out  his 
orders,  which  were  to  pass  out  of  sight  of  Horn 
Reefs  and  the  Danish  coast,  show  himself  off  the 
Skaggerak  before  dark,  cruise  in  the  Skaggerak 
during  the  night,  and  at  noon  of  the  next  day  join 
up  with  the  Main  Fleet.  Groups  of  English  cruis- 
ers had  been  reported  off  the  Norwegian  coast.  It 
was  expected  that  the  presence  of  Hipper  off  the 
Skaggerak  would  be  reported,  that  British  forces 
would  start  from  England  soon  after  the  receipt 
of  this  information,  and  that,  in  all  probability,  a 
battle  would  result  on  the  following  day,  June  1st. 

On  this  day  the  British  Grand  Fleet  was  also  at 
sea.  It  was  part  of  British  naval  strategy  to 
make  periodic  sweeps  through  the  waters  of  the 
North  Sea,  and  one  of  these  sweeps  was  now  in 
progress.* 

It  appears  that  on  the  30th  the  German  Flag- 

*  Admiral  Jellicoe  has  stated : — "In  accordance  with  instructions 
contained  in  their  Lordship's  telegram,  No,  434,  of  30  May,  the 
Grand  Fleet  proceeded  to  sea  for  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  one 
of  its  periodical  sweeps  in  the  North  Sea." 

[37] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

ship  had  been  sending  an  unusually  large  number 
of  messages.  Although  these  code  messages  could 
not  be  deciphered,  the  sending  ship  was  identified, 
and  by  directional  radio  instruments  the  British  had 
determined  a  movement  of  the  German  Flagship 
of  about  7  miles,  indicating  that  she  had  shifted 
from  the  inner  harbor  of  Wilhelmshaven  to  an  outer 
anchorage  in  the  Jade  Basin.  The  British  knew 
that  the  German  fleet  was  ready  for  sea,  and  naval 
activity  of  some  sort  was  inferred. 

Because  of  this  inference  and  the  consequent 
timely  sailing  of  the  British  Grand  Fleet,  however, 
it  does  not  follow  that  Admiral  Jellicoe  had  fore- 
knowledge that  a  fleet  to  fleet  action  was  pending. 
It  is  also  to  be  remembered  that  a  considerable  force 
of  British  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  were  held 
in  port  at  Harwich.  It  is  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  had  the  British  Admiralty  been  informed  of 
the  German  plan  this  Harwich  force  would  have 
been  sent  out  to  take  part  in  the  battle. 

On  the  evening  of  May  30th,  the  British  battle 
fleet  of  24  dreadnaughts,  attended  by  3  battle  cruis- 
ers, 12  light  cruisers,  8  armored  cruisers,  and  46 
destroyers  had  sailed  from  the  northern  bases, 
and  a  few  hours  later  Admiral  Beatty's  advance 
force  of  4  fast  dreadnaughts,  6  battle  cruisers,  15 
light  cruisers,  and  31  destroyers  had  set  out  from 
Rosyth.  (Diagrams  2  and  4.)  The  entire  British 
fleet  formed  a  veritable  armada  totaling  28  dread- 
naughts, 9  battle  cruisers,  27  light  cruisers,  8  ar- 
[38] 


VI. 

I    AGIN  COURT 

27.5001.  22.K 

WIZ'Gi  9"A. 

I      HERCUIXS 
M.OOOT.         ZIK. 
tO-IZ'G  irA. 

I      RElVENGt 

25.750T.        ZSSK. 

8-15'G.  I3"A. 

I  MARLBOROUGH 

ISvOOOT        21 K. 


V. 

ST  VINCENT 

IWSOT  ZIK. 

10  11"  a        xo'K. 

NtPTUNE 
W.OOOT,  21 K 
lO-li'G.  loA. 

COLLI  NGWOOD 
I9Z50T.  21 IC 
lO-liH  lOX 

COLUSSUS 
20JX)0T       aiK. 

lo-a-ft      ii'A. 


17. 

a    VANGUARD 

l9i250T.      21 K. 

ICHfG  tOA. 
§  TEMEIRAIRE 

18.600T.     21 K. 

10-12-G.  tO'A. 
0  BEULROPHQN 

I816OOT.      2HC. 

I0-I2"(i  KTA. 
§      BENBOW 

25iOOOT.     21 K. 

lO-OS'ft.    12'A. 


CANADA 
M.OOOT    22:T5H. 
IfrlA'G.  9'A. 

SUPERB 
(R600T.       21 K. 
lOlZ'G.  lOA 

RCrCALOAH 

2^750T.     2L5K. 

filSa  IVA. 

VRON  DUK£ 

eSOOOT.      fJK. 

io-i^&     ax 


n. 

i  THUNDERER 

225001  aiL 

(0-15^?  <i         \VK 
fl    CONaUEROR 

22500T         21 K. 

10-I3.5"G.        \Z'K 
3       MONARCH 

22500T         21K. 

lO-liS'G.        12'A. 
Q  ORION 

'  t2.S00T.        UK. 

io*a»'a    OTA. 


I. 

I        ERIM 

2S.0OOt         2JH. 

lo-isra.     irA. 

I  CENTURION 
2:iO0OT  21 H. 
lOll^'G       12A. 

I         AJ/>vX 
2iOOOT        21K. 
I0-135GL       I2A 

I  KING  GtORGE  \i 
2i000T  Z\K 
I0-I3£'a.      12-A. 


Diagram  No.  4 

british  battle  fleet  op  24  dreadnaughts  (show- 
ing tonnage,  speed,  armor  and  armament) 

[39] 


FLEET  MOVEMENTS  BEFORE  BATTLE 

mored  cruisers,  and  77  destroyers.  It  represented 
the  acme  of  naval  development.  Never  before  in 
history  had  such  a  powerful  array  of  fighting  ships 
been  grouped  under  one  command.  These  ships 
were  manned,  moreover,  by  a  personnel  steeped  in 
the  traditions  of  England's  long  mastery  of  the 
seas,  traditions  epitomized  in  the  names  of  Blake, 
Hawke,  and  Nelson. 

At  this  period  of  the  war,  no  continuous  British 
submarine  observation  was  maintained  off  the  Ger- 
man bases,  and  Admiral  Jellicoe  received  no  re- 
ports of  the  departure  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet.  The 
advantage  of  the  initiative  enabled  Germany  to 
send  out  observing  U-boats  which  were  stationed 
approximately  as  indicated  on  the  chart  (Diagram 
1) : — Some  off  Scapa  Flow;  one  off  Moray  Firth; 
a  large  number  off  the  Firth  of  Forth;  several  off 
the  Humber;  and  the  remainder  north  of  Ter- 
schelling  Bank  watching  the  approaches  to  the 
Straits  and  Harwich. 

At  5 :30  A.M.,  on  the  30th,  U-32,  about  70  miles 
east  of  the  Firth  of  Forth,  reported  two  British 
battleships,  two  cruisers,  and  several  destroyers 
making  a  southeast  course.  These  were  probably 
part  of  Sir  David  Beatty's  force  which  had  sailed 
from  Rosyth.  An  hour  later  this  same  submarine 
reported  that  she  had  intercepted  English  radio 
messages  to  the  effect  that  two  battleships  and 
groups  of  destroyers  had  sailed  from  Scapa. 
Shortly  after  this,  U-66  reported  from  about  60 

[41] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

miles  east  of  Kinnaird  Head,  a  squadron  of  eight 
British  battleships,  attended  by  light  cruisers  and 
destroyers,  on  a  northeast  course.  These  evi- 
dently belonged  to  Sir  Martin  Jerram's  Squadron 
which  was  en  route  from  Cromarty  to  rendezvous 
at  sea  with  the  rest  of  the  battle  fleet  which  had 
sailed  from  Scapa. 

From  the  above  reports  Admiral  S cheer  esti- 
mated that  the  diverging  courses  of  the  detach- 
ments sighted  did  not  indicate  a  large  operation 
such  as  an  advance  on  the  German  bight;  nor,  to 
his  mind,  did  they  appear  to  have  any  connection 
with  the  German  enterprise.  To  Admiral  Scheer 
this  information  from  his  submarine  scouts  pre- 
saged, not  a  British  fleet  concentration,  but  rather 
a  likelihood  that  his  hope  of  meeting  with  separate 
British  detachments  might  be  fulfilled.  He  was, 
therefore,  the  more  encouraged  to  carry  out  his 
plan. 

At  2:00  P.M.,  on  May  31st,  the  opposing  forces 
were  in  the  relative  positions  shown  in  Diagram  5. 

The  main  body  of  the  British  Grand  Fleet,  com- 
manded by  Admiral  Jellicoe,  was  about  70  miles  off 
the  Norway  coast  in  Lat.  57°  57'  N.,  Long.  3°  45' 
E.  From  Jellicoe  Beatty  bore  S.  23°  E.  and  was 
distant  77  miles,  while  Scheer  bore  about  S.  40°  E. 
and  was  distant  about  150  miles.  The  Grand  Fleet 
was  disposed  as  indicated  in  Diagram  6.  The  24 
dreadnaught  battleships  were  steaming  in  six  col- 
umns of  four  ships  each  with  a  close  anti-submarine 
screen  of  4  light  cruisers  and  about  34  destroy- 
[42] 


JELLICOE 


B/AN  THOMAS 

BEATTY 


German  Des1rt)\/crs 
examininq  netrtral  sitamer 


—  50  miles 


Diagram  No.  5 

RELATIVE  POSITIONS  OF  ALL  FORCES  AT  2:00  P.M. 

[43] 


"^r-^-. 


A 


FLEET  MOVEMENTS  BEFORE  BATTLE 

ers;  5  light  cruisers  covered  the  front  of  the  capi- 
tal ships  3  miles  in  advance  of  the  main  body,  6 
armored  cruisers  were  spread  6  miles  apart  on  a 
line  16  miles  ahead  of  the  Battle  Fleet  and  a  link- 
ing armored  cruiser  to  relay  signals  was  placed  6 
miles  toward  the  Conmiander-in-Chief's  Flagship, 
the  Iron  Duke.  Each  armored  cruiser  was  attended 
by  one  destroyer.  The  Third  Battle  Cruiser 
Squadron,  Hood's  three  Invincibles,  with  two  light 
cruisers  and  four  destroyers,  was  stationed  20  miles 
ahead  of  the  Battle  Fleet.  All  this  force  had  a 
fleet  speed  of  20  knots  and  was  now  zig-zagging, 
speed  of  advance  14  knots  in  the  direction  S.  50°  E. 
The  advance  force  under  Vice  Admiral  Beatty, 
consisting  of  six  battle  cruisers  and  four  25-knot 
battleships  with  attending  light  cruisers  and  de- 
stroyers, was  disposed  as  shown  in  Diagram  7.  The 
1st  Squadron  of  four  battle  cruisers  was  in  single 
line  ahead,  led  by  Admiral  Beatty's  Flagship,  the 
Lion,  and  screened  by  the  light  cruiser  Champion 
and  ten  destroyers  of  the  13th  Flotilla.  The  2d 
Squadron  of  two  battle  cruisers  was  3  miles  E.N.E. 
of  the  Lion  and  screened  by  six  destroyers.  The 
5th  Battleship  Squadron,  four  dreadnaughts  of  the 
Queen  Elizabeth  class,  was  5  miles  N.N.W.  of  the 
Lion  and  screened  by  one  light  cruiser  and  nine 
destroyers  of  the  1st  Flotilla.*  A  scouting  and 
screening  line  of  eleven  light  cruisers  was  eight 

•  The  name  ship   Queen  Elizabeth,  was  undergoing  repairs  after 
severe  service  in  tiie  Dardanelles  Campaign. 

[45] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

miles  S.S.E.  of  the  Laoiij  spread  in  a  direction 
E.N.E.  and  W.S.W.,  distance  between  ships  five 
miles.  The  Engadine,  a  sea-plane  carrier,  was  also 
with  these  light  cruisers.  The  link  ship  Yarmouth 
was  midway  between  the  line  of  light  cruisers  and 
the  Lion.  All  this  advance  force  had  a  fleet  speed 
of  twenty-five  knots  and  was  now  advancing  on  a 
course  north  by  east  toward  the  rendezvous  with 
the  Battle  Fleet,  at  a  speed  of  nineteen  and  one 
half  knots. 

By  the  plan  of  the  sweep  Jellicoe  was  to  be  at 
position  "A,"  Lat.  57°  45'  N.,  Long.  4°  15'  E.  at 
2:00  P.M.  (Diagram  1.)  The  Battle  Fleet  had 
been  delayed,  however,  to  wait  for  a  destroyer  to 
examine  some  trawlers  and  was  eighteen  miles  be- 
hind schedule.  Beatty's  2:00  P.M.  position,  ac- 
cording to  the  plan,  was  Lat.  56°  40'  N.,  Long.  5° 
00'  E.  (Point  "A"'  in  Diagram  1.)  He  actually 
was  about  twelve  miles  N.  64°  W.  from  this  point, 
Lat.  56°  46'  N.,  Long.  4°  40'  E.,  thus  bringing 
the  relative  positions  rf  Beatty  and  Jellicoe  within 
six  or  seven  miles  of  the  plan,  but  geographically 
some  twelve  or  fifteen  miles  to  the  westward.  Ad- 
miral Beatty  had  been  informed  that  Admiral  Jel- 
licoe would  sweep  to  the  south  from  point  **A." 

Considerable  criticism  has  been  made  of  this  dis- 
position of  the  British  forces,  to  the  effect  that 
Beatty  was  too  far  away  from  Jellicoe.  They  were 
then  operating  seventy-seven  miles  apart.  This  is 
a  matter  of  opinion,  and  depends  upon  the  plan  of 
[46] 


^,/}BLLIJ&)E: 


VjQ'^pshife 


^Minotaur 


/. 


/ 


/ 


^  Cochrane 


2nd.  cruiser 

SaUADROH 


Shannon 


1ST  CRUISER 
SQUADRON. 


HOOD 

^  "^Conierbur^ 
Chester 


Diagram  No.  6 

cruising  formation   of  forces  under  immediate 
command  of  admiral  jellicoe  and  rear  admiral 

HOOD 

[47] 


\ 


FLEET  MOVEMENTS  BEFORE  BATTLE 

coordination.  It  will  be  noted  later  on  that  a  dis- 
crepancy of  twelve  miles  developed  in  the  naviga- 
tional reckoning  of  Jellicoe  and  Beatty.  This 
caused  confusion  at  the  critical  juncture  when  Jelli- 
coe joined  Beatty  in  action  against  the  enemy. 
While  it  is  not  considered  tactically  unsound  to 
operate  a  fast  detachment  this  distance  in  advance 
of  the  supporting  battle  fleet,  it  is  of  utmost  im- 
portance that  proper  touch  be  maintained  by  link- 
ing up  ships  or  other  means,  and  suitable  precau- 
tions taken  to  assure  that  the  detachment  be  not 
trapped  and  cut  oiF  by  a  superior  enemy  force. 

The  main  body  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet,  com- 
manded by  Admiral  S  cheer,  was  now  fifty  miles 
west  of  Lyngvig  on  the  Jutland  coast.  The  twenty- 
two  battleships  were  steaming  in  column  with  the 
seven  most  modern  dreadnaughts  in  the  vari  squad- 
ron, the  eight  older  type  dreadnaughts  led  by  the 
Fleet  Flagship,  Friedrich  der  Grosse,  in  the  center, 
and  the  predreadnaught  squadron  of  six  ships 
bringing  up  the  rear.  The  distance  between  ships 
was  763  yards  and  the  interval  between  squadrons 
was  3,800  yards.  (Diagi-am  3.)  Six  light  cruisers 
with  destroyers  were  spread  ahead  as  a  protective 
scout  line,  and  the  balance  of  the  forty-four  destroy- 
ers attending  the  battleships  operated  as  a  close-up 
anti-submarine  screen.  All  this  force  had  a  maxi- 
mum fleet  speed  of  seventeen  knots  and  was  now 
on  course  north,  speed  fourteen  knots.  Compar- 
ing the  cruising  formations  of  the  two  fleets,  it  is 

[49] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

seen  from  Diagram  6  that  Jellicoe  was  in  line  of 
divisions  with  his  strength  fairly  well  distributed, 
favoring  his  left  and  center;  the  right  center  car- 
ried the  weaker  ships,  while  the  right  flank  division 
was  strengthened  by  the  Marlborough  and  the  Re- 
venge: on  the  other  hand.  Diagram  3  shows  that 
Scheer  was  in  extended  column,  his  most  powerful 
ships  in  the  van,  the  intermediate  strength  in  the 
center,  and  the  weak  predreadnaughts  in  the  rear. 
Diagi'ams  2,  3  and  4  show  the  order  of  ships,  their 
heavy  gun  strength,  their  main  armor  protection, 
and  their  speed. 

The  advance  German  force,  technically  named 
the  "Reconnaissance  Force,"  under  Vice  Admiral 
Hipper,  comprising  5  battle  cruisers,  5  light 
cruisers  and  33  destroyers,  was  about  50  miles 
ahead  of  Scheer  and  about  50  miles  east  of  Beatty. 
(See  Diagram  8.)  The  5  battle  cruisers  were  in 
column,  attended  by  a  close-up  anti-submarine  de- 
stroyer screen,  while  the  light  cruisers  and  other 
destroyers  were  spread  out  in  a  semicircle  about  ten 
miles  ahead  and  on  either  flank.  All  this  advance 
force  had  a  fleet  speed  of  about  26%  knots  and  was 
proceeding  on  a  northerly  course  at  a  speed  of 
about  24  knots.  Comparing  the  opposing  battle 
cruisers,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the  British  were 
superior  in  gun  power  and  the  Germans  in  armor 
protection.  German  naval  construction  had,  at  a 
sacrifice  in  gun  power,  devoted  a  larger  percentage 
of  ship  tonnage  to  armor  protection. 
[50] 


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Diagram  No.  7 

cruising  formation  of  forces  under  immediate 
command  of  vice  admiral  beatty  and  rear  ad- 
miral evan-thomas 


[51] 


FLEET  MOVEMENTS  BEFORE  BATTLE 

TABLE   COMPARING  STRENGTH    OF   OPPOSING   FORCES 

Type.  British.  German. 

(Beatty)  (Hipper) 

Dreadnaught  Battleships    4  0 

Battle  Cruisers    6  5 

Light  Cruisers    15*  5 

Destroyers     31  83 

*  Including   one    Sea-plane   Carrier. 

Type.  British.  German. 

(Jellicoe)  (Scheer) 

Dreadnaught  Battleships    24  16 

Predreadnaught  Battleships   ....  0  6 

Battle  Cruisers 3  0 

Armored   Cruisers    8  0 

Light  Cruisers 12  6 

Destroyers    46  45 

There  is  still  some  question  as  to  the  exact  num- 
ber of  destroyers  present.  Lieutenant  Commander 
Frost  in  the  Naval  Institute  Proceedings  gives 
the  following  comparative  table: — 

Dreadnaught  Battleships  28  647,550  16            363,360  1.78  to  1 

Battle  Cruisers  9  196,900        5             118,710  1.66  to  1 

Light  Cruisers  26  108,290  11               44,726  2.42  to  1 

Destroyers  78  77,200*  77  or  less  60,300*  1.28  to  1 
*  Approximate 

Comparing  the  totals  of  the  two  fleets  on  a  ton- 
nage basis,  the  British  had  an  aggregate  superiority 
of  about  7  to  4  or  1.75  to  1.  (The  armored  cruisers 
of  the  British  and  the  predreadnaughts  of  the 
Germans  are  not  included  in  this  comparison. )  In- 
cluding the  German  predreadnaughts  the  aggre- 
gate tonnage  of  German  capital  ships  was  561,110 
as  against  the  British  844,450. 

[53] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

The  British  had  a  total  of  344  heavy  guns:  48 
15-inch,  10  14-inch,  142  13.5-inch,  and  144  12-inch. 
The  Germans  had  a  total  of  244  heavy  guns:  144 
12-inch,  and  100  11-inch. 

A  15-inch  shell  weighs  1,950  lbs.,  a  14-inch  shell 
weighs  1,600  lbs.,  a  13.5-inch  1,400  lbs.,  a  12-inch 
850  lbs.,*  and  an  11 -inch  760  lbs.  A  single  dis- 
charge of  all  British  heavy  guns  in  the  battle  of 
Jutland  weighed  713,600  lbs.  as  compared  with 
217,264  lbs.  for  the  German  side.f 

In  armor  protection  the  German  ships  were  bet- 
ter provided  than  the  British.  Tonnage  is  the  fair- 
est basis  of  comparison,  as  it  represents  capital 
that  can  be  invested  at  discretion  for  offense  and  de- 
fense. 

In  the  battle  itself,  submarines  and  aircraft  took 
no  actual  part.  The  British  had  a  sea-plane  car- 
rier which  flew  some  planes  during  the  approach 
but  they  accomplished  nothing  of  note.  No  British 
submarines  were  in  the  battle.  The  Germans  had 
twenty-four  submarines  and  ten  airships  which  took 
part  in  the  operations,  but  none  of  these  were  pres- 
ent on  the  field  of  action  during  the  afternoon  and 

*  A  12-inch  British  weighs  850  lbs.  The  German  12-inch  is  heav- 
ier and  Comdr.  Bellairs  gives  its  weight  as  981  lbs. 

t  All  the  British  15-inch,  14-inch  and  13.5  inch,  except  the  Erin's 
13.5-ineh,  were  in  center  line  turrets  bearing  on  both  broadsides.  All 
the  12-inch  and  11-inch,  however,  were  not  capable  of  being  fired  on 
both  sides.  The  Germans  suffered  particularly  in  this  respect.  The 
four  Heligolands  lost  four  12-inch  guns  each,  and  the  four  Nasscms 
lost  four  11-inch  each.  Sir  Eustace  D'Eyncourt  gives  the  superiority 
of  the  Grand  Fleet  to  the  High  Sea  Fleet  at  Jutland  as  175  per  cent 
in  weight  of  broadsides,  or  nearly  3  to  1.  ("Naval  Construction 
During  the  War"  by  Sir  Eustace  D'Eyncourt.) 

[54] 


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Diagram  No.  8 

cruising  formation  of  reconnaissance  force  com 
manded  by  vice  admiral  hipper 

[55] 


FLEET  MOVEMENTS  BEFORE  BATTLE 

evening  of  May  31st.  Although  between  the  hours 
of  two  and  three  P.M.  five  Zeppelins  ascended  for 
long  distance  reconnaissance  in  the  sector  north  to 
west  of  Heligoland,  they  did  not  see  their  own 
fleet,  nor  the  British  fleet,  nor  did  they  hear  any- 
thing of  the  battle.* 

*  In  speaking  of  U-boat  enterprises  and  their  tactical  emplojinent, 
Admiral  Scheer  states: — 

"Cooperation  with  separate  units  or  with  the  entire  Fleet  could  not 
be  sufficiently  well  organized  to  prove  dependable  for  certain  opera- 
tions. Tactical  cooperation  would  have  been  understood  to  mean 
that  on  the  Fleet  putting  out  to  sea  with  the  possibility  of  en- 
countering the  enemy,  numbers  of  U-boats  would  be  present  from 
the  beginning  in  order  to  be  able  to  join  in  the  battle.  Even  as 
certain  rules  have  been  evolved  for  the  employment  of  cruisers  and 
torpedo  boats  in  daylight  battle  to  support  the  activity  of  the  battle- 
ship fleet,  so  might  an  opportunity  have  been  found  for  the  tactical 
employment  of  the  U-boats.  But  no  preliminary  work  had  been 
done  in  that  respect  and  it  would  have  been  a  very  risky  experi- 
ment to  take  U-boats  into  battle  without  a  thorough  trial.  The  two 
principal  drawbacks  are  their  inadequate  speed  and  the  possibility 
of  their  not  distinguishing  between  friend  and  foe. 

"Only  temporary  cooperation  was  possible  in  the  case  of  enter- 
prises by  the  Fleet  and  attacks  by  the  U-boats  when  each  unit  had 
a  special  duty,  to  be  mutually  supplemented  but  without  exacting 
any  tactical  union.  If,  for  instance,  there  was  the  intention  to 
bombard  a  certain  coastal  town,  it  might  be  assumed  that  English 
fighting  forces  would  at  once  rush  out  from  different  harbors  where 
they  were  lying  to  drive  off  or  capture  the  disturbers  of  their  peace. 
If  U-boats  had  been  stationed  off  such  towns,  where  it  was  pre- 
sumed there  were  enemy  ships,  they  would  probably  have  a  chance  of 
attacking. 

"Consideration  was  given  as  to  what  would  be  the  most  desirable 
way  to  station  U-boats  off  enemy  harbors;  how  they  could  be  used 
in  the  form  of  movable  mine-barriers,  as  flank  protection,  or  other- 
wise render  assistance.  ,  .  ." 


[57] 


Ill 

THE  PHASES  OF  THE  BATTLE 

The  battle  of  Jutland  is  conveniently  divided  into 
the  following  five  phases  (each  of  these  will  be 
considered  separately  and  in  turn) : 

First  Phase:  (2:00  P.M.  to  4:55  P.M.) 

Biitish  Advance  Force  under  Beatty  encounters 
German  Advance  Force  under  Hipper.  Hipper 
leads  the  action  to  the  southeast  and  effects  junc- 
ture with  the  High  Sea  Battle  Fleet  under  Scheer, 
(Diagrams  9  and  10.) 

Second  Phase:  (4:55  P.M.  to  6:40  P.M.) 

British  Advance  Force  engaged  with  van  of  Ger- 
man High  Sea  Fleet;  Beatty  leads  action  to  north 
and  effects  juncture  with  Jellicoe  and  Hood.  Jelli- 
coe  deploys  the  battle  fleet  and  Scheer  withdraws  to 
the  southwest.     (Diagram  15,) 

Third  Phase:  (6:40  P.M.  to  7:17  P.M.) 

Scheer  turns  hack  and  attacks  the  British  center 
with  guns  and  torpedoes.    After  a  brief  engage- 
[58] 


THE  PHASES  OF  THE  BATTLE 

ment  Scheer  again  withdraws  to  the  west  under 
cover  of  a  smoke  screen.     (Diagram  20.) 

Fourth  Phase:  (7:17  P.M.  to  9:00  P.M.    Dark.) 

In  the  gathering  twilight  Scheer,  avoiding  action, 
hauls  around  from  west  to  southeast,  and  seeks 
to  draw  closer  to  Horn  Reefs.  Jellicoe  tries  to  re- 
gain touch  on  westerly  courses,  then  turns  to  the 
southwest,  and  finally  to  south.     {Diagram  22.) 

Fifth  Phase:  (9:00  P.M.  to  3:00  A.M.) 

During  the  night  Jellicoe  withdraws  to  the  south 
while  Scheer  steers  for  Horn  Reefs.  British  light 
forces  are  intermittently  engaged  with  the  High 
Sea  Fleet.     {Diagram  24-) 

The  day  of  the  battle  was  partly  cloudy  to  over- 
cast, but  the  sun  broke  through  in  places  most  of 
the  time.  Except  for  a  moderate  swell  the  sea  was 
smooth.  There  was  very  little  wind.  Visibility  was 
reported  as  good  in  the  first  stages  of  the  action,  but 
later  in  the  afternoon  was  considerably  reduced  by 
mist  and  smoke  which  hung  low  in  the  heavy  atmos- 
phere. 

Note:  The  tracks  of  the  heavy  ships  throughout  the  battle  are 
shown  in  Diagrams  Nos.  9,  10,  15,  20,  22,  and  24  of  the  five  phases. 
Important  situations  during  these  phases  are  portrayed  in  more  de- 
tail by  position  diagrams  which  also  show  light  forces.  These  dia- 
grams have  been  constructed  by  combining  data  gleaned  from  the 
writings  of  Admiral  Jellicoe,  Admiral  Scheer,  Commander  von  Hase, 
Gunnery  Officer  of  the  Derringer,  and  other  authoritative  sources, 
both  British  and  German.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  plot  in  all 
the  light  forces.  The  positions  of  these  are  given  approximately  to 
indicate  how  the  destroyers  and  light  cruisers  entered  as  factors, 
influencing  the  major  tactics  of  the  battle. 

[59] 


IV 

THE  BATTLE:  FIRST  PHASE 
(2:00  P.  M.  to  4:55  P.  M.) 

British  Advance  Force  under  Beatty  encounters 
German  Advance  Force  under  Hipper.  Hipper 
leads  the  action  to  the  southeast  and  effects  junC' 
ture  with  the  High  Sea  Battle  Fleet  under  Sclwer. 
(Diagrams  9,  10.) 

In  the  early  afternoon  of  the  day  of  the  battle 
the  western  destroyers  of  Hipper's  advanced  scout- 
ing line  were  diverted  to  the  left  to  examine  a 
steamer.  This  proved  a  small  incident  carrying  in 
its  train  large  events.  While  so  engaged  these  Ger- 
man destroyers  made  smoke  contact  with  Beatty 's 
eastern  scout.  A  few  minutes  before  this  contact, 
the  British  Advance  Force  had  turned  to  the  north 
and  as  Beatty  and  Hipper  were  then  on  about 
parallel  courses  they  would  have  just  cleared  each 
other  had  it  not  been  for  the  timejy  appearance  of 
this  neutral  steamer.  Both  sides  proceeded  at  once 
to  develop  this  contact,  and  by  2:30  Beatty  and 
Hipper  knew  by  radio  of  the  presence  of  enemy 
light  forces.  Jellicoe  also  received  the  report  and 
directed  Hood  to  proceed  with  the  three  battle 
cruisers  under  his  command  to  head  off  the  enemy 
[60] 


WwmoMAa 


Diagram  No.  9 

track  of  the  battle  cruisers  during  their  battle 
APPROACH  (2:00  TO  3:48  p.m.,  31  may) 

[61] 


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Diagram  No.  10 

track  of  the  heavy  ships  during  the  first  phase 
(2:00  P.M.  to  4:55  p.m.) 

British  Advance  Force  under  Beatty  encounters  German 
Advance  Force  under  Hipper.  Hipper  leads  the  action 
to  the  southeast  and  effects  juncture  with  the  High  Sea 
Battle  Fleet  under  Scheer 

[63] 


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THE  BATTLE:   FIRST  PHASE 

should  he  attempt  to  escape  via  the  Skaggerak. 
Hipper  headed  to  the  west  and  northwest  to  inves- 
tigate. Beatty  turned  to  the  southeast  to  cut  off 
the  enemy  in  case  he  attempted  to  retire  toward 
the  Horn  Reefs  passage.  Shortly  after  2:30, 
Beatty  was  informed  of  the  presence  of  Hipper's 
heavy  ships.  As  the  opposing  battle  cruisers  ap- 
proached each  other  the  light  forces  became  en- 
gaged, and  the  battle  had  begun. 

In  this  approach  (Diagram  9)  Beatty  maneu- 
vered at  a  speed  of  nineteen  and  one-half  knots. 
When  assured  of  bringing  the  German  ships  to 
action,  he  changed  from  southeasterly  courses  and 
steered  to  the  northeast  toward  the  enemy.  One 
hour  later,  at  3:25,  Hipper's  battle  cruisers  were 
sighted  to  the  east,  distant  fifteen  miles.  By  this 
time  Beatty  had  concentrated  his  six  battle  cruisers, 
but,  although  the  British  had  been  maneuvering  at 
a  speed  of  only  19.5  knots,  the  four  fast  battleships 
under  Evan-Thomas  were  still  five  miles  away  to 
the  northwest.  Admiral  Beatty  evidently  esti- 
mated his  battle  cruisers  as  a  sufficiently  powerful 
force  to  destroy  Hipper's  ships  unassisted.  The 
British  Admiral  now  increased  speed  to  twenty-five 
knots,  took  a  line  of  bearing  formation  to  clear  the 
smoke,  and  attacked.  Hipper  turned  to  the  south- 
east. This  placed  the  two  columns  about  twelve 
miles  apart  on  converging  courses.  When  a  little 
over  eight  miles  from  each  other  both  sides  opened 
fire  simultaneously  at  3:48.    (Diagram  11.) 

[65] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

Admiral  Evan-Thomas  with  his  slower  squadron 
of  four  battleships  was  now  endeavoring  to  close 
up.  He  was  so  far  astern,  however,  that  he  was 
unable  to  take  an  effective  part  in  this  first  phase 
of  the  battle,  and  failure  to  concentrate  before  at- 
tacking proved  costly  to  the  British.  The  German 
fire  was  rapid  and  accurate.  The  Lion  was  hit  twice 
three  minutes  after  fire  was  opened  and  within  ten 
minutes  the  roof  of  one  of  her  turrets  was  blown 
off  and  two  guns  put  out  of  action.  By  this  time 
the  Tiger  and  Princess  Royal  had  also  been  hit  and 
in  a  few  minutes  the  Indefatigable  was  overwhelmed 
by  a  salvo.  She  fell  out  of  line,  sinking  by  the 
stern,  was  hit  by  another  salvo  forward,  turned  over 
and  sank  at  4:04.  The  range  was  now  opening. 
Beatty  had  altered  course  to  the  south  to  confuse 
the  enemy's  fire  control,  and  also  to  give  Evan- 
Thomas  opportunity  to  get  into  action  by  cutting 
a  corner.  (Diagram  12.)  At  4:08  the  Derfflinger 
ceased  firing.  Her  target  ship  was  out  of  range. 
(The  Derfflinger' s  limit  of  gun  elevation  was  for 
20,000  yds.)  There  was  now  a  brief  lull  in  the  en- 
gagement between  the  battle  cruiser  lines. 

At  this  time  Evan-Thomas's  battleships  were 
able  to  open  at  the  extreme  range  of  19,000  yards 
to  20,000  yards  on  the  Von  der  Tann,  Hipper's  rear 
ship.  At  4:16  the  second  ship  from  the  rear  was 
also  taken  under  fire  by  the  battleships,  but,  partly 
due  to  smoke,  and  partly  to  unfavorable  light  con- 
ditions to  the  eastward,  difficulty  was  experienced 
[66] 


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Diagram  No.  11 

at  3:48  the  opposing  battle  cruisers  open  fire 

[67] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIRST  PHASE 

in  seeing  the  targets,  not  more  than  two  ships  being 
visible  at  a  time.  That  the  fire  of  Evan-Thomas's 
battleships  was  of  slight  effect  is  shown  by  the  fact 
that  the  target  ships  of  these  battlesliips  suffered 
little  damage  during  this  run  to  the  south. 

Beatty  and  Hipper  soon  closed  again,  and,  as  the 
range  decreased,  the  battle  cruiser  big  gun  action 
was  renewed.  Hipper's  third  ship  was  seen  to  be  on 
fire.  The  gunnery  officer  of  the  Berffiinger  re- 
ported that  the  Lion  had  temporarily  left  the  line, 
and  that  this  had  caused  him  to  shift  his  fire  from 
the  Princess  Royal  to  the  Queen  Mary.  The  latter 
was  thus  under  the  concentrated  fire  of  the  Derf- 
flinger  and  the  Seydlitz.  At  4:26,  after  having 
been  hit  repeatedly,  the  Queen  Mary  sank  in  a  ter- 
rific explosion,  evidently  caused  by  the  blowing  up 
of  a  magazine.  The  Tiger,  following  close  astern, 
passed  through  a  dense  cloud  of  smoke  and  a  great 
deal  of  debris  fell  on  her  decks,  but  except  for  this 
the  Queen  Mary  had  completely  disappeared.  This 
happened  38  minutes  after  the  engagement  started 
and  20  minutes  after  the  loss  of  the  Indefatigable, 
Eighteen  of  the  Queen  Mary's  complement  of  1,300 
men'were  subsequently  picked  up  by  a  destroyer. 

At  4:15  about  twelve  British  destroyers  moved 
out  to  attack  Hipper's  line.  At  the  same  time 
about  eleven  German  destroyers  also  advanced  to 
attack  the  British  line.  These  light  forces  met  in 
close  range  action  between  the  lines.  A  German 
light   cruiser   and    several   supporting   destroyers 

[69] 


<^N 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

joined  in  this  engagement.  The  Germans  fired 
twelve  torpedoes  at  British  capital  ships  at  dis- 
tances ranging  from  10,000  to  8,000  yards.  Evan- 
Thomas  turned  his  battleships  away  to  avoid  them 
— ^two  torpedoes  were  seen  to  cross  his  track.  The 
British  destroyers  also  fired  torpedoes,  for  the  most 
part  at  a  range  of  about  7,000  yards,  and  Hipper 
turned  his  ships  away  to  escape  them.  (Diagram 
13.)  Most  of  these  torpedoes  were  fired  between 
4:30  and  4:45. 

It  was  reported  that  the  swell  handicapped  the 
speed  of  the  German  destroyers.  This  may  account 
for  the  fact  that  only  about  eleven  of  the  thirty- 
three  destroyers  with  Hipper  took  part  in  the  at- 
tack. On  the  British  side  about  twelve  out  of 
thirty-one  took  part.  Also,  the  destroyers  on  both 
sides  apparently  did  not  get  far  enough  ahead  to 
push  home  an  effective  close  range  torpedo  attack. 
Although  no  torpedoes  hit,  they  exerted  an  impor- 
tant influence  on  the  battle  tactics  at  a  critical  part 
of  the  gun-fire  action  by  causing  ships  of  both  sides 
to  turn  away  and  open  the  range  just  as  Scheer's 
battleship  fleet  was  effecting  juncture  with  Hip- 
per's  battle  cruisers. 

At  4:30  S  cheer  sighted  the  fighting  battle  cruiser 
lines  to  the  north  by  west.  At  4:38  one  of  the 
British  advance  light  cruisers,  the  Southampton, 
reported  the  High  Sea  Battle  Fleet  to  Beatty. 
Jellicoe  and  Hood,  now  advancing  at  their  best 
speed  to  reenforce  Beatty,  also  received  this  report. 
[70] 


\\^St.UC.S. 


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EVANTnOMAS 


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ao.ooo 


UndLCS 


Diagram  No.  12 

at  4:08  admiral  beatty  increases  the  range  and 
admiral  evan-thomas  closes  enough  to  open  fire 
at  long  range 

[71] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIRST  PHASE 

Beatty  stood  on  until  he  sighted  Scheer's  van  at 
4:42,  when  he  turned  the  battle  cruisers  sixteen 
points  in  succession  to  starboard.  At  this  time  Hip- 
per was  about  20,000  yards  away  and  Beatty  was 
not  under  an  effective  fire.  A  few  minutes  later 
Hipper  turned  his  ships  around  and  took  station 
ahead  of  Scheer's  van.  The  German  battle  fleet 
was  now  on  course  N.N.W.,  in  hue  of  divisions 
north,  engaging  the  British  battle  cruisers  at  a 
range  of  19,800  yards.  Hipper  was  ahead  of 
Scheer  to  the  north,  also  firing  at  Beatty's  and 
Evan-Thomas's  ships  at  a  range  of  15,400  to  16,400 
yards.  At  4 :49  five  German  destroyers  tried,  with- 
out success,  to  attack  with  torpedoes.  A  little  after 
5 :00,  two  British  destroyers  also  fired  torpedoes  at 
Hipper's  ships,  but  without  effect.  At  4 :53  Evan- 
Thomas's  ships,  after  engaging  Hipper  on  an  op- 
posite course,  also  countermarched,  and  turned  up 
astern  of  Beatty.  This  placed  the  heavier  ships  in 
a  favorable  position  to  fight  a  rear  guard  action 
against  the  van  of  Scheer's  column.  (Diagram 
14.) 

Just  before  and  during  this  turn,  Evan-Thomas 
reported  that  the  hght  was  in  favor  of  the  enemy, 
and  that  the  British  battleships  could  only  lay  on 
and  fire  at  the  gun  flashes,  visibility  being  twelve 
miles  to  the  west  and  six  miles  to  the  east.  The 
smoke  made  by  the  destroyers  during  their  attack 
hung  between  the  lines  and  helped  decrease  the  visi- 
bility.   This,  in  addition  to  the  opened  range,  due 

[73] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

to  the  "turn  away"  maneuvers  to  evade  torpedoes, 
caused  the  gun-fire  of  both  sides  to  be  ineffective. 
Otherwise,  this  juncture  with  Scheer  might  have 
proved  a  critical  period  for  Beatty's  force.  Upon 
the  arrival  of  the  High  Sea  Battle  Fleet,  Beatty 
had  no  alternative;  he  had  to  withdraw  his  ships. 
At  the  time  he  countermarched,  had  the  Germans 
been  pressing  him  closely,  considerable  damage 
might  have  been  done  the  British  force,  as  the 
maneuver  is  an  awkward  one  to  perform  under 
heavy  gun-fire.  This  marks  the  end  of  the  first 
phase  of  the  battle. 

Before  turning  to  the  second  phase,  it  should  be 
pointed  out  that  Scheer  had  a  plan  to  envelop 
Beatty's  force  between  the  German  battleships  and 
Hipper's  battle  cruisers.  This  plan  was  abandoned 
during  the  approach. 

The  first  contact  with  light  forces  had  been  re- 
ported to  Scheer  at  2:30.  He  had  continued  the 
German  Battle  Fleet  on  a  north  course  until  he 
received  a  second  radio  report  from  Hipper  that 
British  battle  cruisers  had  been  sighted.  Scheer 
then  closed  his  line  into  battle  formation,  500  meters 
(545  yards)  between  ships  and  1,000  meters  (1,090 
yards)  between  squadrons,  cleared  his  ships  for  ac- 
tion, increased  speed  to  fifteen  knots,  and  changed 
course  first  to  the  northwest,  then  to  the  west. 
Scheer  has  explained  his  plan  and  estimate  as 
follows : 
[74] 


YHlPPtTl  turns  away  to 
^  -^-^-v  avoid  torpodoet,. 


/  ^EVAMmOMAS A-i7000va5 

^'(rurns  awQ^  to  avoid  torpedoes)     \ 


Komad  crippled 


Nestor  crjp'plad'* 


Nicator 


20000 

^ards 


Diagram  No.  13 

4:30  TO  4:45  both  sides  deliver  torpedo  attacks 

[75] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIRST  PHASE 

"The  message  received  at  3:45  P.M.  from  the 
Chief  of  Recomiaissance  that  he  was  engaged  with 
six  enemy  battle  cruisers  on  a  southeasterly 
course  showed  that  he  had  succeeded  in  meeting  the 
enemy,  and  as  he  fought  was  drawing  him  closer  to 
our  Main  Fleet.  The  duty  of  the  Main  Fleet  was 
now  to  hasten  as  quickly  as  possible  to  support  the 
battle  cruisers,  which  were  inferior  as  to  material, 
and  to  endeavor  to  hinder  the  premature  retreat  of 
the  enemy.  At  4:05,  therefore,  I  took  a  north- 
westerly course  at  a  speed  of  fifteen  knots,  and 
a  quarter  of  an  hour  later  altered  it  to  a  westerly 
course  in  order  to  place  the  enemy  between  two 
fires,  as  he,  on  his  southerly  course,  would  have 
to  push  through  between  our  line  and  that  of  the 
battle  cruisers." 

The  plan  to  envelop  Beatty  was  abandoned  when 
Scheer  received  word  that  the  six  British  battle 
cruisers  were  being  supported  by  battleships.  Of 
his  new  estimate  and  changed  decision  Scheer 
writes: 

"While  the  Main  Fleet  was  still  altering  course, 
a  message  came  from  Scouting  Division  Two  that 
an  English  unit  of  battleships,  five  ships,  not  four 
[Scheer  then  supposed  that  there  were  five  instead 
of  four  battleships  engaged],  had  joined  in  the 
fight.  The  situation  thus  was  becoming  critical  for 
Scouting  Division  One  (Hipper's  battle  cruisers), 

[77] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

confronted  as  they  were  by  six  battle  cruisers  and 
five  battleships.  Naturally,  therefore,  ever5i;hing 
had  to  be  done  to  get  into  touch  with  them  and  a 
change  was  made  back  to  a  northerly  course.  .  .  .'* 

When  Scheer  made  this  estimate  and  decided  to 
change  his  plan  of  approach,  he  had  not  heard  of 
the  destruction  of  the  Indefatigable  and  Queen 
Mary.  This  news  did  not  reach  him  until  night. 
He  evidently  drew  an  erroneous  picture  of  Hipper 
as  hard  pressed  by  the  superior  British  force, 
whereas,  in  fact,  as  has  been  seen,  he  was  doing  very 
well.  Under  the  altered  plan  the  juncture  was  ef- 
fected in  such  a  way  that  Beatty  succeeded  in  ex- 
tricating his  ships  without  further  loss. 

In  looking  back  at  the  positions  of  Hipper  and 
Beatty  at  2:30,  it  would  appear  a  fair  criticism  to 
observe  that  Hipper  was  then  in  grave  danger  of 
being  cut  up  by  the  greatly  superior  force  under 
Beatty  and  Evan-Thomas.  The  British,  however, 
did  not  concentrate  this  superior  force  against  Hip- 
per's  command  and,  as  a  consequence,  Evan- 
Thomas  took  no  very  effective  part  in  the  first  phase 
of  the  action,  and  Hipper  succeeded  in  getting  well 
out  of  a  diflicult  position. 

Again,  viewing  the  4 :30  situation  in  the  light  of 
Scheer's  plan,  the  question  may  be  raised  as  to 
whether  or  not  the  tables  had  then  been  turned. 
Had  Beatty  allowed  himself  to  be  drawn  into  a 
position  where  he  might  have  been  cut  off  and  de- 
[78] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIRST  PHASE 

stroyed  by  Scheer  and  Hipper?  Scheer's  inten- 
tion, as  above  stated,  was  to  lead  the  Battle  Fleet 
west  of  Beatty,  allowing  him  to  proceed  on  to  the 
south  in  pursuit  of  Hipper  until  the  British  could 
be  pinched  between  two  fires.  It  is  interesting  to 
speculate  as  to  what  might  have  happened  had 
Scheer  persisted  in  this  plan.  It  cannot  be  denied 
that  risks  were  taken,  in  the  first  place  by  Hipper, 
and  in  the  second  place  by  Beatty.  But  war  can- 
not be  waged  without  running  risks. 


[79] 


V 

THE  BATTLE:  SECOND  PHASE 

(4:55  to  6:40) 

British  Advance  Force  engaged  with  van  of  Ger- 
man High  Sea  Fleet;  Beatty  leads  action  to  north 
and  effects  juncture  with  Jellicoe  and  Hood.  Jelli- 
coe  deploys  the  battle  fleet  and  Scheer  withdraws 
to  the  southwest.    (Diagram  15.) 

Sighting  Scheer's  battleships  presented  to  Beatty 
an  enlarged  situation.  Up  to  now,  his  objective 
had  been  to  cut  off  and  destroy  Hipper's  detach- 
ment. The  unexpected  advent  of  Scheer,  however, 
made  the  destruction  of  the  German  battle  fleet 
the  primary  objective.  Henceforth,  Beatty 's  es- 
sential mission  was  to  maintain  contact  with  Scheer 
and  keep  Jellicoe  informed  of  the  enemy's  course, 
speed  and  formation,  so  that  the  Grand  Fleet  might 
be  brought  into  action  quickly  and  effectively. 

Admiral  Jellicoe,  at  2 :30,  upon  receiving  the  first 
report  that  enemy  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  had 
been  sighted,  had  directed  Hood  to  proceed  with 
his  three  battle  cruisers  to  head  off  the  enemy  should 
he  try  to  escape  through  the  Skaggerak.  The  bat- 
tle fleet  had  ceased  zig-zagging  and  had  increased 
[80] 


« 

i 


/ 

yind.ScoutintjDw. 


I 

\ejVA>J  THOMAS 


\ 


aiPFER. 


Diagram  No.  14 

at    4:55    p.m.    admiral   beatty    takes    northwest 
course,  and  admiral  scheer  joins  in  battle 

[81] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

speed.  A  little  over  an  hour  later  Jellicoe  heard 
of  the  presence  of  Hipper's  battle  cruisers.  At 
4:00  P.M.  Hood's  orders  had  been  changed  and  he 
had  been  directed  to  reenforce  Beatty.  By  4:00 
P.M.  the  Battle  Fleet  was  also  closing  the  advance 
force  at  a  speed  of  twenty  knots.  When  Jellicoe 
received  report  that  Beatty  was  in  contact  with  the 
enemy  battle  fleet  and  retiring,  the  Grand  Fleet 
was  about  60  miles  away  to  the  N.N.W.,  and  has- 
tening to  the  support  of  the  battle  cruisers  at  a 
speed  of  twenty  knots.  As  Beatty  was  making 
twenty-five  knots,  the  two  forces,  while  on  opposite 
courses,  were  coming  together  at  the  rate  of  forty- 
five  sea  miles  an  hour.     (Diagram  15.) 

As  Beatty  hauled  out  of  range  at  5:15,  Hipper 
shifted  his  fire  to  Evan-Thomas.  This  brought  the 
four  British  battleships  under  the  fire  of  five  battle 
cruisers  at  about  16,000  yards,  and  also  the  van  of 
the  German  battle  fleet  at  about  18,500  yards.  At 
5:20  Scheer  ordered  all  fighting  forces  "to  give 
chase."  The  ships  of  the  Koenig  class  were  able  to 
make  twenty-three  knots  for  a  short  period  and 
Evan-Thomas  reported  that  at  his  best  speed  he  had 
difficulty  in  drawing  ahead. 

The  two  leading  British  battleships  fired  at  Hip- 
per's ships  and  the  two  rear  battleships  fired  at 
Scheer's  van.  The  British  do  not  record  any  par- 
ticular damage  received  at  this  time.  During  this 
phase  the  weather  became  less  clear,  and  the  wind 
shifted  from  N.W.  to  S.W.    Powder  fumes  and 

[83] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

smoke  hung  over  the  sea  and  cut  off  the  view  to  the 
north  and  east.  Only  now  and  then  could  Scheer 
see  Hipper's  ships.  The  light,  however,  was  in 
favor  of  the  Germans,  being  clearer  to  the  west  than 
to  the  east.  At  5:30  Beatty  gradually  changed 
course  to  the  right,  and  at  5:42,  after  having  been 
out  of  action  for  half  an  hour,  again  opened  fire 
on  Hipper  at  about  14,000  yards,  and  during  the 
next  ten  minutes  the  Lion  alone  fired  some  fifteen 
salvoes.  Hipper  also  turned  to  the  eastward  on  an 
interior  concentric  curve. 

Turning  now  to  Hood,  we  find  that,  due  to  the 
previously-mentioned  12-mile  discrepancy  in  navi- 
gation, he  had  missed  juncture  with  Beatty  and, 
on  a  course  S.  by  E.,  had  passed  to  the  eastward 
\  of  the  fighting  area.  At  5:30  Hood's  western 
protective  scout  cruiser  heard  firing  to  the  south- 
west and,  in  heading  over  to  investigate,  became 
engaged  with  Hipper's  outpost  light  cruiser  and 
destroyers.  Hood  then  turned  around  to  N.W.  and 
at  5:55  opened  an  effective  fire  with  his  port  bat- 
tery against  the  German  light  cruisers.  During 
this  cruiser  fighting,  four  British  destroyers  at- 
tacked, and  about  the  same  time  ten  or  twelve 
German  destroyers  advanced  and  fired  torpedoes 
from  within  60  h.m.  (6,500  yards)  of  Hood's  line. 
Hipper  had  turned  his  battle  cruisers  to  starboard, 
away  from  the  torpedo  threat,  and  being  further 
influenced  by  the  poor  visibility  which  made  it  dif- 
ficult to  return  Beatty's  fire,  Hipper  continued  to 
[84]  ri  ^v  . 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

maneuver  to  close  the  distance  which  had  opened 
between  him  and  Scheer.  Hood's  battle  cruisers 
saw  the  German  torpedoes  and  evaded  them  by  in- 
dividual ship  maneuvers,  two  ships  turning  away 
and  one  toward  the  menace.  No  torpedoes  hit. 
The  German  light  cruiser  Wiesbaden  was  disabled. 
The  British  destroyer  Shark  was  disabled  and  later 
sunk.  The  Chester  was  damaged.  The  German 
light  cruiser  Pillau  was  also  damaged.  This  con- 
tact with  Hood  gave  the  German  command  the  im- 
pression that  Jellicoe  was  approaching  from  the 
N.E. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  Hipper's  veer  round 
to  starboard,  Admiral  Scheer  had  observed  that  his 
leading  battleships  were  turning  to  an  easterly 
course  in  conformity  to  Beatty's  change  of  direc- 
tion. The  High  Sea  Fleet,  during  the  chase  to  the 
north  had  opened  out,  and  the  faster  divisions  in  the 
van  had  drawn  ahead.  Scheer  now  decided  to  re- 
form his  line.  The  order  "Leader  in  Front"  was 
signaled  at  5'A5  P.  M.  (Diagram  16)  and  speed 
temporarily  reduced  to  15  knots  to  give  the  divi- 
sions a  chance  to  get  into  position.  Before 
Jellicoe  arrived,  therefore,  Hipper  had  turned  to 
close  the  High  Sea  Fleet,  and  had  taken  station 
just  ahead  of  the  battleships.  Consequently  Scheer 
had  his  fleet  closed  up  and  well  in  hand.  This  slow- 
ing down  and  maneuvering  added  to  the  difficulty 
Jellicoe  and  Beatty  experienced  in  fixing  the  exact 
position  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet. 

[85] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

The  ensuing  period  was  a  crowded  one.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  contacts  between  the  light  forces  of 
Hood  and  Hipper,  the  outpost  cruisers  of  Jellicoe 
had  also  become  engaged.  This  juncture  of  forces 
on  approximately  opposite  courses  at  high  speeds 
caused  events  to  follow  in  rapid  succession.  Both 
Jellicoe  and  S cheer  had  to  do  quick  thinking  and, 
in  the  midst  of  uncertainties,  make  important 
tactical  decisions  under  a  weight  of  responsibility 
as  great  as  has  ever  been  borne  by  any  naval  com- 
mander. In  order  to  get  a  balanced  conception  of 
the  tactics  used,  we  shall  try,  fii'st,  to  look  at  them 
from  the  British  Commander-in-Chief's  point  of 
view  in  the  Iron  Duke,  and  then  transfer  to  the 
German  flagship  to  get  the  other  aspect  of  the 
situation  as  it  appeared  to  Admiral  Scheer. 

The  British  Commander-in-Chief,  as  he  ap- 
proached the  scene  of  action,  was  perplexed  by 
meager  and  conflicting  information.  The  plots  on 
the  chart  from  the  reports  of  the  JLion  and  South- 
ampton had  led  Jellicoe  to  expect  contact  ahead. 
There  w^as,  however,  a  discrepancy  of  at  least  12 
miles  in  the  navigation.  This  had  already  caused 
Hood  to  miss  Beatty  and  pass  by  him  to  the  east- 
ward. Moreover,  another  message  from  the  South- 
ampton, as  received  on  board  the  I?'on  Duke,  said 
that  the  German  battle  fleet  was  to  the  northeast 
of  the  battle  cruisers.  This  was  an  unlikely  forma- 
tion. It  was  apparent  that  Hood  would  have 
sighted  Scheer's  battleships  had  it  been  the  case,  so 
[86] 


DiAGKAM  No.  15 

TRACK  OF  THE  HEAVY  SHIPS  DUR- 
ING THE  SECOND  PHASE  (4:55  P.M 

TO  6:40  P.M.) 

British  Advance  Force  engaged  with  van  of  German 
High  Sea  Fleet;  Beatty  leads  action  to  north  and  efifects 
juncture  with  Jellicoe  and  Hood.  Jellicoe  deploys  the 
battle  fleet  and  Scheer  withdraws  to  the  southwest 

[87] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

the  report  was  discredited  on  the  face  of  it  as  im- 
probable. Additional  information  was  received  by 
Jelhcoe  as  follows: 

At  5:40  the  Black  Prince,  the  starboard  wing 
armored  cruiser,  reported  that  battle  cruisers  were 
in  sight  bearing  south,  distant  five  miles.  At  5 :45 
the  Comus,  stationed  three  miles  ahead  of  the  Battle 
Fleet,  reported  heavy  gun-fire  on  a  south  bearing. 
Shortly  after  this,  flashes  of  gun-fire  were  visible 
bearing  S.S.W.  At  5:50  Admiral  Arbuthnot,  com- 
manding the  armored  cruisers  in  the  Defense, 
reported  ships  in  action  bearing  S.S.W.  and  steer- 
ing N.E.  At  5:55  the  Marlborough  reported  gun 
flashes  and  heavy  gim-fire  on  the  starboard  bow; 
at  5 :56  strange  vessels  bearing  S.S.W.;  and  at  6:00 
British  battle  cruisers  bearing  S.S.W.,  three  to  four 
miles  distant.  Shortly  after  6:00  the  Iron  Duke 
sighted  these  vessels  under  Admiral  Beatty  about 
five  miles  away  on  an  easterly  course.  (Diagram 
17.) 

The  British  tactics  and  the  estimates  that  led 
to  them  are  described  by  Admiral  Jellicoe  in  the 
below-quoted  passages: 

"At  this  stage,  shortly  after  6:00  P.M.,  there 
was  still  great  uncertainty  as  to  the  position  of 
the  enemy's  Battle  Fleet;  flashes  of  gunfire  were 
visible  from  ahead  round  to  the  starboard  beam, 
and  the  noise  was  heavy  and  continuous.  Our 
cruisers  ahead  seemed  to  be  hotly  engaged,  but 

[89] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

the  fact  that  they  were  not  closing  the  Battle  Fleet 
indicated  to  me  that  their  opponents  could  hardly 
be  battleships. 

"In  order  to  take  ground  to  starboard,  with  a 
view  to  clearing  up  the  situation  without  altering 
the  formation  of  the  Battle  Fleet,  a  signal  had 
been  made  to  the  Battle  Fleet  at  6:02  P.M.  to 
alter  course  leaders  together,  the  remainder  in 
succession,  to  south  (a  turn  of  three  points). 
Speed  at  the  same  time  was  reduced  to  18  knots 
to  allow  of  the  ships  closing  up  into  station. 

"The  conflicting  reports  added  greatly  to  the 
perplexity  of  the  situation,  and  I  determined  to 
hold  on  until  matters  became  clearer.  The  con- 
viction was,  however,  forming  in  my  mind  that  I 
should  strike  the  enemy's  Battle  Fleet  on  a  bearing 
a  little  on  the  starboard  bow,  and  in  order  to  be 
prepared  for  deployment  I  turned  the  Fleet  to 
a  southeast  course,  leaders  together  and  the  re- 
mainder in  succession,  and  the  destroyer  flotillas 
were  directed  by  signal  at  6:08  P.M.  to  take  up 
the  destroyer  position  No.  1  for  battle.  (Diagram 
18.)  There  was,  however,  a  very  short  interval 
between  this  signal  to  the  destroyers  and  the  signal 
for  deployment,  and  consequently  the  destroyers 
did  not  reach  their  positions  before  deployment. 
The  subsequent  alterations  of  course  to  the  south- 
ward and  westward  added  to  their  difficulties  and 
delayed  them  greatly  in  gaining  their  stations  at 
the  van  of  the  Fleet  after  deployment.  .  .  . 
[90] 


c. 


ftOOb 


A 


Diagram  No.  16 

at  5:45  p.m.  admiral  hood*s  light  forces  engage 

ADMIRAL    HIPPER's    ADVANCE    SCOUTS. IN    THE    MEAN- 
WHILE SCHEER  SLOWS   DOWN   AND   REFORMS   HIS  FLEET 


[91] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

"At  6:01  p.m.,  immediately  on  sighting  the 
Lion,  a  signal  had  been  made  to  Sir  David  Beatty 
inquiring  the  position  of  the  enemy's  Battle  Fleet. 
This  signal  was  repeated  at  6:10,  and  at  6:14  P.M. 
he  signalled:  'Have  sighted  the  enemy's  Battle 
Fleet  bearing  south-southwest.'  This  report  gave 
me  the  first  information  on  which  I  could  take 
effective  action  for  deplojrment.  .  .  .  The  enemy 
battle  fleet  position  given  placed  it  thirty  degrees 
before  the  starboard  beam  of  the  Iron  Duke,  or 
fifty-nine  degrees  before  the  starboard  beam  of  the 
3Iarlborough,  and  apparently  in  close  proximity. 
There  was  no  time  to  lose,  as  there  was  evident 
danger  of  the  starboard  wing  column  of  the  Battle 
Fleet  being  engaged  by  the  whole  German  Battle 
Fleet  before  deployment  could  be  effected.  So  at 
6:16  P.M.  a  signal  was  made  to  the  Battle  Fleet 
to  form  line  of  battle  on  the  port  wing  column,  on 
a  course  southeast  by  east,  it  being  assumed  that 
the  course  of  the  enemy  was  approximately  the 
same  as  that  of  our  battle  cruisers.  Speed  was  at 
the  same  time  reduced  to  14  knots  to  admit  of  our 
battle  cruisers  passing  ahead  of  the  Battle  Fleet, 
as  there  was  danger  of  the  fire  of  the  Battle  Fleet 
being  blanketed  by  them."     (Diagi^am  17.) 

Before  considering  the  German  point  of  view, 
in  order  more  clearly  to  understand  Admiral 
Scheer's  decisions,  it  might  be  well  to  explain  that 
the  High  Sea  Fleet  had  been  drilled  to  perform  a 

[93] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

certain  withdrawing  maneuver  generally  regarded 
in  British  naval  circles  as  dangerously  difficult  if 
not  quite  impracticable  to  execute  under  gun-fire. 
This  maneuver,  by  which  S  cheer  hoped  to  retire 
the  inferior  High  Sea  Fleet  whenever  the  superior 
British  gun-fire  became  too  hot,  was  a  simultaneous 
*'swing-around"  of  all  ships  under  cover  of  a  smoke 
screen  made  by  cruisers  and  destroyers.  Admiral 
Scheer  had  carefully  exercised  his  fleet  in  this 
maneuver  so  that  the  ships  could  perform  it, 
whether  they  were  all  on  the  same  course  in  a 
straight  battle  line,  or  steering  various  courses  dis- 
posed on  a  curved  battle  line.*  In  short  the  Ger- 
mans had  a  definite  offensive-defensive  plan  of 
battle  and  the  High  Sea  Fleet  had  been  assiduously 
rehearsed  in  a  novel  method  of  attack  and  with- 
drawal. 

At  this  stage  of  the  battle,  shortly  before  6:00, 
Admiral  Scheer  explains  his  estimate  and  decisions 
as  follows: 

"While  this  encounter  with  the  advance  guard 
of  the  English  Main  Fleet  was  taking  place,  we, 
on  our  flagship,  were  occupied  debating  how  much 
longer  to  continue  the  pursuit  in  view  of  the  ad- 
vanced time.  There  was  no  longer  any  question 
of  a  cruiser  campaign  against  merchantmen  in  the 
Skaggerak,  as  the  meeting  with  the  English  fight- 

•  Scheer  himself  says:  "At  our  peace  maneuvers  great  importance 
was  always  attached  to  their  being  carried  out  on  a  curved  line  and 
every  means  employed  to  insure  the  working  of  the  signals." 

[94] 


yjtiucot 


iBlQCk  \ 
■Prnx£\j     ^^ 


EVAN  TftOrV^/"  \  ffi/ 

^Wiesbaden  CrlppleiJ 


•^. 


1 1 


kAOOD 


\ 


VSharll  crippled  and  later  sunK 


Diagram  No.  17 

at  6:16  p.m.  admiral  jellicoe  deploys  the  british 
battle  fleet  to  port  and  slows  down,  while  ad- 
miral beatty  closes  german  van  at  utmost  speed 

[95] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

ing  forces  which  was  to  result  from  such  action 
had  already  taken  place.  But  we  were  bound  to 
take  into  consideration  that  the  English  Fleet,  if 
at  sea,  which  was  obvious  from  the  ships  we  had 
encountered,  would  offer  battle  the  next  day. 
Some  steps  would  also  have  to  be  taken  to  shake 
off  the  English  light  forces  before  darkness  fell 
in  order  to  avoid  any  loss  to  our  Main  Fleet  from 
nocturnal  torpedo-boat  attacks.  .  .  . 

"At  6:02  came  a  wireless:  'Wieshaden  incap- 
able of  action.'  On  receipt  of  the  message  I  turned 
with  the  fleet  two  points  to  port  so  as  to  draw  nearer 
to  the  group  and  render  assistance  to  the  Wies- 
baden/' 

Even  at  this  late  hour  Admiral  S cheer  did  nol; 
know  of  the  close  proximity  of  Jellicoe.  The  Ger- 
man Commander-in-Chief  apparently  felt  that  he 
could  delay  making  his  night  dispositions  long 
enough  to  help  the  Wiesbaden.  Had  he  known 
that  the  fleet  battle  which  he  expected  to  take 
place  the  following  day  would  be  precipitated  by 
his  maneuver  to  the  north,  there  is  no  evidence 
that  he  would  have  attempted  to  postpone  the  en- 
gagement. But  in  such  circumstances  the  plight 
of  the  Wiesbaden  would  have  hardly  constituted 
a  large  enough  consideration  to  influence  the  tactics 
of  the  major  fleet,  unless  it  so  happened  that  going 
to  her  assistance  fitted  in  Avith  the  plan  of  battle. 

This  maneuver  toward  the  Wiesbaden  brought 

[97] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

the  British  ships  under  Beatty  and  Evan-Thomas 
into  S cheer's  view  as  well  as  the  confused  cruiser 
fighting  to  the  north  and  northeast.  Another 
message  from  destroyers  ahead  reported  twenty 
British  battleships  following  a  southeast  course. 
Admiral  Scheer  thus  describes  the  6:16  circum- 
stances : 

"It  was  now  quite  obvious  that  we  were  con- 
fronted by  a  large  portion  of  the  English  Fleet, 
and  in  a  few  minutes  their  presence  was  notified 
on  the  horizon  directly  ahead  of  us  by  rounds  of 
firing  from  guns  of  heavy  caliber.  The  entire  arc 
stretching  from  north  to  east  was  a  sea  of  fire.  The 
flashes  from  the  muzzles  of  the  guns  were  distinctly 
seen  through  the  mist  and  smoke  on  the  horizon, 
though  the  ships  themselves  were  not  distinguish- 
able. 

"There  was  never  any  question  of  our  line  veer- 
ing round  to  avoid  an  encounter.  The  resolve  to 
do  battle  with  the  enemy  stood  firm  from  the  first. 
The  leaders  of  our  battleship  squadrons,  the  Fifth 
Division,  turned  at  once  for  a  running  fight,  carried 
on  at  about  13,000  m.  (14,200  yds.).  The  other 
divisions  followed  this  movement  on  orders  sig- 
nalled from  the  flagship."  ^ 

Just  before  the  opposing  battleship  squadrons 

became    engaged,    Arbuthnot's   armored   cruisers 

stationed  ahead  of  Jellicoe,  while  pressing  after 

enemy  light  forces,  had  become  involved  with  the 

[98] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

capital  ships.  Three  of  these  had  crossed  ahead 
of  Beatty  and  had  turned  up  on  an  opposite  course 
between  the  lines  coming  under  the  fire  of  S cheer's 
fleet.  The  flagship  Defense  was  sunk;  the  Black 
Prince  was  badly  damaged  and  during  the  follow- 
ing night  was  destroyed  by  German  battleships; 
the  Warrior  was  disabled  and  later  abandoned  in 
a  sinking  condition. 

Beatty,  upon  sighting  Jellicoe  to  the  north, 
crossed  ahead  of  him  on  easterly  courses  at  utmost 
speed.  Hood,  now  approaching  on  a  northwest 
course,  sighted  Beatty  at  6:10,  and  eleven  minutes 
later,  in  obedience  to  orders  signalled  by  Beatty, 
counter-marched,  taking  station  ahead  of  the  JLian 
and  engaging  Hipper  on  an  east-southeast  course. 
At  6:25  Hood  had  closed  Hipper  to  8,000  yards, 
and  at  6 :33  his  flagship,  the  Invincible,  was  sunk  by 
gun-fire.  At  about  the  same  time  Hipper's  flag- 
ship, the  Lutzow,  was  heavily  hit  and  put  out  of 
action. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  British  battleships  had 
become  engaged  during  deployment.  At  6:19 
Evan-Thomas,  who  was  following  at  some  distance 
behind  Beatty,  realized  that  the  battleship  fleet 
was  deploying  on  the  port  wing  and,  in  order  not 
to  blanket  fire  by  crossing  ahead,  decided  to  make 
a  wide  turn  to  the  left  and  form  astern  of  Jellicoe's 
battleships.  The  War  spite's  helm  had  jammed 
just  before  this  and  she  made  a  complete  circle  to 
starboard  toward  the  enemy  line.     Although  put 

[99] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

out  of  action  by  the  concentrated  German  fire,  she 
succeeded  subsequently  in  reaching  port.  At  6:17, 
before  turning  to  port  to  deploy,  the  Marlborough 
division  opened  fire  on  German  ships  of  the  Kaiser 
class  at  a  range  of  13,000  yards.  By  6 :30  the  en- 
gagement had  become  general  and  the  Grand  Fleet 
deployment  was  completed  at  6:38.  (Diagram 
19.) 

Scheer  was  now  in  the  disadvantageous  position 
of  being  capped  by  a  greatly  superior  force.  This 
was  a  contingency,  however,  for  which  he  had  pre- 
pared the  previously-mentioned  "swing-around" 
withdrawing  maneuver.  The  tactics  used  are  de- 
scribed in  the  following  excerpts  from  Admiral 
Scheer's  account  of  the  battle: 

"I  observed  several  enemy  hits  and  consequent 
explosions  on  the  ships  at  our  leading  point.  Fol- 
lowing the  movement  of  the  enemy  they  had  made 
a  bend  which  hindered  free  action  of  our  Torpedo 
Boat  Flotilla  II  stationed  there. 

"I  could  see  nothing  of  our  cruisers,  which  were 
still  farther  forward.  Owing  to  the  turning  aside 
that  was  inevitable  in  drawing  nearer,  they  found 
themselves  between  the  fire  of  both  lines.  For  this 
reason  I  decided  to  turn  our  Hne  and  bring  it  on 
to  an  opposite  course.  Otherwise  an  awkward 
situation  would  have  arisen  round  the  pivot  which 
the  enemy  line  by  degrees  was  passing,  as  long  dis- 
tance shots  from  the  enemy  would  certainly  have 
[100] 


6ih.Div.     Sth.Div      Atti.Div.      3rdDiv      Znd.Div.      Ist.Div. 


J 


J    I    J- 


'MARLBOROUGH 


IRONDUK& 


inotilla/^ 


inohiia 

2  miles  »tia^ 


JUNG  GEORGE  Y 


sinotina 


Diagram  No.  18 

british  battleships  in  approach  formation  with 
destroyers  in  position  no.  1  for  deployment  on 
left  flank  division 

[101] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

hit  our  rear  ships.  As  regards  the  effectiveness 
of  the  artillery,  the  enemy  was  more  favorably 
situated,  as  our  ships  stood  out  against  the  clear 
western  horizon,  whereas  his  own  ships  were  hidden 
by  the  smoke  and  mist  of  the  battle.  A  running 
artillery  fight  on  a  southerly  course  would  there- 
fore not  have  been  advantageous  to  us.  The  swing 
around  was  carried  out  in  excellent  style.  At  our 
peace  maneuvers  great  importance,  was  always  at- 
tached to  their  being  carried  out  on  a  curved  line 
and  every  means  employed  to  ensure  the  working 
of  the  signals.  The  trouble  spent  was  now  well 
repaid;  the  cruisers  were  liberated  from  their 
cramped  position  and  enabled  to  steam  away  south 
and  appeared  as  soon  as  the  two  lines  were  sepa- 
rated, in  view  of  the  flagship.  The  torpedo  boats, 
too,  on  the  lee  side  of  the  fire  had  room  to  move  to 
the  attack  and  advanced. 

*'WIiile  the  veering  round  of  the  line  was  pro- 
ceeding, two  boats  of  Torpedo  Boat  Flotilla  III 
(G-88  and  V-73)  and  the  leading  boat  of  Tor- 
pedo Boat  Flotilla  I  (S-32)  had  attacked.  [It 
was  probably  one  of  these  torpedoes  that  hit  the 
Marlborough.]  The  remaining  boats  of  the  Tor- 
pedo Boat  Flotilla  had  ceased  the  attack  on  an 
order  to  retire  from  the  leader.  The  weakening 
of  the  enemy  fire  had  induced  the  First  Leader  to 
give  the  order,  being  persuaded  that  the  enemy 
had  turned  away  and  that  the  flotilla,  which  would 
be  urgently  needed  in  the  further  development  of 

[103] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

the  battle,  would  find  itself  withoul;  support. 
Owing  to  the  shortening  of  the  line  at  the  head, 
the  boats  of  the  other  flotillas  were  not  able  to 
attack.  One  division  (Torpedo  Boat  Flotillas 
IX  and  VI)  had  just  returned  from  the  6  o'clock 
attack.  The  enemy  line  did  not  follow  our  veer 
round.  In  the  position  it  was  to  our  leading  point, 
it  should  have  remained  on,  and  could  have  held 
us  still  further  surrounded  if  by  a  simultaneous 
turn  to  a  westerly  course  it  had  kept  firmly  to  our 
line. 

"It  may  be  that  the  leader  did  not  grasp  the 
situation,  and  was  afraid  to  come  any  nearer  for 
fear  of  torpedo  attacks.  Neither  did  any  of  the 
other  officers  on  the  enemy  side  think  of  holding 
firmly  to  our  line,  which  would  have  greatly  im- 
peded our  movements  and  rendered  a  fresh  attack 
on  the  enemy  line  extremely  difficult.  Immediately 
after  the  line  was  turned  the  enemy  fire  ceased 
temporarily." 

Although  the  British  ships  observed  that  their 
targets  turned  away,  it  does  not  appear  that  either 
Admiral  Jellicoe  or  Admiral  Beatty  fully  grasped 
this  maneuver  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet.  In  the  dia- 
grams published  in  the  official  reports  and  also  in 
Admiral  Jellicoe's  book,  there  is  no  indication  of 
this  simultaneous  wheeling  away  of  all  ships  in 
the  German  battle  line.  Doubtless  the  smoke  made 
by  the  destroyers  and  cruisers  prevented  the 
[104] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

British  from  observing  exactly  what  had  hap- 
pened. The  light  wind,  now  from  the  southwest, 
favored  the  Germans  in  their  turn  away  movement 
as  it  left  the  British  involved  while  S cheer  quickly 
cleared  it  on  his  west  course  and  was  able  to  re- 
form his  fleet  in  good  visibility  and  clear  of  the 
enemy  fire. 

As  has  already  been  remarked,  the  British  in 
general  had  not  regarded  such  a  maneuver  as  a 
practicable  one  to  perform  under  gun-fire.  In  ex- 
plaining the  Grand  Fleet  movements  Jellicoe  has 
stated : 

"The  objection  to  altering  by  turning  all  the 
ships  together  was  the  inevitable  confusion  that 
would  have  ensued  as  the  result  of  such  a  maneuver 
carried  out  with  a  very  large  fleet  under  action 
conditions  in  misty  weather." 

Admiral  Scheer's  prepared  tactics,  therefore, 
came  as  a  surprise  and  were  not  only  a  complete 
success,  but  were  undetected.  The  secret  was  kept 
and  this  meant  that  the  same  surprise  maneuver 
might  be  repeated  with  equal  chance  of  success. 

There  was  now  a  lull  in  the  battle.  Beatty 
hauled  away  to  the  east,  reduced  speed,  and 
ordered  the  remaining  two  ships  of  Hood's  squad- 
ron to  take  station  astern.  Jellicoe  turned  a  few 
points  to  the  right  in  an  eff'ort  to  regain  touch,  but 
it  is  obvious  that  much  more  radical  maneuvering 
would  have  been  required  to  hold  the   German 

[105] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

fleet  under  gun-fire.    This  ended  the  second  phase 
of  the  battle. 

Although  Admiral  Jellicoe  has  stated  that  it  had 
been  foreseen  that  the  Germans  would  employ  with- 
drawing tactics  under  cover  of  smoke,  it  would 
appear  that  this  particular  simultaneous  "swing- 
around"  maneuver  had  not  been  anticipated,  and 
that  the  British  plan  of  battle  did  not  afford  an 
effective  counter-stroke. 

This  second  phase  of  the  battle  raises  many 
tactical  questions.  Coordination  of  forces — battle- 
ships, cruisers,  and  destroyers — in  the  preliminaries 
and  during  a  fleet  engagement  presents  intricate 
problems.  Under  the  circumstances,  it  is  not  sur- 
prising that  the  somewhat  dispersed  British  units 
under  Jellicoe,  Beatty,  Hood,  and  Evan-Thomas, 
experienced  difficulties.  It  is  important,  however, 
to  examine  these  difficulties,  and  endeavor  to  read 
aright  the  lessons  which  they  teach. 

In  the  first  place,  there  was  confusion  and  failure 
in  the  service  of  information.  Information  is  the 
ground  work  upon  which  plans  are  constructed. 
Accuracy  is  vital,  but  the  most  accurate  informa- 
tion is  of  no  value  if  not  received  in  time.  Accurate, 
timely  information  bestows  the  power  of  initiative 
and  surprise,  which,  if  properly  used,  may  be  de- 
cisive factors.  Victory  may  hinge  upon  the  re- 
liability and  opportuneness  of  the  information  re- 
ceived. 

[106] 


\ 


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s. 


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13.000 

ards 


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& 


,^^'     ^'>J'4e^nK      Invmcible 


e)unk6.34/     hOOD 


Diagram  No.  19 

at  6:35  p.m.  admiral  jellicoe  completes  his  de- 
ployment and  admiral  scheer  executes  a  "swing- 

AROUND"    withdrawing   MANEUVER 


[107] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

Up  to  this  point  in  the  action  events  have  fol- 
lowed in  logical  sequence;  the  advance  forces  made 
contact;  the  more  powerful  British  detachment 
under  Beatty  compelled  the  weaker  German  squad- 
ron under  Hipper  to  retire;  Beatty  was  thus  led 
to  a  contact  with  the  High  Sea  Battle  Fleet  under 
Scheer;  in  turn,  being  pressed  by  the  superior  force 
under  Scheer,  Beatty  retired  toward  Jellicoe; 
then,  upon  the  arrival  of  Jellicoe,  the  inferior  .Ger- 
man fleet  employed  retiring  tactics. 

During  the  preliminaries  the  scout  forces  made 
and  kept  contact  with  Scheer,  but  accurate  and 
timely  information  was  not  transmitted  to  Jellicoe. 
There  were  no  linking  up  ships  or  other  means  em- 
ployed to  guard  against  discrepancies  in  navigation, 
and  it  appears  a  fair  criticism  that  system  and 
method  to  assure  the  accomplishment  of  the  scout 
mission  were  lacking. 

In  addition  to  this  failure  of  the  advance  recon- 
naissance force  to  accomplish  fully  its  scout  mis- 
sion, there  was  confusion  in  the  conduct  of  the 
attached  light  forces  in  the  immediate  van  of  the 
British  battle  fleet. 

The  light  forces  attached  to  a  battle  fleet  have 
a  two- fold  function:  First,  to  screen  their  own 
capital  ships,  denying  information  to  the  enemy, 
while  at  the  same  time  they  drive  in  the  enemy's 
screen  to  get  information  of  his  main  body;  and 
second,  to  take  such  stations  for  action  as  will 
give  opportunities  for  an  offensive  with  torpedoes 

[109] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

against  the  enemy  capital  ships,  while  at  the  same 
time  they  are  on  guard  to  break  up  any  contem- 
plated enemy  destroyer  and  light  cruiser  attacks. 

At  this  juncture  of  the  battle,  the  British  light 
forces,  instead  of  helping  the  major  ships  in  ma- 
neuvering into  action,  actually  hindered  them. 
In  pressing  after  the  enemy,  Arbuthnot's  armored 
cruisers  suddenly  broke  across  Beatty's  line  of 
advance;  the  Defense,  Warrior  and  Black  Prince 
came  up  on  an  opposite  course  between  the  lines 
blanketing  the  fire  of  the  battle  cruisers,  and  there 
the  Defense  was  sunk  and  the  Warrior  and  Black 
Prince  disabled,  to  no  apparent  useful  purpose 
other  than  temporarily  drawing  the  enemy's  fire. 
German  destroyers  broke  through  the  British  light 
forces  and  reported  to  S cheer  the  presence  of  the 
British  battle  fleet. 

Turning  now  to  the  offensive  function  of  the 
light  forces,  we  find  that  little  was  accomplished. 
When  Hood  first  appeared  he  was  compelled  to 
evade  by  maneuvering  the  torpedoes  fired  by  eleven 
German  destroyers.  Also  Hipper  turned  back  to 
close  Scheer  because  of  the  menace  of  a  British 
torpedo  attack.  Otherwise  there  was  only  desul- 
tory torpedo  firing.  There  is  no  report  of  torpe- 
does being  sighted  by  the  capital  ships  of  either  side 
between  6:15  and  6:35,  although  conditions  were 
favorable  for  destroyer  work.  The  delay  in  order- 
ing the  British  battle  fleet  destroyers  to  their  action 
[110] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

positions  accounts  for  some  of  the  lack  of  destroyer 
activity  on  the  British  side,  and  S cheer  has  stated 
that  the  radical  changes  of  course  to  the  right  em- 
barrassed the  German  destroyers  in  the  van.  Only 
three  German  destroyers  succeeded  in  attacking  at 
about  6:30.  One  hit  was  scored  on  the  Marl- 
borough. 

The  British  had  a  superiority  of  36  cruisers 
against  11.  The  British  destroyers  were  numer- 
ically about  equal  to  the  German,  but  the  former 
were  better  gunned,  larger  and  more  seaworthy, 
although  the  German  destroyers  carried  more  tor- 
pedoes. Under  the  circumstances,  it  is  a  conspicu- 
ous fact  that  the  British  flotillas  did  not  push  home 
an  attack  on  the  German  battleships  either  just 
before,  or  during,  or  immediately  after,  the  * 'swing- 
around"  maneuver. 

Of  the  British  plan  and  doctrine  for  the  de- 
stroyers. Admiral  Jellicoe  writes: 

"The  Grand  Fleet  Battle  Orders  contained  a 
great  deal  in  the  way  of  discussion  and  instructions 
on  the  subject  of  torpedo  attack  in  a  Fleet  action. 
The  duties  of  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  in  this 
connection  were  dealt  with  at  considerable  length, 
and  stress  was  laid  on  the  supreme  importance  of 
both  making  early  torpedo  attacks  on  the  enemy's 
line  and  of  immediately  countering  such  attacks, 
and  it  was  pointed  out  that  an  early  attack  by  our 
own  destroyers  would  not  only  tend  to  stop  an 

[111] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

enemy  attack,  but  would  place  our  attacking  ves- 
sels in  the  best  position  to  meet  a  hostile  attack. 

"The  battle  stations  of  both  light  cruisers  and 
destroyers  were  so  fixed  that  they  should  be  in  the 
best  positions  to  effect  these  two  objects,  such 
positions  being  obviously  in  the  van  of  the  Fleet; 
in  order  to  provide  against  a  16-point  turn  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy,  or  deployment  in  the  opposite 
direction  to  that  anticipated,  one  or  two  flotillas, 
according  to  the  numbers  available,  and  a  light 
'cruiser  squadron,  were  also  stationed  in  the  rear." 

Under  this  plan  and  doctrine  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  why  there  was  not  greater  offensive 
activity  on  the  part  of  the  British  destroyers.  It 
would  appear  that  they  were,  for  the  most  part, 
kept  busy  in  trying  to  attain  their  assigned 
geometric  battle  stations. 

The  method  used  in  deploying  the  British  Battle 
Fleet  has  been  severely  criticized.  In  defending 
it  Admiral  Jellicoe  has  presented  the  following 
argument: 

"My  first  and  natural  impulse  was  to  form  on 
the  starboard  wing  column  in  order  to  bring  the 
Fleet  into  action  at  the  earliest  possible  moment, 
but  it  became  increasingly  apparent,  both  from 
the  sound  of  gun-fire  and  the  reports  from  the 
Lion  and  Barham,  that  the  High  Sea  Fleet  wa.s  in 
isuch  close  proximity  and  on  such  a  bearing  as  to 
[112] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

create  obvious  disadvantages  in  such  a  movement. 
I  assumed  that  the  German  destroyers  would  be 
ahead  of  their  Battle  Fleet,  and  it  was  clear  that 
owing  to  the  mist,  the  operations  of  destroyers  at- 
tacking from  a  commanding  position  in  the  van 
would  be  much  facilitated;  it  would  be  suicidal  to 
place  the  Battle  Fleet  in  a  position  where  it  might 
be  open  to  attack  by  destroyers  during  such  de- 
ployment. 

*'The  further  points  that  occurred  to  me  were, 
that  if  the  German  ships  were  as  close  as  seemed 
probable,  there  was  considerable  danger  of  the  1st 
Battle  Squadron,  and  especially  the  Marlborough's 
Division,  being  severely  handled  by  the  concen- 
trated fire  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet  before  the  re- 
maining divisions  could  get  into  line  to  assist.  In- 
cluded in  the  1st  Battle  Squadron  were  several  of 
our  older  ships,  with  only  indifferent  protection 
as  compared  with  the  German  capital  ships,  and 
an  interval  of  at  least  four  minutes  would  elapse 
between  each  division  coming  into  line  astern  on 
the  6th  Division  and  a  further  interval  before  the 
guns  could  be  directed  on  to  the  ship  selected  and 
their  fire  become  effective. 

"The  final  disadvantage  would  be  that  it  ap- 
peared from  the  supposed  position  of  the  High  Sea 
Fleet,  that  the  van  of  the  enemy  would  have  a  very 
considerable  'overlap'  if  hne  were  formed  on  the 
starboard  wing  division,  whereas  this  would  not  be 
the  case  with  deployment  on  the  port  wing  column. 

[113] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

The  overlap  would  necessitate  a  large  turn  of  the 
starboard  wing  division  to  port  to  prevent  the  'T' 
being  crossed,  and  each  successive  division  coming 
into  line  would  have  to  make  this  turn,  in  addition 
to  the  8  point  turn  required  to  form  the  line.  I 
therefore  decided  to  deploy  on  the  first,  the  port 
wing  division. 

"The  further  knowledge  which  I  gained  of  the 
actual  state  of  affairs  after  the  action  confirmed 
my  view  that  the  course  adopted  was  the  best  in 
the  circumstances. 

"The  reports  from  the  ships  of  the  starboard 
wing  division  show  that  the  range  of  the  van  of  the 
enemy's  battle  fleet  at  the  moment  of  deployment 
was  about  13,000  yards.  The  fleets  were  converg- 
ing rapidly,  with  the  High  Sea  Fleet  holding  a 
position  of  advantage  such  as  would  enable  it  to 
engage  effectively,  first  the  unsupported  starboard 
division,  and  subsequently  succeeding  divisions  as 
they  formed  up  astern.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  it 
would  take  some  20  minutes  to  complete  the 
formation  of  the  line  of  battle. 

"The  German  gunnery  was  always  good  at  the 
start,  and  their  ships  invariably  found  the  range 
of  a  target  with  great  rapidity,  and  it  would  have 
been  very  bad  tactics  to  give  them  such  an  initial 
advantage,  not  only  in  regard  to  gunnery,  but  also 
in  respect  of  torpedo  attack,  both  from  ships  and 
from  destroyers." 
[114] 


THE  BATTLE:    SECOND  PHASE 

On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  said  that  this 
deployment  sacrificed  the  advantage  of  surprise, 
delayed  support  to  Beatty's  hard  pressed  ships, 
and  also  surrendered  to  a  certain  extent  the  initia- 
tive. There  is,  perhaps,  more  than  a  modicum 
of  truth  in  this.  Certainly,  turning  away  from  the 
enemy  and  slowing  down  cannot  be  characterized 
as  highly  aggressive  tactics.  But  Admiral  Jelli- 
coe's  plan  of  battle  was  not  an  aggressive  offensive. 
His  plan  was  manifestly  a  cautious  offensive  and 
his  deployment  was  made  accordingly.  From  the 
beginning  to  the  end  of  the  battle  the  maneuvers 
of  Admiral  Jellicoe  were  consistently  of  a  nature 
which  can  be  described  in  a  general  way  as  tactics 
of  a  "cautious  offensive."  It  should  be  understood 
that  this  was  his  plan  of  battle,  and  it  is  significant 
that  it  was  officially  approved  by  the  Admiralty 
both  before  and  after  the  battle. 

Notwithstanding  this,  and  without  presuming  to 
pass  judgment  on  the  British  plan  of  battle,  it 
may  be  pointed  out  that  there  was  lack  of  coor- 
dination in  carrjdng  it  out  at  this  critical  juncture. 
Jellicoe  slowed  the  battle  fleet  down  and  turned 
away;  Hood  and  Beatty  closed  the  enemy  van  at 
utmost  speed;  Evan-Thomas  was  in  a  quandary — 
the  battle  orders  said  in  case  of  deployment  away 
from  Heligoland  the  fast  battleship  squadron  will 
take  station  in  the  van — but  this  would  have  en- 
tailed crossing  the  entire  front  of  the  Fleet,  so 
Evan- Thomas  decided  to  make  a  wide  sweep  and 

[115) 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

turn  up  astern.  As  a  consequence  of  all  this,  we 
find  Beatty  and  Hood  bearing  the  brunt  of  a  close 
range  fire  without  much  support.  Evan-Thomas's 
ships  were  hauled  away  from  the  engagement  in 
maneuvering  for  position  astern,  and  it  is  reported 
that  battleships  in  the  rear  were  temporarily  slowed 
down  and  even  stopped  during  the  deployment. 
Shortly  after  6:30,  just  as  the  deployment  was 
completed,  Scheer  executed  a  simultaneous  ship 
movement  to  the  southwest,  and,  as  the  British 
battle  plan  did  not  provide  any  .maneuver  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  action,  these  evasion  tactics  of  an  in- 
ferior fleet  with  less  speed  were  a  complete  success. 


[116] 


VI 

THE  BATTLE:  THIRD  PHASE 
(6:40  P.M.  to  7:17  P.M.) 

Scheer  turns  back  cmd  attacks  the  British  center 
with  guns  and  torpedoes.  After  a  brief  engage- 
ment Scheer  again  withdraws  to  the  west  vmder 
cover  of  a  smoke  screen.     (Diagram  20.) 

Up  to  this  time  the  battle  had  gone  decidedly 
in  favor  of  the  Germans.  Of  the  heavy  ships,  three 
British  battle  cruisers  had  been  sunk,  while  on  the 
German  side,  Hipper's  flagship,  the  Liltzow,  had 
been  put  out  of  action.  The  other  battle  cruisers 
had  suffered  some  damage  but  still  remained  ef- 
fective fighting  units.  The  Derfflinger,  for  ex- 
ample, although  all  of  her  turrets  were  ready  to 
continue  the  action,  had  masts  and  rigging  badly 
cut  up,  and  her  torpedo  net  had  been  shot  away 
aft,  in  such  a  way  that  the  ship  had  to  be  stopped 
in  order  to  clear  it  from  the  port  screw.  It  is  sig- 
nificant that  the  Derffiinger  was  able  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  the  lull  in  the  battle  after  S cheer's 
withdrawing  maneuver  to  accomplish  this  precari- 
ous operation  unmolested.      (This  experience  led 

[117] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

to  the  subsequent  discard  of  these  torpedo  nets.) 
Hipper  now  decided  to  abandon  the  Liltzow  and 
transfer  his  flag  in  a  destroyer  to  another  battle 
cruiser.  He  went  first  alongside  the  Seydlitz  but 
was  informed  that  her  radio  had  been  shot  away. 
Before  he  could  reach  another  ship  the  battle 
cruisers  were  engaged  again,  and  it  was  not  until 
9:00  P.M.  that  Hipper  finally  succeeded  in  get- 
ting on  board  the  Moltke.  In  the  meanwhile  the 
Derffiinger,  under  Captain  Hartog,  was  directed  to 
take  the  lead. 

The  British  forces  were  apparently  baffled  by 
the  German  tactics.  At  6:50  Beatty  slowed  to 
18  knots  and  reformed  his  line  with  the  two  re- 
maining ships  of  Hood's  squadron  astern.  It  seems 
that  the  Lion  passed  the  wreck  of  the  Invincible 
twice,  indicating  a  loop.  Jellicoe's  course  on  de- 
ployment was  S.E.  by  E.,  but  the  van  had  hauled 
in  to  S.E.,  without  signal,  to  close  the  enemy.  At 
6:50  Admiral  Jellicoe  signaled  to  change  course 
by  divisions  in  succession  to  south.  Several  tor- 
pedoes were  now  seen  crossing  the  track  of  the  rear 
of  the  battle  line.  These  were  probably  fired  by 
the  three  destroyers  which  advanced  to  the  attack 
just  as  Scheer  executed  his  withdrawal  maneuver. 
At  6 :54  one  hit  the  Marlborough  but  she  was  able 
to  retain  station  in  the  battle  line.  During  the 
night  she  was  compelled  to  proceed  to  port  at  re- 
duced speed.  This  was  the  only  torpedo  hit  scored 
on  a  British  capital  ship. 
[118] 


MILL'S 


Diagram  No.  20 

TRACK  OF  THE  HEAVY   SHIPS   DURING  THE  THIRD  PHASE 

(6:40  P.M.  TO  7:17  p.m.) 

Scheer  turns  back  and  attacks  the  British  center  with 
ffuns  and  torpedoes.  After  a  brief  engagement  bcheer 
again  withdraws  to  the  west  under  cover  of  a  smoke 
screen 

[119] 


THE  BATTLE:    THIRD  PHASE 

At  6:33  the  speed  of  the  battle  fleet  had  been 
increased  from  14  knots  to  17  knots  and  tliis 
speed  was  maintained  from  now  on  throughout  the 
day  and  night.  The  following  extract  from  Ad- 
miral Jellicoe's  book  explains  these  speed  decisions, 
which  were  part  of  the  plan  and  doctrine  of  a  cau- 
tious offensive  that  dominated  the  British  battle 
fleet  tactics  throughout  the  engagement: 

"Experience  at  all  Fleet  Exercises  had  shown 
the  necessity  for  keeping  a  reserve  of  some  three 
knots  of  speed  in  hand  in  case  of  a  long  line  of 
ships,  in  order  to  allow  of  station  being  kept  in 
the  line  under  conditions  of  battle,  when  ships  were 
making  alteration  of  course  to  throw  out  enemy's 
fire,  to  avoid  torpedoes,  or  when  other  independent 
action  on  the  part  of  single  ships,  or  of  divisions 
of  ships,  became  necessary,  as  well  as  to  avoid  ex- 
cessive smoke  from  the  funnels ;  for  this  reason  the 
Fleet  speed  during  the  action  was  fixed  at  17  knots. 
In  the  1st  Battle  Squadron,  some  ships  had  at 
times  to  steam  20  knots,  showing  the  necessity  for 
this  reserve.  Up  to  7:10  P.M.  also  the  torpedo 
flotillas  were  not  in  station  ahead." 

These  maneuvers  of  Jellicoe  and  B catty  would 
have  proved  ineffective  to  close  the  German  Fleet 
had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  Scheer  himself 
decided  at  this  time  to  assume  the  offensive.  This 
decision  was  remarkable  in  many  respects. 

[121] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

The  following  statements  of  the  German  Com- 
mander-in-Chief merit  close  scrutiny: 

"It  was  still  too  early  for  a  nocturnal  move.  If 
the  enemy  followed  us  our  action  in  retaining  the 
direction  taken  after  turning  the  line  would  par- 
take of  the  nature  of  a  retreat,  and  in  the  event 
of  any  damage  to  our  ships  in  the  rear  the  Fleet 
would  be  compelled  to  sacrifice  them  or  else  to  de- 
cide on  a  line  of  action  enforced  by  enemy  pressure, 
and  not  adopted  voluntarily,  which  would  therefore 
be  detrimental  to  us  from  the  very  outset.  Still 
less  was  it  feasible  to  strive  at  detaching  oneself 
from  the  enemy,  leaving  it  to  him  to  decide  when 
he  would  elect  to  meet  us  next  morning.  There 
was  but  one  way  of  averting  this — to  force  the 
enemy  into  a  second  battle  by  another  determined 
advance,  and  forcibly  compel  his  torpedo  boats  to 
attack.  The  success  of  the  turning  of  the  line  while 
fighting  encouraged  me  to  make  the  attempt,  and 
decided  me  to  make  still  further  use  of  the  facihty 
of  movement.  The  maneuver  would  be  bound  to 
surprise  the  enemy,  to  upset  his  plans  for  the  rest 
of  the  day,  and  if  the  blow  fell  heavily  it  would 
facilitate  the  breaking  loose  at  night.  Theff»ght^ 
of  the  Wiesbaden  helped  also  to  strengthen  my 
resolve  to  make  an  effort  to  render  assistance  to 
her  and  at  least  save  the  crew. 

"Accordingly,  after  we  had  been  on  the  new 
course  about  a  quarter  of  an  hour,  the  line  was  again 
[122] 


THE  BATTLE:    THIRD  PHASE 

swung  round  to  starboard  on  an  easterly  course 
at  6:55  P.M.  The  battle  cruisers  were  ordered  to 
operate  with  full  strength  on  the  enemy's  leading 
point;  all  the  torpedo  boat  flotillas  had  orders  to 
attack. 

"The  battle  that  developed  after  the  second 
change  of  course  and  led  to  the  intended  result 
very  soon  brought  a  full  resumption  of  the  firing 
at  the  van,  which,  as  was  inevitable,  became  the 
same  running  fight  as  the  previous  one,  in  order  to 
bring  the  whole  of  the  guns  into  action.  This  time, 
however,  in  spite  of  'crossing  the  T,'  the  acknowl- 
edged purpose  was  to  deal  a  blow  at  the  center  of 
the  enemy  line.  The  fire  directed  on  our  line  by 
the  enemy  concentrated  chiefly  on  the  battle  cruisers 
and  the  Fifth  Division.  The  ships  suffered  all 
the  more  as  they  could  see  but  little  of  the  enemy 
beyond  the  flash  of  fire  at  each  round,  while  they 
themselves  apparently  offered  a  good  target  for 
the  enemy  guns.  The  behavior  of  the  battle 
cruisers  is  specially  deserving  of  the  highest  praise, 
— crippled  in  the  use  of  their  guns  by  their  numer- 
ous casualties,  some  of  them  badly  damaged,  obey- 
ing the  given  signal,  'At  the  enemy,'  they  dashed 
recklessly  to  attack." 

Scheer's  turn  to  an  easterly  course  quickly  closed 
the  British.  At  7:05  Jellicoe  had  turned  three 
more  points  to  starboard  to  close,  but  at  7:10  enemy 
destroyers  were  seen  approaching  and  a  report 

[123] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

was  received  that  a  submarine  had  been  sighted  on 
the  port  bow  and  he  brought  the  fleet  back  to  course 
south  again,  "to  turn  on  the  submarine  and  bring 
the  ships  in  line  ahead  ready  for  any  required 
maneuver."  (This  report  of  a  submarine  was  evi- 
dently an  error  as  Scheer  has  stated  no  submarines 
were  present. ) 

Scheer's  attack  landed  a  little  abaft  the  British 
center.  At  7:12  German  battle  cruisers  emerged 
from  the  mist  and  smoke  at  a  range  of  10,000 
yards  abeam  of  the  ColossiiSj  the  seventeenth  bat- 
tleship in  line.  Four  British  battleships  were  now 
able  to  open  an  effective  fire.  The  German  van 
turned  to  a  southerly  course.  At  7:14<  Beatty  re- 
gained touch,  sighting  two  battle  cruisers  and  two 
battleships  at  a  range  of  15,000  yards.  The  visi- 
bility conditions  were  to  the  advantage  of  the  Brit- 
ish who  were  firing  to  windward  at  targets  which 
had  the  western  sky  for  a  background.  (Diagram 
20.) 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  situation  which  now  de- 
veloped was  similar  to  that  which  existed  at  6:35 
when  Scheer  executed  his  first  withdrawal 
maneuver.  The  High  Sea  Fleet  was  again  in  the 
tactically  disadvantageous  position  of  being  T'd 
by  a  superior  force.  This  time  the  light  conditions 
were  very  unfavorable  for  the  Germans,  and  the 
High  Sea  Fleet  was  suff'ering  severe  damage  while 
inflicting  punishment  on  the  enemy  so  slight  as  to 
be  negligible.  Admiral  Scheer,  therefore,  at  7:12, 
[124] 


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SCftttR     »  ,jH^.%, 


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BEAOTY 


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Diagram  No.  21 

AT  7:17  ADMIRAL  SCHEER,  AFTER  ATTACKING  THE 
BRITISH  CENTER,  AGAIN  EXECUTES  HIS  WITHDRAWAL 
MANEUVER 

[125] 


/ 


THE  BATTLE:    THIRD  PHASE 


made  signal  once  more  to  perform  the  simultane- 
ous "swing-around"  withdrawing  maneuver.  This 
was  executed  at  7:17  and  the  High  Sea  Fleet 
again  hauled  out  of  action  on  a  westerly  course. 
(Diagram  21.)  At  the  time  of  turning,  Scheer 
observed  that  his  line  was  somewhat  congested, 
the  Friedrich  dei'  Grosse  was  approaching  the 
pivot  while  the  van  squadron  had  already  turned 
to  the  south;  although  the  signal  was  flying  to 
turn  to  starboard,  Scheer  ordered  his  flagship,  the 
Friedrich  der  Grosse,  to  turn  to  port.  His  pur- 
pose was  to  afford  more  room  for  maneuvering,  and 
with  this  modification,  the  "swing-around"  was  ex- 
ecuted without  mishap. 

At  7:12,  when  Scheer  made  signal  for  the  battle- 
ships to  withdraw  from  the  T-ing  position,  the 
cruisers  and  destroyers  were  signalled  to  push  home 
a  torpedo  attack.  The  four  remaining  German 
battle  cruisers,  already  heavily  engaged  in  the  van, 
continued  to  close  the  British  line  and  provided 
a  protecting  curtain  of  fire  for  the  attacking  de- 
stroyers. Under  cover  of  destroyer  attack  and 
smoke  screen,  the  High  Sea  Battle  Fleet  was  able, 
for  the  second  time,  and  again  without  the  exact 
nature  of  the  maneuver  being  detected  by  the 
British,  successfully  to  withdraw  by  simultaneously 
swinging  the  line  to  an  opposite  course. 

The  German  battle  cruisers,  however,  were  sub- 
jected to  a  severe  fire  and  suffered  heavily.  In  the 
Derfflinger,  for  example,  at  7:13,  a  shell  penetrated 

[127] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

one  of  the  after  turrets  and  exploded  inside.  The 
flames  ignited  a  powder  charge  in  the  handling 
room  but  it  burned  without  an  explosion  and  did 
not  reach  the  magazines.  All  but  5  of  the  turret 
crew  of  78  were  wiped  out.  It  was  only  a  few 
minutes  later  that  another  heavy  shell  penetrated 
the  roof  of  the  second  after  turret  exploding  in- 
side with  much  the  same  result,  except  that  only 
one  of  the  turret  crew  of  80  was  saved.  The  ship 
was  hit  again  and  again.  A  direct  heavy  shell 
hit  was  scored  on  the  conning  tower,  but  did  not 
penetrate.  Of  the  broadside  battery  of  six  15- 
centimeter  guns,  all  but  two  were  put  out  of  action. 
Practically  all  communications  were  carried  away, 
and  the  two  remaining  turrets  fired  independently 
under  individual  control.  Three  thousand  four 
hundred  tons  of  water  entered  the  ship  and  fires 
were  burning  in  numerous  places.  The  light  con- 
ditions were  such,  at  this  time,  that  the  Germans 
could  not  see  the  British  hulls  and  could  only  fire 
at  the  gun  flashes. 

At  7:37  the  cruisers  had  hauled  out  of  action, 
all  severely  punished  but,  with  the  exception  of 
the  Liitzow,  still  in  formation.  The  Seydlitz  in 
particular  was  badly  damaged,  flames  were  leaping 
upward  from  one  of  her  turrets,  and  she  was  well 
down  by  the  head  with  several  thousand  tons  of 
water  on  board. 

In  the  meanwhile,  the  German  destroyers  had 
advanced  to  attack  in  two  waves.  The  first  wave 
[128] 


THE  BATTLE:  THIRD  PHASE 

of  ten  to  fifteen  boats  was  sighted  by  Jellicoe  at 
7:10  bearing  S.  50°  W.  from  the  Iron  Duke. 
Under  a  heavy  fire  they  advanced  to  within  6,000 
to  7,000  yards  of  the  center  of  the  British  battle- 
ship line,  fired  torpedoes,  and  retired  making  a 
dense  smoke  screen.  One,  the  S-35,  was  sunk. 
At  this  time  the  British  light  forces  had  not  yet 
reached  their  assigned  positions  in  the  van  favor- 
able to  counter  the  attack,  so  the  battleship  line 
was  turned  four  points  to  port,  away  from  the 
menace,  to  avoid  the  torpedoes.  Of  this  maneuver 
Admiral  Jellicoe  writes: 

"At  a  sufficient  interval  before  it  was  considered 
that  the  torpedoes  fired  by  the  destroyers  would 
cross  our  line,  a  signal  was  made  to  the  Battle 
Fleet  to  turn  two  points  to  port  by  subdivisions. 
Some  minutes  later  a  report  was  made  to  me  by 
Commander  Bellairs  (the  officer  on  my  Staff  espe- 
cially detailed  for  this  duty,  and  provided  with  an 
instrument  for  giving  the  necessary  information) 
that  this  turn  was  insufficient  to  clear  the  torpedoes, 
as  I  had  held  on  until  the  last  moment;  a  further 
turn  of  two  points  was  then  made  for  a  short  time. 
As  a  result  of  this  attack  and  another  that  fol- 
lowed immediately,  some  twenty  or  more  torpedoes 
were  observed  to  cross  the  track  of  the  Battle 
Fleet,  in  spite  of  our  turn,  the  large  majority  of 
them  passing  the  ships  of  the  1st  and  5th  Battle 
Squadrons  at  the  rear  of  the  line.    It  was  fortunate 

[129] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

that,  owing  to  the  turn  away  of  the  Fleet,  the  tor- 
pedoes were  apparently  near  the  end  of  their  run, 
and  were  consequently  not  running  at  high  speed. 
They  were  all  avoided.  .  ,  ." 

At  7:25  the  second  wave  of  attacking  German 
destroyers,  about  20  boats,  advanced  through  the 
smoke;  but  by  this  time  the  British  cruisers  and 
destroyers  were  in  position  to  meet  them.  Also 
the  German  capital  ships  had  withdrawn  and  could 
not  afford  the  cover  of  heavy  gun-fire.  Upon 
emerging  from  the  smoke,  the  German  destroyers, 
besides  being  fired  upon  by  the  British  battleships, 
were  counter-attacked  by  British  light  forces  and 
driven  back  before  they  could  fire  torpedoes  at  the 
battleship  line.  This  ended  the  third  phase  of  the 
battle. 

During  this  phase  of  the  action  it  is  again  a  con- 
spicuous fact  that  the  British  flotillas  did  not  press 
home  an  attack  against  the  German  capital  ships. 

The  tactics  used  by  Scheer  illustrate  clearly  the 
German  offensive-defensive  battle  plan — a  surprise 
blow  with  the  battleships  and  battle  cruisers,  sup- 
plemented by  destroyer  attack,  and  followed  by  a 
quick  withdrawal  executed  under  cover  of  a  smoke 
screen. 

This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  Scheer  fore- 
saw, or  sought,  the  exact  situation  in  which  he 
found  himself  just  before  7:00  P.M.  On  the  con- 
trary, there  is  evidence  that  he  considered  the  High 
[130] 


THE  BATTLE:    THIRD  PHASE 

Sea  Fleet  then  in  something  like  a  predicament.* 
Scheer  had  good  cause  to  be  satisfied  with  the  results 
of  the  fighting  up  to  that  point,  and  it  is  quite  pos- 
sible he  would  not  have  sought  to  reengage  the 
British  fleet  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that  he  was 
concerned  to  keep  open  his  route  of  retirement 
toward  Heligoland.  For  this  reason,  Scheer's 
estimate  and  consequent  decision  to  return  to  the 
attack  are  particularly  noteworthy. 

The  German  Commander-in-Chief  did  not  wish 
to  give  Admiral  Jellicoe  the  initiative  in  pressing 
the  High  Sea  Fleet  to  the  west  by  attacks  during 
twilight,  thus  perfecting  the  British  encircling 
maneuver,  getting  in  position  to  harass  the  Ger- 
man Fleet  with  torpedoes  during  the  dark  hours 
and  finally  reengaging  on  terms  of  Admiral 
Jellicoe's  choosing  the  next  morning.  Admiral 
Scheer,  therefore,  decided  on  a  surprise  attack 
aimed  at  the  British  center  with  a  view  to  upsetting 
the  British  dispositions  and  plans  to  such  an  extent 
as  would  permit  the  High  Sea  Fleet  to  get  clear 
and  gain  by  daylight  the  Horn  Reefs  Passage 
where  the  advantage  of  position  and  initiative  would 
be  on  the  German  side.  Fortunately  for  the  High 
Sea  Fleet,  its  rehearsed  battle  maneuver  was  well 
adapted  to  this  purpose. 

At  first  glance,  it  would  appear  questionable 
tactics  deliberately  to  charge  the  center  of  the 

*  The  German  Chief  of  Staff  is  quoted  as  saying  that  if  any 
admiral  had  involved  himself  in  such  a  position  in  peace  time 
maneuvers  he  would  never  again  have  obtained  a  command  afloat. 

[131] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

British  line,  thus  placing  the  German  Fleet  in 
the  disadvantageous  position  of  being  T'd  by  a 
superior  force.  The  advantage  of  light  to  the 
British  was  an  important  consideration.  As  far 
as  results  in  material  damage  were  concerned,  the 
Germans  suffered  heavily  in  this  attack  and  the 
British  practically  not  at  all.  It  cannot  be  denied, 
however,  that  this  aggressive  maneuver,  at  least  to 
a  gi'eat  extent,  accomplished  its  purpose.  The 
British  fleet  was  pushed  to  the  eastward:  Scheer 
gained  ground  toward  his  base  and  was  able  to 
reach  the  shelter  of  his  mine  fields  off  Horn  Reefs 
by  daylight.  It  would  appear  that  the  results 
vindicated  Scheer's  decision.  At  the  same  time, 
it  is  to  be  remembered  that  this  attack  was  not  a 
pushed  home  offensive;  it  was  only  a  limited  of- 
fensive with  a  defensive  objective. 

Since  the  situation  which  developed  in  the  third 
phase  of  the  fighting  was  similar  to  that  of  the 
second  phase  in  its  general  aspects,  it  has  followed 
that  criticisms,  resting  on  the  same  general  grounds, 
have  been  made  of  the  British  tactics  used  in  both 
these  phases.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that,  shortly 
after  seven,  as  a  result  of  Scheer's  turn  to  the 
eastward  toward  the  British,  the  High  Sea  Fleet, 
was  placed  under  the  guns  of  the  Grand  Fleet, 
and  a  second  opportunity  thus  presented  to  destroy 
the  slower  inferior  enemy  force.  Critics  have 
argued  that  it  was  only  necessary  to  follow  the  lead 
of  Beatty's  battle  cruisers,  hold  firmly  to  the  van, 
[132] 


THE  BATTLE:    THIRD  PHASE 

and  develop  an  encircling  maneuver  from  which 
Scheer  would  have  been  unable  to  escape.*  To 
these  critics  Admiral  Jellicoe  has  replied: 

"  (a)  The  retiring  fleet  places  itself  in  a  position 
of  advantage  in  regard  to  torpedo  attack  on  the 
following  fleet.  The  retiring  fleet  also  eliminates, 
to  a  large  extent,  danger  of  torpedo  attack  by  the 
following  fleet. 

"(6)  Opportunity  is  afforded  the  retiring  fleet 
of  drawing  its  opponent  over  a  mine  or  submarine 
track. 

"(c)  Smoke  screens  can  be  used  with  effect  to  in- 
terfere with  the  observation  of  gun-fire  by  the  fol- 
lowing fleet. 

"(^)  Considerations  of  moral  effect  will  force 
stronger  fleets  to  follow  the  weaker,  and  play  into 
the  hands  of  the  enemy." 

Here  again  it  can  be  seen  that  the  controversy 
hinges  on  Admiral  Jellicoe's  plan  of  battle.  His  op- 
ponents claim  that  he  should  have  used  aggressive 
offensive  tactics,  while  Admiral  Jellicoe  maintains 
that  his  plan  and  tactics  of  a  cautious  offensive 
were  correct. 

The  "turn-away"  tactics  to  avoid  torpedoes  were 
a  particular  application  of  this  doctrine,  just  as  the 
method  of  deployment  was  another  particular  ap- 

*  These  critics  attach  much  importance  to  Admiral  Beatty's  signal 
—"Urgent.  Submit  van  of  battleships  follow  battle  cruisers.  We 
can  then  cut  off  whole  of  enemy's  battle  fleet." 

[133] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

plication  of  the  same  doctrine — the  cautious  offen- 
sive. Admiral  Jellicoe's  arguments  in  justification 
of  his  tactics  should  be  fully  appreciated.  In  re- 
gard to  the  "turn-away"  tactics  to  avoid  torpedoes 
he  writes : 

"When  the  first  attack  by  German  destroyers 
took  place  and  the  first  of  the  enemy's  flotillas  was 
seen  to  be  approaching  on  a  bearing  30  degrees 
before  the  beam  of  the  Iron  Duke,  and  had  reached 
a  distance  of  9,000  yards  or  less,  the  'counter'  of 
a  turn  toward  or  away  was  essential.  Our  own 
flotillas  had  been  using  every  endeavor  to  get  to  the 
van,  but  the  frequent  turns  to  starboard  and  the 
movement  of  our  battle  cruisers  across  the  bows 
of  the  battle  fleet  had  delayed  their  movement,  and 
it  was  evident  that  neither  they  nor  the  light  cruis- 
ers could  prevent  the  attack  from  developing. 

"The  moment  of  discharge  of  torpedoes  could 
not  be  determined  with  sufficient  accuracy  for  a 
turn  towards  and  therefore  the  Battle  Fleet  was 
turned  away  in  subdivisions  [of  2  ships  each]. 

"It  may  be  asked  whether  it  was  necessary  to 
turn  the  whole  line  of  battle  away  for  this  attack, 
or  whether  the  leading  squadron  could  not  have 
held  the  original  course.  Such  a  movement  was 
provided  for  in  the  Battle  Orders,  but  the  de- 
stroyers were  observed  at  a  range  of  9,000  yards 
on  a  bearing  30  degrees  before  the  beam  of  the 
Iron  Duke,  the  leading  ship  of  the  center  battle 
[134] 


THE  BATTLE:   THIRD  PHASE 


squadron,  and  therefore  the  leading  Battle  Squad- 
ron was  as  open  to  attack  by  torpedoes  as  was  the  7  V 
center  or  rear  squadron ;  indeed  the  destroyers  were 
standing  in  a  direction  to  attack  the  van  squadron. 
The  rear  of  the  leading  Battle  Squadron  was  also 
not  at  the  time  clear  of  the  van  of  the  center 
squadron,  as  the  turns  that  had  been  made  had  pre- 
vented line  ahead  being  reformed,  and  the  Iron 
Duke's  division  could  not  turn  unless  the  division 
ahead  also  turned.  These  facts  strengthened  the 
reasons  which  led  me  to  make  the  signal  general 
to  the  Battle  Fleet. 

"The  German  torpedo  attacks  at  Jutland  did 
not  produce  any  great  effect,  and  their  importance 
should  not  be  exaggerated.  The  turn  of  the  British 
Battle  Fleet  opened  the  range  some  1,750  yards, 
but  it  was  not  this  turn  which  led  to  the  difficulty 
of  keeping  touch  with  the  enemy.  That  difficulty 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  German  Fleet  made 
a  very  large  turn  to  the  westward  under  cover  of 
a  smoke  screen  at  the  moment  of  launching  the 
earliest  destroyer  attacks." 

This  contention  of  Admiral  Jellicoe  that  "the 
German  torpedo  attacks  at  Jutland  did  not  pro- 
duce any  gi-eat  effect,  and  their  importance  should 
not  be  exaggerated"  should  be  pondered  by  students 
of  tactics.  While  the  torpedo  is  an  important 
weapon  and,  potentially  rather  than  actively,  took 
a  significant  part  in  the  battle  of  Jutland,  still  the 

[135] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

admonition  not  to  exaggerate  its  importance  should 
be  heeded.  The  torpedo  was  not  the  controlhng 
factor.  The  controlhng  factors  were  the  respective 
battle  plans.  With  the  German  "offensive-de- 
fensive" pitted  against  the  British  "cautious  of- 
fensive," it  would  have  taken  some  stroke  of 
fortune  to  bring  the  forces  together  in  decisive 
battle.  History  has  taught — ^no  matter  what  the 
weapons  may  be,  whether  sailing  ships  with  smooth 
bores  or  dreadnaughts  with  high  power  rifles — a 
"cautious  offensive"  never  gives  decisive  results. 
It  takes  an  "aggressive  offensive"  to  gain  complete 
victory,  such  as  was  Nelson's  at  Trafalgar.  Nor 
can  it  be  admitted  that  an  "aggressive  offensive" 
battle  plan  is  impracticable  with  modern  fleets  and 
modem  weapons.  Whether  an  "aggressive  offen- 
sive" by  the  British  at  Jutland  would  have  ended 
in  victory  or  defeat  is,  and  must  remain,  subject 
matter  for  conjecture,  but  it  is  certain  that  one 
way  or  the  other  a  definite  decision  would  have 
resulted. 


[136] 


VII 

THE  BATTLE:  FOURTH  PHASE 
(7:40  P.M.  to  9:00  P.M.,  dark) 

In  the  gathering  twilight  Scheer,  avoiding  action, 
turns  front  west  to  southeast  and  seeks  to  draw 
closer  to  Horn  Reefs.  Jellicoe  tries  to  regain  touch 
on  westerly  courses,  then  turns  to  the  southwest  and 
finally  to  south.     (Diagram  22.) 

Shortly  after  7 :30  the  German  battle  cruisers  fol- 
lowed Scheer's  battle  fleet  in  withdrawing  to  the 
west  under  cover  of  smoke,  and  there  was  another 
lull  in  the  fighting.  The  British  battleships  were 
not  again  engaged.  By  7:33  Jellicoe  had  turned 
to  a  south  by  west  course.  At  7:41  a  further 
change  of  3  points  to  a  southwest  course  was  made. 
About  this  time,  Beatty  signaled  that  the  enemy 
bore  northwest  by  west  from  the  Lion,  distant  10 
to  11  miles,  and  that  Lion's  course  was  southwest. 
Other  enemy  battleships  were  observed  to  the  west- 
ward of  the  Iron  Duke,  and  at  8:00  the  course  of 
the  fleet  was  changed  by  divisions  to  west  to  close 
them.  Enemy  destroyers  were  sighted  to  star- 
board  of  Jellicoe's   line.     British   light   cruisers, 

[137] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

while  advancing  to  attack  them,  were  engaged  by- 
enemy  battleships.  The  Calliope  fired  a  torpedo 
at  the  leading  battleship,  range  6,500  yards,  and  an 
explosion  was  heard. 

Had  Jellicoe  continued  to  the  west,  he  would 
have  regained  touch  with  Scheer  or  forced  him  to 
move  over  to  the  west,  but  the  mist  and  smoke, 
combined  with  the  threat  of  torpedoes,  influenced 
him,  at  8:21,  to  turn  the  Grand  Fleet  two  points 
to  port  for  four  minutes,  then  back  to  west  for 
5  minutes,  and  at  8:30  to  form  column  on  course 
southwest.  In  like  manner  as  they  have  con- 
demned the  deployment  of  the  second  phase  and 
the  "turn  away"  to  avoid  torpedoes  of  the  third 
phase,  Admiral  Jellicoe's  critics  have  condemned 
these  tactics  as  lacking  aggressiveness — especially 
in  view  of  the  silhouette  advantage  on  the  British 
side.  In  fact,  it  would  appear  that  the  British 
had  an  excellent  opportunity,  even  at  this  late 
hour,  to  engage  Scheer  under  favorable  conditions 
or  to  force  him  over  to  the  west  far  enough  to 
assure  a  battle  the  next  morning  before  he  could 
reach  shelter  off  Horn  Reefs.  Whether  right  or 
wrong,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  Admiral  Jellicoe  con- 
sistently held  to  his  battle  plan  of  a  cautious  of- 
fensive.    (Diagram  23.) 

In  the  meanwhile,  Beatty,  after  being  out  of 
touch  since  about  7:40,  made  contact  with  enemy 
battle  cruisers  at  8:22,  holding  them  under  an 
[138] 


Diagram  No.  22 

track  of  the  heavy  ships  during  the  fourth  phase 
(7:17  P.M.  TO  9:00  p.m. — Dark) 

In  the  gathering  twilight  Scheer,  avoiding  action,  hauls 
around  from  west  to  southeast,  and  seeks  to  draw  closer 
to  Horn  Reefs.  Jellicoe  tries  to  regain  touch  on  westerly 
courses,  then  turns  to  the  southwest  and  finally  to  south 

[139] 


THE  BATTLE:  FOURTH  PHASE 

effective  fire  until  8:28  when  they  turned  away. 
Admiral  Scheer  says  of  this  brief  encounter: 

".  .  .  The  ships,  already  heavily  damaged,  were 
hit  again  without  being  able  to  return  the  fire  to 
any  purpose.  Nothing  could  be  seen  of  the  enemy 
beyond  the  flash  of  the  guns  at  each  round." 

It  so  happened  that  the  German  Squadron  of 
predreadnaughts  in  maneuvering  to  take  their 
station  ahead  of  Squadron  One,  crossed  between 
Hipper  and  Beatty  at  just  this  time  and  took  the 
fire  of  the  latter.  As  they  were  unable  to  return 
it  effectively,  they  also  hauled  away  to  the  west. 
Beatty,  being  unsupported,  did  not  follow  them. 
Up  to  now,  these  slower  German  ships  had  taken 
little  part  in  the  action  and  during  the  previous 
fighting  had  dropped  astern.  Jellicoe's  surmise 
that  the  enemy  fleet  had  become  temporarily  di- 
vided was  correct.  The  German  ships  were  last 
seen  by  the  light  cruiser  Falmouth  at  8:38. 

Turning  now  to  the  German  maneuvers  during 
this  phase,  it  is  seen  that  Scheer,  after  withdrawing 
to  the  west,  soon  changed  to  southerly  courses. 
His  aim  was  to  prevent  an  encircling  maneuver  and 
to  gain  ground  toward  Horn  Reefs  so  that  he  could 
surely  reach  there  by  daylight.  Under  cover  of 
a  smoke  screen  to  leeward  he  kept  over  as  far  to 
the  east  as  Beatty  and  Jellicoe  would  permit.  At 
9:00  P.M.,  the  two  fleets  were  barely  out  of  sight 

[141] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

of  each  other  when  the  dispositions  for  the  night 
were  made. 

Admiral  Jellicoe  describes  the  British  night  dis- 
positions as  follows: 

"At  9  P.M.  the  enemy  was  entirely  out  of  sight, 
and  the  threat  of  torpedo-boat-destroyer  attacks 
during  the  rapidly  approaching  darkness  made 
it  necessary  for  me  to  dispose  of  the  fleet  for 
the  night,  with  a  view  to  its  safety  from  such  at- 
tacks, while  providing  for  a  renewal  of  action  at 
daylight.  I  accordingly  maneuvered  to  remain  be- 
tween the  enemy  and  his  bases,  placing  our  flotillas 
in  a  position  in  which  they  would  afford  protection 
to  the  fleet  from  destroyer  attack  and  at  the  same 
time  be  favorably  situated  for  attacking  the  enemy's 
heavy  ships." 

Admiral  Beatty  made  the  following  estimate; 

"In  view  of  the  gathering  darkness  and  the  fact 
that  our  strategical  position  was  such  as  to  make  it 
appear  certain  that  we  should  locate  the  enemy  at 
daylight  under  most  favorable  circumstances,  I 
did  not  consider  it  desirable  or  proper  to  close  the 
enemy  battle-fleet  dm-ing  the  dark  hours." 

The  British  Commander-in-Chief's  reasons  for 
not  seeking  a  night  action  were : — first,  that  he  did 
not  wish  to  subject  the  battle  fleet  to  night  torpedo 
[142] 


r' 


n  Squadron  ^ 

/  V 

J  Squadron  /  /      ^fs,^ 

// 


JtLUCCpa- 


S&quQdron 


ttlPPER    ^' 


/ 


Diagram  No.  23 

at   8:30   p.m.  admiral  beattt  is  again  engaged, 
admiral  jellicoe  turns  to  the  southwest 


[143] 


THE  BATTLE:  FOURTH  PHASE 

attack  by  the  well  equipped  and  efficient  enemy 
destroyer  flotillas;  second,  that  the  German  Navy 
had  an  advantage  in  night  fighting,  as  they  pos- 
sessed a  superior  searchlight  system,  supplemented 
by  the  star-shell,  a  better  fire  control  installation, 
more  effective  explosive  shell,  and  moreover,  had 
demonstrated  an  ability  to  gain  an  initial  advantage 
with  their  guns  by  greater  accuracy  and  rapidity 
of  fire;  third,  that  British  naval  constructors  had 
been  restricted  in  giving  the  dreadnaughts  beam  by 
the  size  of  their  docks  and  that  in  compromising 
between  long  range  gun  power  and  armor  protec- 
tion they  had  devoted  a  larger  percentage  of  ton- 
nage to  the  former  than  had  German  naval  con- 
structors, that  this  had  made  the  British  ships  more 
vulnerable,  while  the  German  ships  had  better 
armor  protection  and  watertight  sub-divisioning  at 
a  proportionate  sacrifice  of  gun  power,  and  that 
while  this  condition  might  favor  the  British  in  a 
long  range  day  action,  it  worked  against  them  in  a 
short  range  night  action;  and,  fourth,  that  the  ele- 
ment of  chance  enters  into  a  night  encounter,  con- 
cerning which  Admiral  Jellicoe  states  that  there 
was  present  in  his  mind  "the  necessity  for  not  leav- 
ing anything  to  chance  in  a  fleet  action,  because 
our  fleet  was  the  one  and  only  factor  that  was  vital 
to  the  existence  of  the  Empire,  as  indeed  of  the 
Allied  cause." 

The  estimate  that  the  strategic  position  of  the 
British  was  such  as  to  make  it  appear  certain  that 

[145] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

the  enemy  would  be  located  at  daylight  under 
favorable  circumstances,  seems  to  have  been  made 
on  an  erroneous  assumption  as  to  the  position  of 
the  High  Sea  Fleet,  although  it  is  not  clear  why 
either  force  should  have  been  deceived  as  to  the 
approximate  location  of  the  other.  Since  Admiral 
Jellicoe  did  not  wish  to  fight  a  night  action  nor  an 
early  morning  twilight  action  in  the  vicinity  of 
Horn  Reefs,  the  initiative  as  to  whether  or  not 
action  would  be  fought  the  next  day  rested  with 
Admiral  Scheer.  At  9:00  P.IM.  this,  apparently, 
was  not  appreciated  by  the  British  high  command. 
The  German  Commander-in-Chief's  estimate  and 
decisions  for  the  night  were: 

"It  might  safely  be  expected  that  in  the  twilight 
the  enemy  would  endeavor  by  attacking  with  strong 
forces,  and  during  the  night  with  destroyers,  to 
force  us  over  to  the  west  in  order  to  open  battle  with 
us  when  it  was  light.  He  was  strong  enough  to  do 
it.  If  we  could  succeed  in  warding  off  the  enemy's 
encircling  movement,  and  could  be  the  first  to  reach 
Horn  Reefs,  then  the  liberty  of  decision  for  the 
next  morning  was  assured  to  us.  In  order  to  make 
this  possible  all  flotillas  were  ordered  to  be  ready 
to  attack  at  night,  even  though  there  was  a  danger 
when  day  broke  of  their  not  being  able  to  take  part 
in  the  new  battle  that  was  expected.  The  Main 
Fleet  in  close  formation  was  to  make  for  Horn 
Reefs  by  the  shortest  route,  and,  defying  all  enemy 
[146] 


THE  BATTLE:  FOURTH  PHASE 

attacks,  keep  on  that  course.  In  accordance  with 
this,  preparations  for  the  night  were  made.  In 
view  of  the  fact  that  the  leading  ships  of  the  Main 
Fleet  would  chiefly  have  to  ward  off  the  attacks  of 
the  enemy,  and  in  order  that  at  daybreak  there 
should  be  powerful  vessels  at  the  head,  Squadron 
II  [predreadnaughts]  was  placed  in  the  rear.  Out 
of  consideration  for  their  damaged  condition, 
Scouting  Division  I  [battle  cruisers]  was  told  off 
to  cover  the  rear.  Division  II  [light  cruisers]  to  the 
vanguard,  and  the  IVth  [light  cruisers]  to  cover 
the  starboard  side.  The  Leaders  of  the  torpedo- 
boat  forces  placed  the  flotillas  in  an  E.N.E.  to 
S.S.W.  direction,*  which  was  where  the  enemy 
Main  Fleet  could  be  expected.  A  great  many  of 
the  boats  had  fired  off  all  their  torpedoes  during 
the  battle.  Some  were  left  behind  for  the  protec- 
tion of  the  badly  damaged  Liltzow  [speed  reduced 
to  15  knots] ;  others  were  retained  by  the  flotilla 
leaders  in  case  of  emergency. 

"At  9:00  P.M.  the  head  of  the  line  stood  at 
Lat.  5Q°  37'  N.,  Long.  5°  30'  E.  At  9:06  the  or- 
der for  the  night  was  'Course  S.S.E,  %  E.,  speed 
16  knots.'  " 

Admiral  Scheer  held  rigidly  to  his  plan  to  reach 
the  shelter  of  Horn  Reefs  by  daylight.  During  the 
late  afternoon,  although  it  cannot  be  said  that  op- 

*  This  probably  means  in  a  sector  E.N.E.  to  S.S.W.  rather  than 
in  a  line. 

[147] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

portunity  was  lacking,  the  British  took  no  effective 
steps  to  frustrate  it.  If  the  British  had  wished  to 
assure  an  action  in  the  open  sea  the  next  morning, 
and  at  the  same  time  wished  to  avoid  night  fight- 
ing, it  would  have  been  necessary  to  push  the 
German  fleet  farther  to  the  westward  during  the 
late  afternoon.  This  was  not  done.  Admiral  Jel- 
licoe  did  not  wish  to  fight  during  the  night  nor  in 
the  Horn  Reefs  Passage  at  early  daylight.  It  is 
apparent,  therefore,  that  Admiral  Scheer,  at  9:00 
P.M.,  held  the  initiative  as  to  whether  or  not  he 
would  engage  the  following  day. 

In  tliis  last  phase  of  the  day  fighting  it  is  re- 
corded that  the  light  cruiser  Calliope  fired  one 
torpedo.  A  summary  of  the  torpedo  attacks  dur- 
ing the  day  action  indicates  that  the  destroyer  work, 
on  the  whole,  was  disappointing.  In  the  day  action 
of  the  31  destroyers  with  Beatty  about  12  attacked 
at  4 :15 ;  four  destroyers  with  Hood  attacked  shortly 
before  six ;  of  the  42  destroyers  with  Jellicoe  none 
attacked  enemy  capital  ships  during  daylight.  On 
the  German  side  about  11  of  the  33  destroyers 
with  Hipper  attacked  at  4:15;  at  4:49  five  more 
attacked ;  at  6 :00  some  10  or  12  destroyers  attacked 
Hood's  ships;  at  6:35  during  the  first  veering 
around  and  withdrawal  of  the  German  line,  three 
destroyers  attacked  (it  was  probably  a  torpedo 
from  one  of  those  that  hit  the  Marlborough)  ;  at 
7:15,  during  the  second  withdrawal  of  the  German 
fleet,  10  to  15  destroyers  attacked  under  cover  of 
[148] 


THE  BATTLE:  FOURTH  PHASE 

gun-fire,  fired  torpedoes  and  made  a  smoke  screen; 
and  these  were  followed  about  fifteen  minutes  later 
by  a  second  wave  of  about  20  destroyers  which, 
however,  were  not  afforded  the  cover  of  gun-fire — 
they  were  engaged  and  turned  back  by  British 
heavy  and  light  forces  before  they  could  attack  the 
battleships.  In  addition  light  cruisers  and  de- 
stroyers on  both  sides  did  some  detached  fighting 
during  which  torpedoes  were  fired. 

Making  a  rough  estimate,  it  is  thus  seen  that 
during  the  day  battle,  out  of  about  77  destroyers 
on  the  British  side,  about  16  to  20  fired  torpedoes 
at  capital  ships,  while  out  of  about  78  German 
destroyers  about  35  to  40  fired  torpedoes  at  British 
capital  ships.  Considering  the  fact  that  conditions 
were  favorable  for  torpedo  work,  it  does  not  ap- 
pear that,  on  the  British  side  at  least,  a  very  effec- 
tive use  was  made  of  the  destroyers  as  an  offensive 
weapon.  It  may  be  added,  as  a  point  to  empha- 
size, that  the  German  plan  for  coordinating  battle- 
ships, cruisers,  and  destroyers  in  a  daylight  action, 
as  carried  out  during  the  third  and  fourth  phases, 
presents  one  of  the  most  important  tactical  con- 
siderations of  the  battle. 


[149] 


VIII 

THE  BATTLE:  FIFTH  PHASE 

(9:00  P.M.,  31  May  to  3:00  A.M.,  1  June) 

During  the  night  Jellicoe  withdraws  to  the  south 
while  S cheer  steers  for  Horn  Reefs.  British  Light 
Forces  are  intermittently  engaged  with  the  High 
Sea  Fleet.    (Diagram  24.) 

At  9:00  TM.  the  British  Battle  Fleet  was  dis- 
posed in  night  cruising  formation,  course  south, 
speed  17  knots,  in  four  parallel  squadron  columns, 
one  mile  apart  with  light  cruisers  ahead  and  astern. 
From  east  to  west  the  order  of  Squadrons  was 
5th,  1st,  4th,  and  2nd.  Beatty's  battle  cruisers 
maintained  a  position  about  14  miles  on  the  star- 
board hand  of  the  battleships.  The  flotillas  were 
spread  five  miles  astern  to  screen  the  fleet  and  also 
to  be  in  favorable  position  to  attack  the  enemy. 
(Diagram  25.)  A  mine  layer  was  sent  to  lay  a 
mine  field  in  the  Horn  Reefs  Passage,  and  during 
the  night  three  British  submarines  were  stationed 
in  that  vicinity,  4,  12,  and  20  miles,  respectively, 
west  of  Vyl  lightship. 
[150] 


11:(»P.M.  <TM  FUmUA  PyT  S-SlOUTOrAtTlOM. 


FLOTILLA  ATTACKEO  ROSTOOt  8f 

TORPCOOm  - CLBINS  INCOaiSIOMWTWPOSEll-  5fW5T{0WHAWi!  WMMLiy- 
FLOTILLA  8.  FMELCSS  tif f  C**Kf  SUN* 


NASSAU  VSr  DOWN  TURBULEWt 


?  00  AW, 

■aa.  FLOTiaA  attacked  sccono 

BATTLE  SQUADRON  &  POMMttRM  WAS  SDH*. 


t.3SAM 
M0RE3BV  SIGMTCO  4SH1PS. 
(5tX0ND  BATTLt  SftUAORON) 


«nOEN3  IJCtP  US. 

•>r.-.=3B----'.-> 


6hli4h  Submorinea 


J*'        Atjdiet  loid  mines  in 
r  defined  area  about  15  miles 

fromVvuLb 


MILES. 


Diagram  No.  24 

track  of  the  heavy  ships  during  the  fifth  phase 
(9:00  P.M.  MAY  31sT  TO  3:00  a.  m.  june  1st) 

During  the  night  Jellicoe  withdraws  to  the  south  while 
Scheer  steers  for  Horn  Reefs.  British  Ught  forces  are 
intermittently  engaged  with  the  High  Sea  Fleet 

ri5i] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIFTH  PHASE 

Scheer's  battle  squadrons  proceeded  during  the 
night  in  modified  inverted  order,  speed  16  knots; 
the  Westfalen  led  Squadron  I  in  the  van,  then 
came  Squadron  III,  then  Squadron  II  (the  pre- 
dreadnaughts ) ,  while  the  battle  cruisers  brought 
up  the  rear.  The  Germans  carried  out  the  decision 
— "The  Main  Fleet  in  close  formation  was  to  make 
for  Horn  Reefs  by  the  shortest  route,  and,  defying 
all  enemy  attacks,  keep  on  that  course." 

Throughout  the  short  summer  night  of  about 
five  hours  the  British  destroyers  and  cruisers,  which 
were  gradually  drawn  to  the  eastward,  maintained 
intermittent  contact  with  the  enemy  battle  fleet. 
At  different  times  by  various  destroyers  all  of  the 
enemy  battle  squadrons  were  sighted  before  day- 
light. 

At  10:04  the  western  destroyers  of  the  11th 
Flotilla  sighted  and  attacked  enemy  cruisers.  At 
10:20  the  2nd  light  cruiser  squadron  engaged 
Scout  Division  IV.  The  German  Frauenlob  was 
torpedoed  and  sunk,  while  the  British  Southampton 
and  Dublin  suffered  from  gun-fire.  At  11 :00  the 
4!th  Flotilla  was  engaged  and  the  German  S-32 
was  put  out  of  action  by  a  hit  in  her  boiler  com- 
partment. 

At  11:30  the  4th  Flotilla  attacked  the  enemy 
cruisers  Rostock  and  Elbing  on  the  port  side  of 
the  German  Battle  Squadron  I.  In  withdrawing 
the  cruisers  passed  through  the  battleship  line. 
While  doing  this  the  Rostock  was  hit  by  a  torpedo 

[153] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

and  the  Elhing  collided  with  the  Posen.  Both  the 
Elbing  and  Rostock  were  put  out  of  action  and 
later  blown  up.  On  the  British  side,  in  this  attack, 
the  Tipperary  was  disabled  by  gun-fire  and  later 
sank ;  the  S parrowJiawk  rammed  the  Broke  and  the 
former  was  abandoned  a  few  hours  later;  the  Spit- 
fire also  collided  with  an  enemy  cruiser. 

At  11:35  the  Birmingham  reported  enemy  battle 
cruisers  steering  south  in  Lat.  56°  46'  N.,  5°  46' 
E.  At  12:00  the  4th  Flotilla  and  Fearless  at- 
tacked the  German  2nd  Battle  Squadron.  The 
Fortune  and  Ardent  were  sunk  by  gun-fire.  Also, 
at  midnight  the  Black  Prince  suddenly  appeared 
within  1,500  meters  of  Squadron  I.  The  Thiiringen 
and  Ostfriedand  switched  on  searchlights  and 
opened  fire.  In  a  few  seconds  the  Black  Prince 
was  on  fire  and  four  minutes  later  sank  with  a 
terrific  explosion. 

At  12:15  the  German  battleship  Nassau  turned 
out  of  column  to  evade  a  torpedo  attack  and  cut 
through  the  British  destroyer  Turbulent  which  in- 
stantly sank.  The  Nassau  also  damaged  the  de- 
stroyer Petard  by  gun-fire.  These  destroyers  were 
of  the  13th  Flotilla  which  had  become  scattered. 
The  Nassau  did  not  rejoin  that  night  but  met  the 
High  Sea  Fleet  at  the  Horn  Reefs  rendezvous  next 
morning. 

The  damaged  Liltzow,  accompanied  by  destroy- 
ers, was  falling  astern  and  shortly  before  2:00 
A.M.  she  had  7,000  tons  of  water  forward  which 
[154] 


Iirh,  4th.  12fti,  9tVi.  IQlh  13th. 

V   V   V  V  V 
Destroyers 


12nd  LtQuiseP 
Squodron 


j  Cruiser  Squadrwia 


JfcU-lCOC 


'  limited 


j-Mh  U  Cruiser 
I    Squadron. 


ECy\mf 


Diagram  No.  25 

british  night  cruising  formation  signalled  shortly 
after  9:00  p.m.  31  may 

[155] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIFTH  PHASE 

caused  her  propellers  to  fan  the  air.  Thereupon 
she  was  abandoned  and  torpedoed.  The  crew, 
totaling  1,250,  including  wounded,  were  taken  off 
by  four  destroyers. 

At  2:00  the  12th  Flotilla,  having  been  drawn 
some  miles  to  the  northeast,  made  contact  with 
the  German  Battle  Squadron  II  and  attacked. 
The  Pommern  was  torpedoed  and  sank  with  all 
hands.  The  signal  reporting  the  location  of  the 
Squadron  was  not  received  by  Jellicoe  or  any  ship, 
presumably  because  of  the  strong  interference 
caused  by  the  German  wireless.* 

At  2:30  the  MarlborougU  reported  she  could 
make  only  12  knots.  Vice  Admiral  Sir  Cecil 
Burney  transferred  his  flag  to  the  Revenge,  and  the 
Marlborough,  under  escort  of  Fearless,  proceeded 
to  port.  This  caused  the  6th  British  battleship 
Division  to  stray,  and  it  was  not  until  the  next 
evening  that  this  Division  with  the  Vice  Admiral 
rejoined  the  fleet. 

At  2 :35  the  destroyer  Moresby  sighted  four  Ger- 
man battleships  of  the  DeutscJdand  class  and  fired 
one  torpedo.  This  was  the  last  shot  in  the  night 
fighting.    At  2:40  dawn  was  breaking. 

Although   the   British   destroyers   which   made 

*  The  loss  of  this  message  sent  by  the  destroyer  Faulknor  has  been 
featured  in  the  press  as  a  stroke  of  good  fortune  for  the  Germans 
which  presented  the  British  Fleet  from  intercepting  the  High  Sea 
Fleet  at  daylight.  This  is  misleading.  As  Admiral  Jellicoe  did  not 
wish  to  risk  either  a  night  action,  or  an  early  morning  action  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  mine  fields  off  Horn  Reefs,  it  is  evident  that  the 
battle  would  not  have  been  renewed  at  daylight  even  if  the  Faulk- 
nor's  message  had  been  received  by  the  British  Commander-in-Chief. 

[157] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

contact  with  the  enemy  pushed  home  spirited  at- 
tacks, it  would  appear  that  the  general  purpose  of 
the  night  British  dispositions  was  to  use  the  de- 
stroyers for  defense  rather  than  offense.  The 
British  destroyers  were  assigned  to  take  station  five 
miles  astern  of  the  battle  fleet  as  a  defensive  screen. 
There  might  have  been  no  attacks  had  not  the 
course  of  the  German  High  Sea  Fleet  cut  through 
the  screen.  This  caused  the  night  fighting  which 
has  been  recounted.  It  was  generally  of  a  hap- 
hazard nature  and  did  no  damage  to  enemy  capital 
ships  with  the  exception  of  the  attack  of  the  12th 
Flotilla  on  the  2nd  Battle  Squadron  just  before 
dawn.  This  latter  attack  was  well  planned  and 
efficiently  executed.  It  resulted  in  the  destruction 
of  the  predreadnaught  Pommern. 

Admiral  S cheer  states  that  destroyers  of  five 
flotillas  proceeded  to  the  attack  during  the  night, 
that  they  had  various  nocturnal  fights  with  enemy 
light  forces,  but  that  they  did  not  sight  the  British 
Main  Fleet.  He  also  states  that  a  great  many  of 
the  destroyers  had  expended  their  torpedoes  dur- 
ing the  day  action.  The  cover  of  night  presents 
opportunity  for  destroyer  attack,  and  the  night 
immediately  follo^dng  a  day  action  is  generally 
regarded  as  a  favorable  time  to  launch  an  effective 
destroyer  offensive.  It  would  appear,  however, 
that  the  German  destroyers  did  not  search  out  the 
British  Fleet,  but  kept  comparatively  close  to  their 
own  ships.  All  the  attacking  flotillas  except  one 
[158] 


BtATTY 

\NOON  ' 


Wijl  U9M  Slfip 


Abdiei  lo\d  trflnta 
In  deflntcl  arw 
oOoot  (5  miles  lYum 
Vijl  Lrghl  5hi(X 


Ostfrieslond  hit  mine 
6-50  An 


Til  1 1  Til  11* 


Diagram  No.  26 

MANEUVERS  ON  JUNE   IST   AFTER  THE  BATTLE 


[159] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIFTH  PHASE 

joined  the  Main  Fleet  at  daybreak.  The  missing 
flotilla  had  been  pressed  by  the  British  light  forces 
to  the  north  and  made  its  escape  the  next  day  via 
Skagen. 

At  dawn  Jellicoe  was  far  to  the  southwest  of 
the  Horn  Reefs  course.  Instead  of  closing  the 
Horn  Reefs  as  had  been  his  intention  the  night 
before,  he  decided  to  sweep  to  the  north  and 
gather  together  his  scattered  forces.  In  order  to 
be  ready  for  battle  should  the  German  Fleet  attack, 
at  2 :47  the  Battle  Fleet  formed  single  line  on  course 
north.  Visibility  was  now  a  little  over  3  miles, 
weather  fine,  wind  of  force  3  from  S.S.W.,  sea 
smooth.  At  2 :52  Jellicoe  had  20  battleships  in  line 
accompanied  by  one  destroyer  and  three  cruisers. 

Admiral  Jellicoe  has  explained  his  early  morn- 
ing estimate  and  decision: 

".  .  .  Partly  on  account  of  the  low  visibility, 
and  partly  because  of  the  inevitable  difference  in 
dead  reckoning  between  ships,  due  to  their  many 
movements  in  course  of  the  action  and  in  the  night, 
considerable  difficulty  was  experienced  in  collecting 
the  Fleet.  This  applied  particularly  to  the  de- 
stroyer flotillas,  as  they  had  been  heavily  engaged, 
and  their  facilities  for  computing  their  positions 
under  these  conditions  were  only  slight;  but  the 
same  difficulty  was  experienced  with  all  classes  of 
ships,  and,  although  awkward,  the  fact  did  not  cause 
me  any  surprise. 

[161] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

"The  difficulties  experienced  in  collecting  the 
Fleet  (particularly  the  destroyers),  due  to  the 
above  causes,  rendered  it  undesirable  for  the  Battle 
Fleet  to  close  the  Horn  Reefs  at  daylight,  as  had 
been  my  intention  when  deciding  to  steer  to  the 
southward  during  the  night.  It  was  obviously  nec- 
essary to  concentrate  the  Battle  Fleet  and  the  de- 
stroyers before  renewing  action.  By  the  time  this 
concentration  was  effected  it  had  become  apparent 
that  the  High  Sea  Fleet,  steering  for  the  Horn 
Reefs,  had  passed  behind  the  shelter  of  the  German 
mine  fields  in  the  early  morning  on  the  way  to 
their  ports.  The  information  obtained  from  our 
wireless  directional  stations  during  the  early  morn- 
ing showed  that  ships  of  the  High  Sea  Fleet  must 
have  passed  the  Horn  Reefs  on  a  southerly  course 
shortly  after  daylight." 

During  the  night  five  German  airships  were  sent 
out  to  make  an  early  reconnaissance.  At  3:10 
twelve  battleships  were  reported  to  the  westward 
of  Horn  Reefs  on  a  north  course,  and  a  little  later 
more  battleships  and  battle  cruisers  to  the  north 
of  those  first  reported.  Also  numerous  light  forces 
were  reported.  At  3:00  A.M.  another  airship  re- 
ported a  unit  of  12  ships  in  Jammers  Bay  steam- 
ing rapidly  to  the  south. 

Soon  after  daylight  Admiral  S cheer  had  with 
him:  sixteen  dreadnaught  battleships — ^the  Koenig 
division  of  the  four  newest  dreadnaughts  had  ex- 
[162] 


THE  BATTLE:    FIFTH  PHASE 

pended  most  of  their  ammunition  and  three  of  them 
had  sustained  damage.  The  other  twelve  ships 
were  practically  undamaged;  five  predreadnaught 
battleships,  practically  undamaged;  three  light 
cruisers,  slightly  damaged;  sixty  destroyers  (ap- 
proximate), many  with  all  torpedoes  expended. 

On  arriving  at  Horn  Reefs  at  about  3 :00  A.M., 
Admiral  S cheer  decided  to  wait  for  the  Liitzow, 
but  a  little  later,  having  been  informed  of  her  fate, 
he  made  the  following  estimate  and  decision: 

"In  our  opinion  the  ships  in  a  southwesterly 
direction  as  reported  by  L-11  could  only  just 
have  come  from  the  Channel  to  try,  on  hearing  the 
news  of  the  battle,  to  join  up  with  their  Main  Fleet 
and  advance  against  us.*  There  was  no  occa- 
sion for  us  to  shun  an  encounter  with  this  group, 
but  owing  to  the  slight  chance  of  meeting  on  ac- 
count of  visibility  conditions,  it  would  have  been 
a  mistake  to  have  followed  them.  Added  to  this 
the  reports  received  from  the  battle  cruisers  showed 
that  Scouting  Division  I  would  not  be  capable  of 
sustaining  a  serious  fight,  besides  which  the  leading 
ships  of  Squadron  III  could  not  have  fought  for 

*  It  does  not  appear  that  the  British  force  of  8  predreadnaughts 
and  four  cruisers  in  the  Humber,  put  to  sea  at  all.  The  Harwich 
force  of  light  cruisers  and  destroyers  (about  30)  wei-e  held  in  port 
by  Admiralty  orders  until  the  morning  of  June  1st.  They  were  then 
sent  to  reenforce  Jellicoe  but  were  too  late  to  be  a  factor  and  were 
turned  back  before  joining.  Four  of  these  destroyers  were  used  to 
escort  the  injured  Marlborough  to  port.  Admiral  Jellicoe  has  stated 
that  this  Hai-wich  force  would  have  been  a  welcome  reenforcement 
during  the  night  and  at  dawn. 

[163] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

any  length  of  time,  owing  to  the  reduction  in  their 
supply  of  munitions  by  the  long  spell  of  firing. 
The  Frankfurt,  Pillau  and  Regen^burg  were  the 
only  fast  light  cruisers  now  available  and  in  such 
misty  weather  there  was  no  depending  on  aerial 
reconnaissance.  There  was,  therefore,  no  certain 
prospect  of  defeating  the  enemy  reported  in  the 
south.  An  encounter  and  the  consequences  thereof 
had  to  be  left  to  chance.  I  therefore  abandoned 
the  idea  of  further  operations  and  ordered  the 
return  to  port." 

As  has  been  said,  the  arrival  of  the  High  Sea 
Fleet  off  Horn  Reefs  gave  Scheer  the  initiative  in 
regard  to  the  renewal  of  the  battle.  His  decision 
to  return  to  port  may  be  considered  the  final  act 
of  the  engagement. 

En  route  to  the  German  bases  the  Ostfriesland 
hit  a  mine  but  suffered  no  great  damage.  A  Ger- 
man destroyer  also  hit  a  mine  and  sank  with  all 
hands.  Admiral  Scheer  reported  that  submarines 
were  encountered,  and  their  attacks  frustrated. 
(Diagram  26.) 

Considerable  difficulty  was  experienced  in  re- 
assembling the  British  Grand  Fleet.  At  3 :33  the 
5th  Battle  Squadron  rejoined,  but  the  6th  Divi- 
sion of  three  battleships  did  not  join  up  until  eve- 
ning. The  cruisers  were  not  sighted  until  6:00 
A.M.,  and  the  destroyers  did  not  join  up  until 
9 :00  A.M.  The  Grand  Fleet,  after  sweeping  the 
battlefield,  proceeded  to  its  bases. 
[164] 


IX 

CONCLUSION 

Such,  in  brief,  were  the  tactics  of  the  Battle  of 
Jutland.  The  action  was  indecisive.  Therefore, 
it  had  no  decisive  influence  upon  the  naval  situa- 
tion or  the  general  course  of  the  war.  The  battle 
is  unique  in  that  it  was  the  only  major  fleet  en- 
gagement in  the  World  War,  and,  considering  the 
size,  power,  and  scientific  development  of  the  ships 
and  weapons  used,  together  with  the  magnitude  of 
the  issue  which  hung  in  the  balance,  ranks  with  the 
greatest  battles  in  history.  This  truth  is  not  gen- 
erally appreciated  because  the  battle  was  not 
fought  to  the  decisive  conclusion  which  would  have 
clearly  demonstrated  it. 

Before  attempting  a  judgment  of  the  tactical 
plans  and  doctrines  used  respectively  by  the  Brit- 
ish and  Germans  at  Jutland  it  would  be  necessary 
to  take  into  consideration  the  larger  questions  of 
policy  governing  the  conduct  of  the  war.  The 
ramifications  of  policy  and  strategy  which  may  or 
may  not  have  justified  Admiral  Jellicoe's  plan  and 
doctrine  of  a  "cautious  offensive,"  and  Admiral 
Scheer's   plan  and   doctrine  of  an   "offensive-de- 

[165] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

fensive,"  are  not  within  the  scope  of  this  discussion. 
It  is  enough  for  the  present  to  point  out  these 
respective  plans  and  doctrines  with  their  conse- 
quences— in  short,  to  explain  what  happened  at 
Jutland.  The  importance  to  the  United  States  of 
reading  aright  the  lessons  of  this  engagement  is 
obvious. 

From  the  German  viewpoint  the  battle  was  a 
success,  and  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  official 
announcement  of  a  German  victory  in  a  great  fleet 
action  had  an  important  moral  effect.  The  British 
Admiralty  announcement  of  heavy  losses  was  ac- 
cepted as  confirmation  of  the  German  claim  to 
victory.  The  popular  demand  for  greater  fleet 
activity  had  received  a  satisfactory  answer,  and  the 
people  of  Germany  were  filled  with  pride  for  their 
Navy.  This  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  Govern- 
ment at  a  critical  period  in  the  war. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  as  has  been  said,  the  battle 
was  indecisive  and  had  no  marked  effect  on  the 
naval  and  military  situation.  The  British  Navy 
still  controlled  the  High  Seas,  while  the  German 
Navy  continued  its  dominance  of  the  Baltic  and 
home  coastal  waters.  Great  Britain  still  enjoyed 
the  benefits  of  open  sea  communications  leading  to 
all  parts  of  the  world,  while  German  sea  com- 
munications were  confined  to  a  restricted  area  em- 
bracing only  the  North  European  neutrals. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  contention  made  after 
the  battle  by  Mr.  Balfour,  then  First  Lord  of  the 
[166] 


CONCLUSION 

British  Admiralty,  a  contention  maintained  by  high 
British  authority  to  this  day,  that  England  already 
enjoyed  all  the  benefits  which  could  have  been  de- 
rived from  a  Jutland  victory,  is  misleading.  On 
the  contrary  it  would  appear  that  the  destruction 
of  the  High  Sea  Fleet  at  Jutland  would  have  pro- 
duced a  change  of  far-reaching  significance  in  the 
war  situation.  Mine  fields  not  protected  by  guns 
may  be  swept  up.  With  the  German  battle  fleet 
eliminated  the  German  mine  fields  out  of  range 
of  guns  ashore  could  have  been  swept  up,  while 
British  mine  fields  could  have  been  maintained 
comparatively  close  up  to  the  German  harbors. 
Submarines  would  have  continued  to  give  trouble, 
but  the  removal  of  their  mobile  heavy  gun  support 
would  have  greatly  reduced  their  effectiveness. 
For  the  most  part  they  would  have  been  kept  busy 
guarding  the  German  coast  line.  It  is  also  to  be 
remembered  that  as  the  war  advanced  anti-subma- 
rine measures  attained  greater  efficiency.  Another 
consequence  of  a  decisive  British  victory  at  Jutland 
would  have  been  to  open  Allied  sea  communications 
to  Russia's  Baltic  ports.  With  Russia  thus  saved 
to  the  Allied  cause  and  the  German  Baltic  coast 
threatened  with  invasion,  Germany  would  have 
been  subjected  to  severe  additional  pressure. 
Moreover,  the  removal  of  the  menacing  German 
* 'fleet  in  being"  would  have  released  great  numbers 
of  workers  engaged  in  Enghsh  naval  industries 
and  permitted  the  transfer  of  considerable  energy 

[167] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

to  army  activities.  And  finally  the  unrestricted 
German  submarine  campaign  against  commerce 
would  have  been  greatly  hampered  if  not  completely 
frustrated  had  the  British  fleet  destroyed  the  Ger- 
man fleet  at  Jutland.  It  was  the  High  Sea  Battle 
Fleet  that  not  only  held  the  gates  for  the  U-boats, 
but  also,  to  a  large  extent,  supplied  the  skilled 
personnel  to  man  them.  On  the  whole,  it  would 
not  appear  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  a  second 
Trafalgar  on  the  day  of  Jutland  would  have 
crushed  Germany's  hope  and  brought  Allied  vic- 
tory into  view. 

The  tactics  of  two  fleets  in  battle  may  be  com- 
pared to  the  tactics  employed  by  two  chess  players 
in  moving  their  pieces  on  the  game  board.  The 
ships  have  various  values  and  abilities  just  as  the 
chessmen  have  various  values  and  abilities.  But 
the  tactics  of  maneuvering  ships  in  battle  pre- 
sent much  more  complex  and  baffling  problems 
than  the  tactics  of  the  chess  game.  In  the  latter 
the  relative  value  of  the  pieces  are  invariable  and 
the  rules  for  moving  are  fixed;  skill  can  be  devel- 
oped by  long  years  of  practice  under  conditions 
which  never  change.  On  the  other  hand,  in  naval 
tactics,  numerous  variables  enter  and  interact  on 
each  other  to  produce  a  multiplicity  and  complicity 
of  combinations.  On  the  day  of  battle,  as  at  Jut- 
land, the  two  commanders  may  face  each  other 
without  previous  experience  in  actual  war.  Under 
such  circumstances  ii  would  indeed  be  astonishing 
[168] 


CONCLUSION 

if  tactical  mistakes  were  not  made.  Skill,  how- 
ever, is  relative,  and  the  high  command  better 
equipped  by  study,  peace  time  maneuvers,  war  col- 
lege training,  and  experience  afloat,  possesses  an 
advantage,  which,  if  the  forces  are  otherwise  near 
a  parity,  will  inevitably  decide  the  victory. 

To  naval  administrators  and  professional  men, 
the  Jutland  battle  presents  a  study  of  absorbing 
interest.  For  the  first  and  only  time,  modern  types 
of  ships  and  weapons  were  placed  on  trial.  As  a 
result,  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  were  very  start- 
ling surprises.  The  heavy  gunned  line  of  battle- 
ships with  their  ability  to  give  and  receive  the 
hardest  blows  again  demonstrated  their  supreme 
function  in  the  struggle  for  control  of  the  Seas. 
The  battle  cruisers  showed  their  value  as  scouts 
and  also  their  limitations — as  now  developed — when 
called  upon  to  take  station  in  the  line  of  battle.  The 
need  for  light  cruisers  in  a  balanced  fleet  was  em- 
phasized. The  varied  usefulness  of  destroyers  both 
for  offense  and  defense  was  clearly  shown  at  Jut- 
land and  has  assured  this  type  the  recognition  it 
deserves.  Although  aircraft  and  submarines  took 
part  in  the  operations  they  had  no  influence  in  the 
actual  fighting  of  the  battle.  That  this  will  not 
be  a  condition  in  future  naval  battles  is  a  question 
hardly  open  to  argument.  Aircraft  and  submarines 
will  undoubtedly  come  into  their  own  and  take  their 
proper  place  as  important  tactical  factors.  But  it 
remains  a  fact  that  they  were  practically  negligible 

[169] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

at  Jutland.  This  consideration  provides  a  valuable 
check  to  extravagant  claims  made  for  these  com- 
paratively new  elements  in  naval  warfare. 

Reviewing  the  tactical  features  of  the  action,  it 
is  seen  that,  both  by  commission  and  omission,  the 
principles  taught  by  the  experiences  of  history 
are  strikingly  portrayed  under  the  new  light  af- 
forded by  the  use  of  modern  ships  and  modern 
weapons.  In  the  course  of  the  analysis  of  the 
action  it  has  been  attempted  to  point  by  illustra- 
tion these  principles  of  offense  and  defense,  con- 
centration, coordination,  information,  surprise, 
initiative,  plan,  indoctrination,  and  cooperative 
skill.  The  conclusion  is  clear  enough,  that  no 
matter  how  great  the  preponderance  of  material 
power,  the  navy  that  neglects  these  principles  will 
be  found  wanting  when  tried  by  the  test  of  battle. 


[170] 


APPENDIX 

LOSSES  AND  DAMAGE 

The  losses  are  summarized  in  the  following  table  :* 

British 

THREE   BATTLE   CRUISERS 

Tonnage 

Queen  Mary 26,350 

Indefatigable   18,800 

Invmcible  17,250 

THREE  ARMORED   CRUISERS 

Defense 14,600 

Warrior 13,550 

Black  Pnnce 13,350 

EIGHT    DESTROYERS 

Tipperary    1,430 

Nestor 890 

Nomad   890 

Turbulent    1,100 

Fortune      965 

Ardent    935 

Shark   935 

Sparrowhawk   935 


Total    111,980 

imander  '. 

[171] 


•  The  High  Sea  Fleet  at  Jutland,  by  Lieutenant  Commander  H.  H. 
Frost,  U.  S.  N.,  Naioal  iTistitute  Proceedings, 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

GerTTums 

ONE    BATTLE    CRUISEB, 

Tonnage 

Liltzow    26,180 

ONE    PKE-DREADNAUGHT 

Pomvwm 13,200 

FOUR    LIGHT    CRUISERS 

Wiesbaden    5,400 

Elbmg 4,500 

Rostock    4,900 

Frauenloh    2,700 

FIVE    DESTROYERS 

V-4   570 

V-48   750 

V-27   640 

V-29   640 

S-35    700 

Total    60,180 

PERSONNEL  KILLED  AND  WOUNDED 

British:    Killed  or  missing 6,447 

Wounded    564 

Total    7,011 

German :  Killed  or  missing 2,400. 

Wounded    400  • 

Total    2,800 

(British  figures  quoted  from  Commander  Bellairs;  Ger- 
man figures  from  Admiral  Scheer.) 
[172] 


APPENDIX 

The  ship  damage  is  indicated  in  the  following 
table ; 

British  Ships  Damaged  and  Put  Out  of  Action 
Dreadnaught  Battleships 

Warspite Hit  by  major  caliber  shells  be- 
tween 20  and  25  times.  Re- 
joined fleet  during  July. 

Marlborough Torpedoed.     Continued  in  day 

action  but  was  forced  to  fall 
out  during  night. 

British  Ships  Damaged  But  Not  Put  Out  of  Action 
Battle  Cruisers 

Lion .Hit   many   times.      One  turret 

put  out  of  action. 
Tiger Hit  a  considerable  number  of 

times. 
Princess  Royal Hit   a  considerable  number  of 

times.    One  turret  put  out  of 

action. 

New  Zealand Hit  several  times. 

Dreadnaught  Battleships 

Barham Hit  by  about  five  heavy  shells. 

Malaya Hit  by  about  eight  heavy  shells. 

Colossus Hit  by  one  heavy  shell. 

Light  Cruisers 

Calliope .Hit  by  one  heavy  shell  and  by 

several  lighter  shells. 
DvbUn Hit  many  times  by  small  caliber 

shells, 
Southampton  ,...,.  Hit  many  times  by  small  caliber 

shells  (89  casualties). 
Chester  ....... . . .  .Hit   many   times    and   severely 

damaged      (81      casualties). 

Enjoined  fleet  on  July  29. 
[173] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

German  Vessels  Considerably  Damaged 

(Number  of  Hits  Approximate  Only) 
Battle  Cruisers   (4) 

Derfflmger 25  hits 

Seydlitz   25  hits ;  1  torpedo  hit 

Moltke 5  hits 

Von  der  Tann.  .i 4  hits 

Battleships  (4) 

Koenig     „    7  hits 

Grosser  Ktirfurst    ....     7  hits 

Markgraf  13  hits 

Ostfriesland   1  mine 

Destroyers  (2) 

G-40   Engines  damaged 

S-32    Boilers  damaged 

German  Vessels  Moderately  Damaged 

Dreadnaught  Battleships  (2) 

Heligoland    1  hit 

Kaiser    1  hit 

Predreadnaught  Battleship  (1) 
Holstein   1  hit 

Light  Cruisers  (5) 

Frankfurt    4  small  caliber  hits 

PUlau   1  large  caliber  hit 

Stettvn    2  small  caliber  hits 

Munchen   6  small  caliber  hits 

Hamburg    4  small  caliber  hits 

In  addition  several  ships  were  hit  by  small  caliber  shells 
fired  by  British  destroyers  during  the  night  action  and  a 
few  destroyers  were  hit  and  slightly  damaged. 
[174] 


APPENDIX 

DESIGN  OF  WAR  SHIPS  AS  AFFECTED  BY 
JUTLAND 

The  following  excerpts  are  taken  from  a  paper  by  Rear 
Admiral  D.  W.  Taylor,  Chief  Constructor,  U.  S.  Navy 
(The  Franklin  Institute) : 

The  losses  and  heavy  damages  sustained  by  the  vessels 
of  battle  cruiser  type  bear  out  to  some  extent  the  pre-war 
contentions  of  those  who  maintained  that  it  was  not  fit  to 
take  its  place  in  the  line  of  battle.  On  the  other  hand, 
excepting  their  greater  vulnerability,  it  cannot  be  denied 
that  they  acquitted  themselves  with  credit  even  when  pitted 
against  the  more  heavily  armed  and  armored  battleship. 

Another  result  from  this  action  of  general  influence  on 
type  is  found  in  connection  with  the  use  of  older  battle- 
ships, generally  referred  to  as  of  the  "predreadnaught" 
era.  The  German  Fleet  included  one  squadron  of  vessels 
of  this  type,  and  this  squadron  not  only  failed  to  be  of  any 
essential  assistance  to  them  but  proved  actually  to  be  a 
handicap  on  their  freedom  of  maneuver.  The  force  of  this 
lesson  was  shown  by  the  fact  that  subsequent  to  the  battle 
most  of  the  German  battleships  of  this  type  were  retired 
from  active  commission.  The  material  weakness  of  this 
type  of  older  ships,  when  opposed  to  the  most  modem 
weapons,  was  shown  in  the  case  of  the  PoTmnern,  which 
blew  up  and  sank  immediately  as  a  result  of  a  single 
torpedo.  During  the  war  there  were  sunk  by  hostile  ac- 
tion 21  predreadnaught  battleships  and  27  armored 
cruisers;  of  this  total  of  48,  11  were  sunk  by  gun-fire  and 
37  by  mine  or  torpedo,  only  a  single  explosion  in  nearly 
every  case  being  necessary  to  inflict  the  fatal  damage. 

The  ability  of  the  large,  modern,  heavily-armored  ships 
not  only  to  survive,  but  to  continue  in  action  after  the 
most  severe  punislmient,  was  perhaps  best  shown  by  the 
British  battleship  WarspitCy  which,  due  to  an  unfortunate 

[175] 


/ 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

accident  to  the  steering  gear,  sheered  out  of  the  battle 
line  and  made  two  complete  circles  within  short  range  of 
the  German  Fleet.  This  vessel  was  hit  by  major  caliber 
shell  between  20  and  25  times.  The  net  result  of  this  tre- 
mendous hammering  was  that  one  out  of  eight  15-inch 
guns  was  put  out  of  action;  there  was  no  damage  of  any 
kind  to  her  main  machinery  plant ;  the  upper  works  and 
unprotected  portions  of  the  ship  were  riddled ;  communica- 
tions were  interrupted  to  a  considerable  extent ;  and  some 
compartments  at  and  below  the  waterline  were  flooded 
by  water  which  came  in  from  above,  but  none  of  the  main 
compartments  were  affected  to  such  an  extent  that  the 
entering  water  could  not  be  handled  by  the  pumping  ar- 
rangements provided.  In  short,  although  the  sliip  had  lost 
a  certain  amount  of  her  margin  of  safety,  due  to  decreased 
buoyancy  and  stability,  and  her  speed  had  suffered  on  ac- 
count of  increased  resistance  due  to  her  greater  draft,  she 
was  entirely  capable  of  resuming  action  after  adjustments 
to  her  steering  gear. 

The  Marlborough  was  another  example  of  a  battleship 
continuing  in  action  after  receiving  what  we  were  inclined 
formerly  to  consider  would  be  a  disabling  attack.  This 
vessel,  although  of  the  "dreadnaught"  era,  has  not  what 
is  now  considered  a  highly  efficient  form  of  protection 
against  torpedo  attack,  yet,  after  being  struck  by  a  tor- 
pedo, resulting  in  the  flooding  of  a  number  of  compart- 
ments, which  produced  a  list  of  about  7  degrees,  the  vessel 
continued  in  action  at  a  speed  of  17  knots. 

Similarly,  the  German  battleship  Ostfriesland  (of  the 
"dreadnaught"  era)  was  struck  by  a  torpedo  which  pro- 
duced some  flooding,  but  the  vessel  was  otherwise  unaf- 
fected and  continued  on  with  the  German  Fleet. 

No  other  British  battleships  received  any  considerable 
amount  of  punishment,  but  three  of  the  modem  German 
ships  of  this  class  received,  respectively,  7,  7  and  13  hits 
[176] 


APPENDIX 

from  major  caliber  guns,  but  none  of  them  were  disabled 
or  even  damaged  to  an  extent  sufficient  to  prevent  their 
continuing  in  action.  The  Markgraf,  which  was  struck  13' 
times,  is  a  particularly  illuminating  example  of  the  amount 
of  punishment  which  a  modem  heavily  armored  ship  can 
stand.  The  only  damage  affecting  the  efficiency  of  the 
ship  was  the  cutting  of  the  communications  from  the 
masthead  fire  control  positions,  and  this  only  resulted  in 
shifting  the  control  to  the  lower  armored  station  pro- 
vided for  this  purpose.  The  casualties  on  this  ship  were 
likewise  remarkably  low,  as  there  were  only  8  dead  and  9 
wounded,  or  only  a  little  more  than  one  casualty  for 
each  major  caliber  hit. 

One  particular  class  of  hit  of  special  interest  to  Ameri- 
can^ designers  is  that  in  which  turrets  or  their  barbettes 
have  been  hit.  Taking  the  case  of  four  British  and  four 
German  vessels  which  suffered  heavy  damage,  it  is  found 
that  out  of  a  total  of  about  116  hits,  19,  or  16.5  per  cent, 
were  on  turrets  or  barbettes,  of  which  16  were  struck. 
Of  this  number,  four  were  completely  put  out  of  action 
and  one  gun  in  each  of  four  others  was  disabled,  while  the 
remaining  eight  escaped  without  serious  damage.  In  other 
words,  out  of  66  big  guns  carried  by  these  ships,  the  em- 
placements of  32  were  struck,  but  only  12  were  sufficiently 
damaged  to  prevent  their  further  use.  This  comparatively 
low  proportion  of  casualty  in  the  major  off'ensive  arma- 
ment, together  with  the  demonstration  of  the  ability  of 
the  mechanism  of  a  turret  to  continue  to  function  even 
after  the  turret  has  had  a  direct  hit,  appears  to  dispose 
of  the  argument  of  "too  many  eggs  in  one  basket"  so  fre- 
quently advanced  against  the  American  three-gun  turret. 

Turning  to  the  damage  sustained  by  the  battle  cruisers, 
one's  attention  is  naturally  taken  first  by  the  tragic  loss 
of  the  three  great  British  vessels  of  this  type.  Although 
in  one  case  the  Germans  claimed  a  torpedo  liit  on  one  of 

[177] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

them,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  loss  of  all  three  was 
directly  attributable  to  gun-fire,  but  the  immediate  cause 
of  the  loss  in  each  case  is  still,  and  always  will  be,  shrouded 
in  mystery.  It  is,  of  course,  known  that  each  one  sank  in 
an  appallingly  short  interval  of  time  and  that  in  each  case 
at  least  a  portion  of  the  magazines  blew  up.  The  mystery 
lies  in  the  immediate  cause  of  the  magazine  explosion. 
Many  different  explanations  have  been  advanced,  but  all 
of  these  affect  details  rather  than  the  general  character- 
istics of  type.  There  seems  little  doubt  that  one  of  two 
things  happened :  German  shell  either  entered  the  magazine 
through  penetration  of  the  protective  deck,  or,  having 
pierced  turret  or  barbette  and  exploded,  flame  was  com- 
municated to  the  magazine  along  the  path  followed  by  the 
ammunition  from  magazine  to  gun.  From  the  fact  that  in 
the  case  of  British  ships  that  survived,  there  was  only  one 
case  of  penetration  below  the  protective  deck  at  any  part 
(no  harm  resulted  from  this),  it  would  seem  to  be  highly 
improbable  that  the  three  battle  cruisers  were  all  sunk  by 
protective  deck  penetrations  directly  over  the  magazines, 
and  not  very  probable  that  any  one  of  them  was  so  sunk. 
We  must  not  permit  our  judgment  to  be  swayed  too 
largely  by  this  particularly  spectacular  phase  of  the 
battle.  Just  as  in  the  case  of  the  battleships  previously 
referred  to,  the  remaining  battle  cruisers  on  both  sides 
demonstrated  ability  of  modem  ships  of  large  size  to  with- 
stand heavy  punishment  without  losing  their  fighting  effi- 
ciency. The  battle  cruiser  type  is  essentially  and  unavoid- 
ably less  thoroughly  protected  than  the  battleship  type. 
This  greater  vulnerability  must  result  in  greater  loss  of 
the  battle  cruiser  type,  other  things  being  equal;  but  in 
the  Jutland  fight  the  battle  cruisers  were  engaged  much 
longer  and  much  more  severely  than  the  battleships,  so 
that  a  greater  percentage  of  loss  of  this  type  should  have 
[178] 


APPENDIX 

resulted  even  had  their  protection  been  equal  to  that  of 
the  battleships. 

A  notable  fact  in  regard  to  the  modem  ships,  both  bat- 
tleships and  battle  cruisers,  on  both  sides,  is  that  not  a 
single  one  experienced  a  disabling  casualty  to  its  machin- 
ery, either  as  a  result  of  damage  from  enemy  fire  or  as  a 
result  of  engineering  breakdown.  In  the  case  of  one  Brit- 
ish ship  and  one  Gennan  ship,  fires  were  drawn  from  under 
the  boilers  in  one  fireroom,  due  in  each  case  to  leakage 
from  adjacent  compartments,  but  in  each  case  this  leakage 
was  controlled  by  the  pumping  plant  provided  for  the 
purpose.  Leaving  out  the  three  lost  battle  cruisers,  for 
which  no  data  are  available,  the  dozen  large  ships  in  the 
two  fleets  which  bore  the  brunt  of  the  punishment  were  hit 
a  total  of  about  150  times  by  large  caliber  shell,  or  an  av- 
erage of  more  than  12  times  each.  Only  one  of  these  dozen 
ships,  namely,  the  German  battle  cruiser  Lutzow,  sank 
as  the  result  of  the  damage  received.  Even  this  vessel 
sank  only  after  six  hours.  She  had  received  17  large 
caliber  hits  and  one  torpedo.  She  continued  to  try  to 
make  the  best  of  her  way  to  port,  but  the  struggle  was 
given  up  about  one  o'clock  in  the  morning;  her  crew  was 
taken  off  by  destroyers  and  she  was  finally  sunk  by  a 
friendly  toi-pedo. 

The  results  of  the  battle,  as  a  test  of  the  defensive 
qualities  of  capital  ships,  show  that  in  the  entire  action 
only  four  modern  armored  ships,  all  of  them  of  the  battle 
cruiser  type,  were  lost  as  a  result  of  the  action.  This  was 
out  of  a  total  of  14  engaged  and  at  least  seven  out  of  the 
remaining  10  survived  heavier  punishment  than  most  de- 
signers in  pre-war  days  would  have  considered  possible. 

Before  the  war  there  were  two  distinct  schools  of  naval 
thought  in  regard  to  the  main  armament  for  the  largest 
fighting  ships.  This  difference  of  opinion  existed  inter- 
nally in   probably   every  navy,  but   internationally   the 

[179] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

American  and  Britisli  navies  represented  the  "Big  Gun'* 
advocates,  as  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  the  former  we 
find  successive  increases  from  12-inch  to  14-inch  to 
16-inch,  and  in  the  latter  from  12-inch  to  131/2-inch  to 
15-inch.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Germans  adhered  for  a 
number  of  years  to  the  11 -inch  gun  and  increased  their 
caliber  to  12-inch  with  apparent  reluctance,  and  a  larger 
caliber  did  not  appear  until  close  to  the  end  of  the  war. 
There  were  undoubtedly  excellent  theoretical  arguments 
on  both  sides  of  this  contention.  Even  now  the  argument 
cannot  be  definitely  settled  in  terms  of  absolute  material 
results,  for  too  many  other  factors,  which  cannot  be  elim- 
inated, enter  into  the  problem.  A  convincing  answer,  how- 
ever, appears  to  be  provided  in  the  very  decided  trend  of 
German  naval  opinion  since  the  Battle  of  Jutland.  Prac- 
tically every  report  from  German  sources  and  every  Ger- 
man publication  bearing  on  the  Battle  of  Jutland  lays 
stress  on  the  superiority  in  range  and  accuracy  of  the 
British  15-inch  guns.  Even  if  no  definite  material  advan- 
tage for  the  larger  caliber  gun  could  be  established,  there 
appears  to  remain  a  marked  moral  superiority  on  the  side 
possessing  the  biggest  guns.  This,  of  course,  only  con- 
firms the  previous  views  and  policies  followed  in  our 
service. 

Summing  up,  therefore,  we  find  that  four  outstanding 
facts  of  interest  to  the  designer  appear  to  emerge  from 
the  smoke  and  flames  of  the  battle : 

V       First.     The  value  of  armor  protection. 

j/  Second.  As  a  corollary  to  this,  the  necessity  for  the 
maximum  number  of  major  caliber  guns ;  for,  if  the  mod- 
em ship  can  withstand  great  punishment,  we  must,  for 
purposes  of  offense,  provide  a  sufficient  number  of  guns 
to  inflict  a  degree  of  punishment  which  will  be  fatal. 
y  Third.  The  tactical  value  of  speed. 
[180] 


APPENDIX 

V^  Fourth.  The  futility  of  subjecting  older  ships  to  the 
attack  of  modem  weapons. 

In  other  words,  the  value  of  each  one  of  the  three  major 
elements  entering  into  capital  ship  design  was  demon- 
strated and  it  cannot  be  said  that  any  single  one  has 
emerged  with  an  importance  transcending  that  of  the 
others.  If,  however,  one  must  choose  among  them,  the 
consensus  of  opinion  will  probably  attach  more  impor- 
tance to  protection  than  before  the  battle.  This  arises 
largely  from  two  causes : 

1st.  The  deep  impression  on  the  human  mind  by  such 
an  outstanding  tragedy  as  the  almost  instantaneous  loss 
of  the  three  great  British  battle  cruisers. 

2d.  The  impression  that  German  ships,  generally 
speaking,  stood  punishment  better  than  the  English.  Ad- 
miral von  Tirpitz  has  been  reported  to  have  laid  down  as 
the  fundamental  principle  of  German  design:  That  ves- 
sels before  everything  else  must  float ;  that  they  must  not 
sink,  and  if  possible,  not  even  list,  and  that  all  else  is  of 
secondary  importance. 

This  emphasis  on  the  feature  of  protection  is  shown 
already  by  the  intensified  and  successful  efforts  of  both 
the  British  and  the  American  navies  to  perfect  an  efficient 
form  of  torpedo  protection.  In  this  connection,  I  tliink  I 
can  safely  say  that  both  services  have  solved  this  problem 
so  far  as  the  toi-pedo  has  been  developed  to  date.  It  is 
also  interesting  to  know  that  during  the  war  the  two 
services  frankly  and  fully  compared  their  solutions  of  this 
problem,  and  that  although  the  solutions  differ  radically 
in  details,  they  do  not  differ  much  in  underlying  ideas  and 
both  are  believed  to  be  successful  in  result.  This  emphasis 
of  the  protective  feature  is  further  shown  by  the  fact  that 
our  battle  cruisers,  whose  construction  was  delayed,  due 
to  the  necessity  for  our  concentrating  on  the  construction 
of  torpedo  craft  and  merchant  vessels  during  the  war, 

[181] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

have  been  re-designed  and  given  much  heavier  and  more 
complete  protection  than  was  originally  contemplated,  ac- 
cepting at  the  same  time  the  slight  decrease  in  speed  neces- 
sitated thereby.  We  find  precisely  the  same  influence  in 
the  case  of  the  latest  British  battle  cruiser,  the  Hood, 
which  was  laid  down  shortly  after  the  battle  of  Jutland 
and  in  wliich  we  find  more  than  a  50  per  cent  increase  in 
size  as  compared  to  the  Renown,  which  I  have  previously 
referred  to,  an  increase  of  protection  almost  to  a  battle- 
ship standard  and  a  decrease  in  speed. 

Passing  to  the  general  phases  of  the  war,  we  come  at 
once  to  the  outstanding  feature  of  the  war  at  sea,  the 
submarine  campaign  and  the  methods  adopted  to  combat 
it.  Now  that  the  veil  of  secrecy  has  been  lifted,  we  all 
know  how  close  the  German  submarine  campaign  came  to 
being  an  outstanding  factor  in  the  final  result.  Without 
entering  into  the  legality  and  ethics  of  the  German  use 
of  the  submarine  against  merchant  shipping,  which  all 
thoughtful  and  enlightened  men  join  in  condemning,  we 
cannot  escape  the  fact  that  we  must  in  the  future  be  pre- 
pared to  find  the  submarine  playing  an  important  part 
in  attacking  and  throttling  enemy  commerce,  even  on 
their  own  coasts.  The  use  of  submarines  during  the  war 
has  led  to  placing  very  great  emphasis  on  the  value  of 
radius  of  action  of  these  vessels,  and  with  radius  of  action 
there  must  go  hand  in  hand  improvements  in  the  living 
conditions  on  board,  so  that  the  physical  endurance  of 
the  personnel  may  be  sufficiently  conserved  to  permit  it 
to  make  full  use  of  the  material  capabilities  of  the  vessel. 
Both  of  these  elements,  even  without  the  usual  and  con- 
current demands,  for  higher  speed  and  greater  offensive 
power,  inevitably  lead  to  increased  size,  except  for  a 
limited  class  of  small  boats,  which,  due  to  a  particular 
strategic  situation,  such  as  that  occupied  by  the  Germans 
on  the  Belgian  Coast,  makes  it  possible  to  use  with  good 
[182] 


APPENDIX 

results  a  large  number  of  submarines  of  small  size  and 
limited  speed  and  cruising  radius.  The  technic  of  mine- 
laying  has,  during  the  war,  so  kept  pace  with  the 
strategical  and  tactical  demands  for  the  use  of  this 
weapon,  that  the  demonstrated  practicability  of  laying 
them  on  the  enemy's  coast  by  means  of  submarines  must 
in  the  future  be  taken  into  account,  but  this  does  not 
affect  the  general  characteristics  of  the  type,  as  the  mine- 
laying  feature  can  easily  be  substituted  in  whole  or  in 
part  for  the  torpedo  armament.  Although  the  submarine 
was  throughout  the  war  something  of  a  disappointment 
in  the  actual  results  which  it  obtained  in  inflicting  loss 
or  damage  on  the  fighting  ships  of  the  enemy,  its  indirect 
effect  on  the  freedom  of  the  action  of  the  main  fighting 
fleets  was  so  considerable  that  the  problem  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  so-called  fleet  submarine  is  still  with  us  and 
must  be  solved  largely  from  theoretical  and  engineering 
considerations,  rather  than  from  direct  experience  in  ac- 
tion. Another  use  of  the  submarine,  not  largely  foreseen, 
which  developed  considerable  importance  during  the  war, 
is  that  of  scouting.  It  has  been  conclusively  demon- 
strated that  these  undei'water  craft  form  one  of  the  most 
valuable  assets  to  a  navy  in  obtaining  and  transmitting 
infomiation  in  regard  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy's 
forces. 

War  experience  developed  and  emphasized  certain  facts 
regarding  submarines  as  a  type  which  are  very  important 
from  the  point  of  view  of  a  designer,  and  even  more  im- 
portant from  the  point  of  view  of  those  who  have  to  de- 
termine the  constitution  of  a  navy.  The  submarine  is 
essentially  an  instrument  of  stealth.  Once  detected,  it 
must  take  refuge  in  the  depths  where,  for  any  design  as 
yet  known,  its  off'ensive  powers  become  nil,  and  to  the 
depth  charge  or  explosive  bomb  developed  during  the  war 
it  is  exceedingly  vulnerable.     In  other  words,  once  de- 

[183] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

tected  and  accurately  located,  a  submarine  is  at  the  mercy 
of  a  surface  vessel.  While  detection  devices,  in  spite  of 
the  enormous  effort  expended  upon  them  during  the  war, 
did  not  reach  perfection,  they  made  much  progress  and 
will  undoubtedly  be  steadily  improved  as  time  goes  on. 
If  we  had  to-day  an  accurate  device  which  would  locate 
a  submerged  submarine  with  reasonable  approximation 
several  miles  off,  and  with  accuracy  when  one  or  two 
hundred  feet  directly  under  the  surface  vessel,  the  sub- 
marine would  be  already  obsolete  as  a  weapon  of  war. 
While  we  may  never  reach  this  ideal,  and  while  the  sub- 
marine may  be  given  offensive  features  to  enable  it  to 
deal  in  some  fashion  with  the  surface  vessel  from  beneath 
the  surface,  the  submarine  is  essentially  a  vulnerable,  and, 
if  I  may  so  express  it,  a  precarious  type ;  is  necessary  to- 
day and  probably  will  be  for  many  years  to  come,  but 
could  not  be  relied  upon  as  the  main  feature  of  a  navy. 
We  read  at  times  of  proposed  submersible  battleships  and 
other  such  imaginations,  but  the  experience  of  the  war 
does  not  seem  to  indicate  this  as  a  probable  future  de- 
velopment even  if  mechanically  possible. 

On  this  same  subject  Sir  Eustace  d'Eyncourt,  the  Di- 
rector of  Naval  Construction  for  the  British  Admiralty, 
very  recently  stated  his  views  in  the  course  of  a  paper 
presented  before  the  British  Institution  of  Naval  Archi- 
tects.   He  said: 

"A  good  deal  has  been  written  and  talked  of  lately 
about  the  surface  capital  ship  being  dead  and  the  neces- 
sity for  submersibles.  But  with  our  present  knowledge  it 
would  be  quite  impossible  to  design  a  submersible  ship 
which  on  the  same  displacement  and  cost  had  anything 
like  the  fighting  qualities  on  the  surface,  which  are  pos- 
sessed by  the  Hood  (the  latest  British  battle  cruiser). 
Every  ship  is  a  compromise,  and  if  in  addition  to  the 
ordinary  qualities  of  a  battleship,  she  is  required  to  sub- 
[184] 


APPENDIX 

merge,  or  even  partially  submerge,  a  very  considerable 
percentage  of  weight  has  to  be  added  to  give  her  this  ad- 
ditional capability  of  submergence.  She  becomes  still 
more  of  a  compromise,  and  the  added  weight  must  detract 
from  the  fighting  qualities  of  the  ship  when  on  the  sur- 
face, so  that  whatever  is  done,  other  things  being  equal, 
the  submersible  ship  must  be  inferior  to  a  surface  ship 
in  an  ordinary  action.  There  are  many  difficulties  of 
details  in  the  design  of  a  submersible  battleship  which 
would  take  too  long  to  go  into  fully  now,  and  although 
there  is  no  doubt  that  submarines  are  capable  of  great 
development,  a  little  thought  will  make  it  clear  to  any- 
body that  if  naval  warfare  is  to  continue,  the  surface 
ship  of  the  line  must  still  hold  the  field  as  the  principal 
fighting  unit  of  any  great  navy." 

The  actual  offensive  use  of  aircraft  against  naval  ves- 
sels was  little  developed  during  the  war.  Perhaps  the 
most  prominent  case  was  that  of  the  Goeben,  wliich  was 
ashore  near  the  Dardanelles,  and  for  six  days  exposed 
to  aircraft  attack,  it  being  stated  that  some  217  bombs 
were  dropped  against  her.  There  is  no  doubt  that  there 
will  be  a  great  development  of  aircraft  for  naval  use  as 
a  result  of  the  war  experience,  and  some  enthusiasts  have 
visions  of  navies  of  the  air  rendering  obsolete  the  navies 
of  the  ocean. 

The  United  States  Navy,  which  has  in  its  own  hands 
the  development  and  control  of  its  aircraft  for  use  over 
the  water,  should  take  lead  in  any  air  naval  development ; 
but  there  is  no  doubt  that,  step  by  step  with  the  air  of- 
fensive, there  will  be  developed  a  defensive.  The  defensive, 
moreover,  will  not  be  passive.  We  have  seen  in  the  late 
war  how  the  light  craft,  destroyers,  etc.,  on  one  side  met 
and  countered  the  attacks  of  similar  craft  on  the  other 
side.  Had  either  side  been  deprived  of  its  light  craft,  it 
would  have  been  at  most  serious  disadvantage.    Similarly, 

[185] 


WHAT  HAPPENED  AT  JUTLAND 

developments  in  the  air  will  undoubtedly  be  along  the 
line  of  defending-  the  capital  ship  by  auxiliary  and  of- 
fensive aircraft.  The  big  ship  which  must  be  protected 
from  projectiles  of  a  ton  weight  falling  at  angles  of  30 
degrees,  fired  from  ships  almost  out  of  sight  below  the 
horizon,  is  not  yet  in  serious  danger  from  bombs  carried 
by  present-day  aircraft,  with  chances  of  hitting  small 
indeed. 

At  the  moment  it  appears  that  the  torpedo  plane  is  the 
most  promising  development ;  its  weapon  of  attack  is  the 
torpedo  which  the  capital  ship  must  already  be  prepared 
to  defend  itself  from,  whether  fired  by  a  surface  vessel  or 
a  submarine.  A  torpedo  from  a  ship  in  the  air  is  no  more 
deadly  than  from  a  submarine  under  the  surface.  It 
seems  probable  that  aircraft  will  sooner  become  danger- 
ous to  destroyers  and  light  vessels  generally  than  to  the 
large  ships  of  the  line.  The  former  are  more  vulnerable 
and  will  be  less  able  to  protect  themselves. 

Even  these  early  developments  of  naval  uses  for  air- 
craft made  it  evident  that  they  could  not  efficiently  per- 
form such  functions  with  the  fleet  unless  they  could  be 
carried  with  the  fleet,  not  only  on  long  cruises  but  actu- 
ally in  battle,  with  the  result  that  special  types  of  ships 
have  appeared  to  fill  this  requirement.  The  first  essential 
of  this  type  is  that  it  should  be  capable  not  only  of 
launching  aeroplanes  but  also  of  receiving  them  back 
after  the  accomplishment  of  their  mission.  With  the 
present  development  of  aeroplanes  and  seaplanes,  the  only 
practicable  method  of  providing  the  latter  requirement 
is  the  provision  of  an  enormously  large  and  absolutely 
clear  deck  upon  which  the  planes  can  light  and  be  brought 
to  rest.  The  next  requirement  is  that  such  a  vessel  shall 
have  a  speed  sufficient  to  permit  it  to  keep  up  with  the 
main  battle  fleet  when  it  is  going  into  action.  This  means 
a  speed  of  20  to  25  knots.  These  qualities,  together  with 
[186] 


APPENDIX 

the  need  for  sufficient  space  to  house  and  care  for  a  con- 
siderable number  of  planes,  together  with  their  personnel, 
have  resulted  in  vessels  of  10,000  to  25,000  tons  displace- 
ment. To  obtain  a  clear  upper  deck  requires  special  ar- 
rangements for  funnels,  navigating  bridges,  etc.,  which 
has  resulted  in  the  only  absolutely  new  type  of  naval 
vessels  of  large  size  and  cost  which  has  appeared  as  a 
result  of  the  war  experience. 


THE    END 


[187] 


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